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Abstract

As most of the countries in the world approach an aging society, security for the
aged emerges as one of the most important goals for a government to pursue. There are
two primary areas related to retirement income security: pension systems and inflationindexed bonds. Pension systems fall into three categories: public, corporate, and
individual pensions. Public pensions, such as Social Security in the United States, are
showing their limitation in securing retirement income because it is no longer easy to
maintain their solvency as the ratio of workers-to-retirees goes down. Because of this
limitation of public pensions, private pensions are gaining attention as methods to secure
retirement income.
A characteristic of retirement savings is long-term investment. It is furthermore
difficult to earn additional income after retirement. For these reasons, retirees are exposed
to inflation risk more than anyone else. The only financial products that guarantee returns
exceeding the inflation level are inflation-indexed bonds. They guarantee the bonds’
purchasing power by indexing principal and interest to inflation. Therefore, investing in
inflation-indexed bonds is essential to secure the real income of retirees. Financial
markets are another significant factor for retirement income security because they are
where pension funds and individual retirement savers invest to secure retirement income.
Pension systems, inflation-indexed bonds, and financial markets develop by influencing
one another. Therefore, facilitating the interaction of the three factors is essential to
strengthening retirement income security.

iv

The primary goal of this dissertation is to suggest reform measures for Korean
pension systems and inflation-indexed bonds. The dissertation examines the related
systems with which the United States has had an extensive experience compared with
Korea. Based on this examination, several suggestions are offered regarding how these
systems can be implemented efficiently and effectively in Korea.
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I.

Introduction

As the population of most countries in the world grows older, security for the
aged emerges as one of the most important goals for a government to pursue.
The United States has already entered this stage with the aging of its “baby
boomer” generation, and Korea1 is nearing that stage. Retirement income security has
become one of the biggest issues in Korea. In December 2005, Korea introduced
corporate pension systems2 as preparation for its aging society. However, as of
September 2007, only 4.8% of organizations qualifying for corporate pension systems
actually adopted them.3
Retirement savings are, in essence, long-term investments. Since it is difficult to
earn additional income after retirement, retirees are exposed to inflation risk4 more than
anyone else. The only financial products that guarantee returns exceeding inflation level
are inflation-indexed bonds.5 They guarantee the bonds’ purchasing power by indexing
principal and interest to inflation. Therefore, investing in inflation-indexed bonds is
necessary to secure a retiree’s real income.

1

Korea in this dissertation refers to the Republic of Korea (South Korea).
Korea introduced corporate pension systems by enacting the Korea Employee
Retirement Income Security Act which took effect in December 2005.
3
Press Release, Ministry of Labor of Korea, Twejikyongemjedo Doip Hyonhwang
[The Present State of Corporate Pension Systems] (Oct. 2007).
4
Inflation risk is “the risk of unanticipated changes in the purchasing power of the
nominal payments promised by the bond.” See Jeffrey M. Wrase, Inflation-Indexed Bonds: How
Do They Work?, BUSINESS REVIEW (FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA), July/Aug.
1997, at 4.
5
P Brett Hammond, Understanding and Using Inflation Bonds, RESEARCH DIALOGUE,
Sept. 2002, at 7.
2
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The Korean government began issuing inflation-indexed bonds in April 2007, but
the volume of the bonds is still insignificant.6 This is because inflation-indexed bond
systems, like corporate pension systems, have not yet taken root in Korea. This
dissertation proposes a plan for the increased use of inflection-indexed bonds for
retirement security in Korea.

A. Options for Income Security in Retirement
Pension systems for retiremint income security fall into three categories: public,
corporate and individual pensions. Both corporate and individual pensions can be
categorized as private pensions.
Public pensions such as Social Security are mandatory for everyone, and many
countries are currently debating public pension reforms because of financial solvency
issues. Public pension reforms have a variety of issues that include political, social and
economic aspects; therefore, it is difficult to find a solution that everyone supports. The
current trend seems to reduce public pensions. Reducing public pensions is already in
progress in many European countries.7 Korea amended the National Pension Act in 2007
to reduce pension benefits and maintain the amount of premium payment. This reflects
Korea’s concern about its own public pension fund’s financial solvency.
Korea needs to have efficient private pension systems to complement the
minimum standard of living set by the public pension system. Workers should make the

6

For example, Korean government inflation-indexed bonds accounts for only 4% of all
government bonds issued in December 2007 in terms of the par value of those bonds. See Press
Release, Ministry of Finance of Economy of Korea, Issuance of Government Bonds during
December 2007 (Dec. 18, 2007).
7
See JOHN TURNER, INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMINTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. DEBATE 12 (2006).

2

best use of private pension systems in order to enjoy a comfortable life even after
retirement. Accordingly, the importance of private pensions to retirement income security
is also gaining attention in Korea.8
Private pensions, consisting of corporate and individual pensions, already have a
central status among retiree protection systems in the United States. The importance of
private pensions is expected to attract more attention than before, because of Social
Security’s solvency issues.
Given the limits of public pension systems, additional sources of retirement
security are needed. Pension funds need to invest in inflation-indexed bonds because
retirement savings are long-term investments exposed to the inflation risk. However, only
some twenty countries have introduced inflation-indexed bonds, which have a relatively
short history.
As mentioned earlier, Korea also has a very short history of inflation-indexed
bonds; the issue and trade of inflation-indexed bonds are not yet thriving in Korea.
Furthermore, Korea has not issued corporate or municipal inflation-indexed bonds that
can be used as retirement savings vehicles along with government inflation-indexed
bonds. If inflation-indexed bonds take root in Korean financial markets, Korea will have
an opportunity for healthy development of private pensions. Additionally, inflationindexed bonds are expected to help the development of Korean financial markets by

8

Korea has a strong Confucian tradition. Under the tradition, Koreans have thought that
children should support parents after parents lost the ability to earn income. Sons and daughters
still think that they bear a moral obligation to support parents. Because of this tradition, Koreans
did not keenly feel the necessity of retirement income security. Family was a safety net for social
security in Korea before the country introduced the National Pension system. The Confucian
tradition was a source of power that supported the elderly when Korea was poor. However, Korea
can no longer depend on family for retirement income security as the trend toward nuclear
families becomes conspicuous and living expenses increase.

3

increasing the demand for bonds, and facilitating the development of financial derivatives,
such as inflation SWAP and futures. They will also play a significant role as financing
vehicles for the government and corporations.
Revitalized pension systems will result in revitalized inflation-indexed bonds, and
vice versa. Pension funds increase the demand for inflation-indexed bonds, and the latter
facilitates asset/liability management of the former. Revitalized pension systems and
inflation-indexed bonds will lead to developed financial markets that promote the
operation of retirement savings products, thereby improving retirement income security.
The development of private pensions and inflation-indexed bonds should be
supported by legislation and regulation. The United States established the legal basis of
private pension systems by enacting the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in 1972. Since then, private pension systems have changed in many areas such
as pension eligibility and contribution limit. Such changes were made mainly through
reforming tax codes, such as the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997. In addition, the United States established the Pension Protection Act in 2006 to
reform pension systems. Various regulations concerning pension systems also have been
improved to serve the intent of related laws.
Korea had operated retirement allowance systems, a kind of defined benefit plan
unique to Korea, implemented according to the Korea Labor Standard Act. In 2005, the
Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act introduced corporate pensions.
Corporate pensions and retirement allowances operate simultaneously for the time being.
The United States is operating government inflation-indexed bond systems, such
as Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) and Series I Savings Bonds, according

4

to the Government Securities Act and the Sale of Treasury Securities Act. In addition, the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 should be considered
particularly with regard to corporate inflation-indexed bonds.
Korea is carrying out the Inflation-Linked Korean Treasury Bonds (KTBi) system
according to the State Credit Management Act and the State Bond Act. If Korea
introduces corporate inflation-indexed bonds, the Korea Securities and Exchange Act and
tax code should be reformed to support issuing of the new bonds.

B. Goals of Dissertation
This dissertation’s primary goal is to suggest reform measures for Korean private
pension systems and inflation-indexed bonds. For this purpose, the dissertation first
examines the related systems of the United States, a country with a long history and much
experience in private pension systems, and then draws suggestions for Korea.9 That is, it
derives reform measures for Korean pension and inflation-indexed bond systems by
comparing laws and regulations of the United States and Korea. The dissertation
develops those measures with a focus on retirement income security. Through comparing
the two countries’ systems, the dissertation suggests that Korea actively introduce the
strengths of the U.S. systems, while maintaining the advantages of Korean systems.
Section II examines pension systems overall, including both public and private
pensions. The first part of the section analyzes public pensions such as Social Security.

9

The saving rate of Korea is 31.4%, and that of the United States is 13.7% as of 2006.
This means that Koreans have advantage over Americans in terms of retirement income security.
Korea’s saving rate is one of the highest in the world. The high saving rate helped Koreans
prepare for retired life when Korea did not have pension systems. Recently Korea’s saving rate
keeps falling. The importance of pension systems is increasing in proportion to the decrease in the
saving rate.

5

The section helps put the importance of private pensions in perspective by explaining the
limitations of public pensions as protection for retirement income security. Although the
government should make every effort to secure retirement income, it has no choice but to
reduce its roles in security for the aged because of the budget solvency issues. The
remaining parts of the section examine corporate and individual pensions as
complementary measures for public pension systems. They also compare the United
States and Korean pension systems. Looking at the United States corporate pension
systems is particularly useful for Korean pension system development, because Korea has
less experience in operating its corporate pension systems. Furthermore, it is necessary
for Korea to take American examples into account because Korean corporate pension
systems were introduced on the basis of American systems. Although Korea introduced
American-style corporate pension systems, it also adjusted the systems to fit Korea’s
transitional situation. As Korea gets used to the new systems, it is expected to need
additional reforms. While the process of comparing two countries’ systems gives insight
on reform measures for Korean pension systems, it may also help reform the United
States pension systems. For example, Korean individual accounts, which apply to all
Koreans whether or not they are taxpayers who have earned income, can furnish the
United State with useful information to complement its existing private pension systems.
Section III addresses the relationship between retirees and inflation. A pension
system cannot succeed unless financial markets provide financial products in which
pension funds can effectively invest. For a financial product to be an effective investment
vehicle for pension funds, it is required to serve the funds’ primary goal of securing
retirement income. Retirees are vulnerable to inflation that decreases the real value of

6

income because they have few tools that compensate for the loss from inflation. For
example, younger workers can be compensated for inflation by higher wages. Retirees,
however, have no such inflation risk hedge tool. As mentioned earlier, inflation-indexed
bonds are the only financial product that maintains its own purchasing power until
maturity. Therefore, investing in inflation-indexed bonds is useful to secure retirement
income. The end of the section emphasizes the necessity of investing in inflation-indexed
bonds as financial vehicles for retirement income security, and briefly explains inflationindexed bonds.
Section IV gives an in-depth description of inflation-indexed bonds. This section
describes the key features of inflation-indexed bonds and reasons for issuing inflationindexed bonds. It also deals with tax and principal guarantee issues concerning inflationindexed bonds. Tax issues relate to taxation for increase in principal. As an inflation rate
rises, an inflation-indexed bond’s principal increases to compensate for the loss of the
bond’s real value.
Whether the government imposes a tax on this increase is an important issue for
an investor, because the taxation affects the real yield of the inflation-indexed bond that
the investor purchased. The United States and Korea have adopted different tax policies
with regard to increase in principal. The United States imposes a tax on increase in
principal, but Korea does not levy the tax, in order to attract investors to inflation-indexed
bond markets.
Whether the principal is guaranteed during deflation is another main issue
regarding inflation-indexed bonds. Because the bond’s principal changes according to
inflation rate, it is natural that the principal amount decreases when inflation rate falls
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below zero. However, some countries, such as the United States, guarantee the principal
of their government-issued inflation-indexed bonds, even if the country’s price level
decreases to deflation. This policy gives investors an incentive to invest in inflationindexed bonds. Because Korea does not adopt this policy, the comparison of the two
countries’ systems here provides another interesting contrast of policy. In addition, the
section explains different kinds of inflation-indexed bonds, including corporate and
municipal inflation-indexed bonds. It also examines the United States and Korean
regulations for these bonds. The comparison of the two countries’ inflation-indexed bond
systems is the first step to devise proper measures for reforming the Korean system.
Inflation-indexed bonds and financial markets, as well as pension systems,
function as protection for retirees. There are strong correlations among those three
systems with regard to protecting individuals entering retirement. Section V analyzes and
emphasizes such mutual relations. It shows that the interaction of those three systems can
strengthen retirement income security. First, the section examines the relationship
between pension systems and financial markets. Second, it analyzes the relationship
between inflation-indexed bonds and financial markets. Third, it examines the
relationship between pension funds and inflation-indexed bonds. Each part focuses on
how the two elements interact to improve retirement income security.
Section VI recommends reforms for the Korean retirement income security
system. The basic principal of the recommendation is to facilitate the interaction of
pension systems, inflation-indexed bonds and financial markets. This section suggests
reform measures for making each system positively influence the others. The reform
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measures include introducing new systems to Korea, as well as improving Korea’s
existing systems.
Section VII concludes this dissertation, reemphasizing the author’s basic
philosophies and ideas concerning the strengthening of retirement income security.
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II.

Pension Systems

A. Public Pensions: Social Security
1. Overview of Social Security Systems
Most countries in the world operate public pension systems. While such programs
are often expensive, they help avoid other social costs. If people in a country do not
prepare for their retired life and sink into poverty after retirement, the country might face
economic downturn and social unrest, and bear enormous economic and social costs.
These additional costs, in turn, would add to the tax burden of all citizens.10 As a result,
the government needs a public pension system as the foundation for retirement life. In
addition, because people often fail to save enough on their own for retirement, a
mandatory public pension system is necessary. Although insolvency questions of public
pension systems are being raised, public pension systems are still important to retirees
because they help retirees maintain at least a minimum standard of living.
The United States introduced public pension systems as social insurance in 1935
when many Americans were suffering in the aftermath of the Great Depression. The
Social Security Act encompasses many areas concerning social welfare11, but the main
part of the Act is the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI).12
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See National Pension Service, Gukminyongeumeui Teukjing [Characteristics of the
National Pension], http://www.nps.or.kr/jsppage/info/easy/easy_01_03.jsp (last visited Sep. 12,
2007)
11
Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, Unemployment Insurance
(OASDI), Temporary assistance to Needy Families, Health Insurance for Aged and Disabled
(Medicare), Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs (Medicaid), State Children’s
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
12
When Social Security is mentioned, it generally means the OASDI. Therefore, Social
Security in this paper also means OASDI.
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Under the Social Security13 system, American workers, according to the Federal
Insurance Contribution Act, must pay payroll taxes,14 the source of benefits for retirees.
Social Security is the so-called “Pay-As-You-Go” system as opposed to the funded
system in which beneficiaries receive benefits depending on the result of the fund’s
operation. The pay-as-you-go system gives beneficiaries benefits regardless of the fund’s
financial conditions. Current beneficiaries of Social Security receive retirement benefits
fixed by the Social Security Act. Benefits are funded by payroll taxes collected from
current workers and employers. Workers pay current payroll taxes with the hope of future
benefits. Therefore, Social Security system is a compact between two generations: one
gets present benefits and another is promised the same benefits later. The pay-as-you-go
system, however, cannot guarantee benefits to future generations because it does not save
current payroll taxes for future beneficiaries.15 This problem will only get worse as the
ratio of retirees to workers16 increases over the next several decades. As a result, the
financial solvency of Social Security is the major problem for the public pension system
today.

2. Social Security Reform
The financial solvency of Social Security is a central issue in American politics
today. Since the George W. Bush Administration published its report on Social Security
reform, the financial solvency problem of Social Security has come to the forefront in

Some scholars use the expression of Social Security instead of the Federal Old Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI). See Turner, supra note 7, at 7.
13
Notice that “Social Security” is capitalized.
14
I.R.C. § 3101 (2005).
15
See Turner, supra note 7, at 4.
16
The old-age dependency ratio. id.
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American politics and economics. The Administration’s proposals17 are basically to cut
taxes and expand individual’s contribution limits for defined contribution plans such as
401(k)18. The Administration also proposes a new type of individual account. Under these
proposals, individuals who pay payroll taxes are allowed to choose new individual
accounts to replace part or all19 of the Social Security that is expected to be a heavy
burden on the Federal budget. Individual accounts transfer some of the cost of Social
Security to private individual accounts that individuals manage for themselves.
There are, however, criticisms of this idea. Transferring part of Social Security
into individual accounts does not necessarily solve the Social Security’s financial
solvency problem. Critics argue new individual accounts are similar to a loan from the
Social Security fund.20 Although individuals do not pay payroll taxes on the amount they
invested in individual accounts, the Social Security system still assumes they paid payroll
taxes on the money invested in the accounts. This amount, in turn, is assigned its own
interest rate by the government.21 This hypothetical accrued principal and interest is not
given to the individuals after they retire, but is deducted by the Social Security system
from the individuals’ benefits. The hypothetical principal and interest are excluded from

17

See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION TO STRENGTHEN SOCIAL SECURITY, STRENGTHENING
SOCIAL SECURITY AND CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS (2001).
18
A kind of defined contribution plan that is one of the corporate pensions. See pp. 20-21
of this dissertation for details.
19
Individual accounts fall into two categories: carve-out accounts and add-on accounts.
The former replaces part or all of Social Security with the new individual accounts, while the
latter supplements Social Security. See pp. 27-28 of this dissertation for details of the types of the
new individual accounts.
20
See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Social Security Reform: Lessons from
Private Pensions, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 297, 313 (2007).
21
The specified interest rate is called “the offset rate.” See id.
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the Social Security benefits that they would have received if they had not invested in
individual accounts.22
This structure is essentially borrowing money from, and repaying it to, the Social
Security system. Workers who invest in individual accounts can use the new individual
accounts only if the yield of the accounts exceeds the offset rate of Social Security.
Whether the new individual accounts may solve the Social Security solvency problem is
uncertain at best. First, the offset rate is likely to be set by political considerations. If the
offset rate is above the individual account’s earning rate, the retirees who are to suffer a
loss from the individual account investment will pressure Congress to decrease the offset
rate.23 Second, transition costs cannot be ignored when part or all of the Social Security
system is converted into the individual account system.24 The government’s financial
support is needed during the period of transition from Social Security to the new
individual accounts system, because the Social Security system needs financial resources
to provide to the current Social Security beneficiaries.25 Therefore, the transition cost
would be a heavy burden on the Federal budget. The Social Security reform debates
continue.
Korea has the same problem as the United States in terms of public pension
system solvency issues. Korea’s birth rate is at the lowest level in the world. Korea is
expected to have one of the highest ratios of retirees to workers of any country.26 The
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See id.
See Turner, supra note 7, at 6.
24
See id.
25
See id.
26
Korea’s total fertility rate (TFR) as of 2006 is 1.13, the lowest among the OECD
countries. On the other hand, life expectancy of Korea during the period of 2005-2010 is 79.1,
higher than that of North America (78.5), Europe (74.6), and the world average (67.2). See Press
23
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Korean government, worried about its public pension system solvency, introduced a
public pension system reform bill to the National Assembly in 2003 and 2004.27 The
main reform measure of the bill was to increase the public pension insurance premium28
and, at the same time, to decrease benefits.29 The government submitted the bill to
maintain the solvency of the Korean public pension system, known as the National
Pension. Although the ruling party supported the bill, the National Assembly rejected the
bill because opposition parties argued the increase in insurance premiums would burden
workers. The government, since then, submitted amended bills to the National Assembly,
but the political parties could not agree. In 2007, finally, the political parties amended the
National Pension Act. The amended Act maintains the current insurance premium of 9%
of annual income, but reduces retirement benefits to 50% from 60% of annual average
income prior to retirement. This amendment is the result of political negotiations. It is
still questionable whether or how much the reform measure can help the solvency of the
National Pension Fund. This process of amending the National Pension Act shows just
how difficult reform of the public pension system is.

Release, Korea National Statistical Office, Segewa Hangukeui Inguhyonhwang [Population
Statistics of the World and Korea] (July 10, 2007).
27
In Korea, the government (executive branch), without lawmakers’ involvement, can
introduce a bill to the National Assembly, which is the equivalent of the U.S. Congress.
28
The public pension system of Korea is different from that of the United States in terms
of form. Koreans pay insurance premiums, not payroll taxes, to the National Pension Service, not
to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
29
According to the bill, a worker’s annual insurance premium increases from 9% of his
annual income to 12.9%, and his benefits after retirement decreases from 60% of his average
annual income prior to retirement to 50%. In addition, the bill proposed the increase and decrease
be incrementally applied until 2018.
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3. Importance of Strengthening Private Pension Systems
As shown above, reforming public pension systems is difficult. Nevertheless, the
debates will continue because of the urgency of budget solvency. Even if comprehensive
reform of the system is not easy, partial reform is possible at any time.
If the reform of public pension systems leads to budget stability, more
government resources will be available for investment in public infrastructure. This
increase in public investment would raise the standard of living of all people including
retirees. These results, however, cannot be achieved unless private pension systems
compensate for any reduction of public pension benefits. Therefore, private pension
systems now may matter more to workers than public pension systems. To support
retirees effectively, it is essential to have better private pension systems. This is the
reason to reform the existing private pension systems.

B. Private Pensions
Private pension systems fall into two categories: corporate and individual
pensions. Employers provide corporate pensions, and workers manage individual
pensions without the employer’s involvement. Examples of corporate pensions include
defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans and their modifications. Individual
pensions include Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and individual accounts.
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1. Corporate Pensions
a. Defined Benefit Plans
Defined benefit plans give retirees a percentage of their average income as
promised by the employer.30 Under defined benefit plans, the employer reserves a
percentage of the employee’s wage to pay retirement benefits. The employer invests the
money in financial products. If there is a return on the investment, the employer can keep
the money left after paying the employee defined benefits. The employer, however, is
bound to pay the promised benefits even if it suffered investment loss. In short, under a
defined benefit plan, the employer bears the financial risk of the investment.31
Additionally, the employer must hire an actuary and pay premiums to the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in preparation for the company’s default situation.32
The corporate pension system of Korea is based on the model of the United States.
Korea only first introduced the corporate pension system in 2005 by enacting the Korea
Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Therefore, Korea needs some time for its
corporate pension system to take root in the country. To help promote the system, the
Korean legislature lessened the burden of employers who adopted the new corporate
pension system: employers who adopted defined benefit plans were not required to buy
insurance for default of pension benefit payments. Therefore, Korea does not have
pension benefit insurance institutions such as the PBGC of the United States.
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See Pamela D. Perdue, Types of Qualified Retirement Plans, SM058 ALI-ABA 29, 33

31

See id.
See id. at 36

(2007)
32
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Another measure was taken to help defined benefit plans take root in Korean
society: according to the Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act, employers
operating defined benefit plans must have at least sixty percent of pension benefits
managed by financial institutions.33 This provision forces employers to use outside
financial institutions. Before adopting the corporate pension system, Korea had a unique
system for retirement income security. Employers had an obligation to pay a retirement
allowance to their retiring employees. A retirement allowance is similar to a defined
benefit plan in that the employer pays an employee an amount specified in advance by
the employer.34 However, under this plan, the employer need not set aside specific funds.
This means the employer need not place resources for retirees in outside financial
institutions. Under this system, employees lose their retirement allowances if the
employer goes bankrupt. Therefore, the newly introduced defined benefit system helps
protect employees from nonpayment of retirement compensation. The Korean
government explains to workers that the defined benefit plan is better for organizations
with a seniority wage system or a sound financial condition so workers do not have to
worry about nonpayment.35

33

Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 12 (2007); Enforcement Decree of
the Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 9 (2006).
34
The retirement allowance was provided by the Labor Standard Act, but it is now
provided by the Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act (§§ 8-11).
35
MINISTRY OF LABOR OF KOREA, ALGISHIUN TWEJIKYONGEMJE [EXPLANATION OF
CORPORATE PENSION SYSTEMS] 11 (2006)
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b. Defined Contribution Plans
Defined contribution plans are the ones where the employer contributes a certain
level of the employee’s salary to the pension fund that, in turn, is invested according to
the employee’s instruction. While employees under defined benefit plans can get
specified pension benefits regardless of the result of investment of the employer, under
defined contribution plans, employees receive their benefits based on the results of their
own investment choices. Therefore, unlike defined benefit plans, defined contribution
plans place the financial risk on employees. The employee under defined contribution
plans has his own account that accumulates pension benefits resulting from his own
investments.36 In defined contribution plans, the employee can earn investment gains
exceeding the amount of money that she would have received if she had chosen defined
benefit plans. On the other hand, the employee also can suffer significant losses if she
fails to use an effective investment strategy. This is because the employer has no
obligation to guarantee his employee a specified amount of pension benefits. The only
obligation of the employer is to contribute a promised amount of money to the pension
fund. Therefore, investment gains or losses are borne by the employee, not the employer.
Another advantage for employers under defined contribution plans is not having to pay
for actuaries or insurance for the PBGC.37
There are four types of defined contribution plans under the United States
corporate pension systems. The first is profit sharing plans where an employer shares

36
37

See Perdue, supra note 30, at 32.
See id. at 36.
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profits with employees.38 The employer’s contribution, however, can be made regardless
of whether the employer gained profits.39 The employer may also decide whether to
contribute to a pension fund or how much to do so.40 This contribution “flexibility” is the
most prominent feature of profit sharing plans.41 Profit sharing plans also allow
employees to withdraw benefits accumulated for them before retirement.42
Money purchase pension plans are the second type of defined contribution plans.
In contrast to profit sharing plans, they do not allow employers to vary the contribution.43
Employers must fix a percentage of an employee’s salary as the amount of contribution
for the employee.44 Another difference is that money purchase plans do not permit
employees to withdraw benefits before retirement.45
The third type of defined contribution plans is section 401(k) plans, called so
because they are provided on section 401 (k) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).
Section 401 (k) plans are basically profit sharing plans, but they have a conspicuous
feature that allows employees to contribute a part of their salaries.46 Under these plans, an
employer shares the financial burden with employees who bear a part of contribution,
while employees get tax benefits because their contributions are not taxed.47 Section 401
(k) plans are the most popular contribution plans because employees can make an
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See InvestorWords.com
I.R.C. § 401 (a)(27)(A) (2005).
40
Perdue, supra note 30, at 39.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 48.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 49.
46
Id. at 50.
47
Id. at 50-50.
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additional investment in preparation for retirement. Therefore, 401 (k) plans represent
most current retirement plans.
Target benefit plans are the fourth type of defined contribution plans. They are
similar to money purchase plans in that they have no contribution flexibility, but also
have a characteristic of defined benefit plans, because the employer sets up a target level
of benefits to be given to the employee at retirement.48 Despite the established target,
target benefit plans are still one of the defined contribution plans, because pension
benefits are determined by the result of investment regardless of the target benefit set up
in advance. That is, the target is only a tool for calculating the employer’s contribution
amount. Thus, employees under target benefit plans bear financial risk as they do under
other defined contribution plans.49
Korean defined contribution plans are basically money purchase pension plans
where the employer specifies its contribution level with a fixed percentage50 of the
employee’s annual compensation. Employees, however, can choose to make an
additional contribution if the employer agrees. In this respect, Korean defined
contribution plans have a feature similar to section 401 (k) plans of the United States.
When an employee who chose defined contribution plans leaves her employer for a new
job, her old pension account is integrated into a new one. Thus, the employee does not
need to open a new pension account. Employees under defined benefit plans have
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Id. at 53.
Id.
50
1/12 or more. See Ministry of Labor of Korea, supra note 35, at 84.
49
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difficulty in doing the same; they can only use IRAs to combine old pension benefits with
new ones.51

c. Others
There is a pension plan that is between defined benefit plans and defined
contribution plans: a cash balance plan. The cash balance plan is one of the defined
benefit plans because the employer promises the employee a certain level of retirement
benefits. Thus employers under the plan pay an insurance premium to the PBGC.52 Yet it
also has a feature of defined contribution plans because a contribution credit by the
employer and an interest credit are accumulated in each employee’s own account. The
employer determines the interest rate, and interest accrues according to the interest rate.
The interest credit, unlike in defined contribution plans, accrues regardless of the result of
investment. Even if the rate of return of investment is below the rate of interest specified
by the employer, the employer is obligated to give the employee the promised interest
credit. That is, the employer bears financial risks, the same case as in other defined
benefit plans.53
A cash balance plan, unlike traditional defined benefit plans, has been recognized
as a plan favorable for younger workers. Older workers under the traditional defined
benefit plan do better than younger workers, because the plan’s benefits are based on the
employee’s final annual compensation, which tends to be more in proportion to the
period of the employee’s service. However, younger employees benefit under the cash
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Id. at 85
See Perdue, supra note 30, at 56.
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See id. at 55.
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balance plan because they have more time to compound interest than older employees do.
This disparity between older and younger employees raises questions of age
discrimination. An employer violates the age discrimination rule if an employee’s
pension benefit accrual stops or the rate of the accrual is reduced because of the
employee’s age.54
This age discrimination issue is confusing to participants in the plan. Even courts
differ in their views: one court ruled that a cash balance plan violated age discrimination
rules,55 but other courts ruled that a cash balance plan was not against age discrimination
rules.56 The age disparity issue occurs especially when the traditional defined benefit plan
is converted to the cash balance plan. Older and longer-service workers often have
pension benefits suddenly reduced. To end the confusion, the U.S. Treasury Department
asked Congress in 2004 to clarify the characteristic of a cash balance plan.57 The U.S.
Congress, in turn, provided in the Pension Protection Act of 2006, providing that a cash
balance plan does not violate age discrimination rules if accrued benefits of older and
longer-service workers are not less than those of younger workers, and the interest credits
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I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(H) (2005); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-406, § 204 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1054(b)(1)(H)(i) (2006));
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4(j)(1)(A), 81 Stat. 602
(1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(j)(1)(A) (2006)).
55
Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ill. 2003).
56
Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A., 206 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D. Mass. 2002), aff’d, 327 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2003); Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
57
See The U.S. Department of Treasury, Preserving Cash Balance Plans for Workers:
Treasury Proposes Legislation to Protect Defined Benefit Plans and Ensure Fair Treatment of
Older Workers in Cash Balance conversions, Press Release (February 2004).
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1132.htm
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are not discriminatory.58 Despite the criticism of age discrimination, a cash balance plan
also gives employers an incentive to hire competitive younger workers who would not
suffer losses of pension benefits under the plan.59 Under the traditional defined benefit
plan, a younger worker is better off not switching jobs if she prefers higher retirement
compensation.
Defined benefit and defined contribution plans also are called qualified retirement
plans, because they qualify for tax benefits under the Internal Revenue Code and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.60 Although qualified retirement
plans have tax advantages for both employers and employees, they also have many
regulations on contribution limits and nondiscrimination requirements.61 The goal of the
regulations is to treat all workers equally and to prevent excessive tax benefits leading to
a budget deficit. Those regulations, however, make it difficult for employers to give more
benefits to highly compensated employees. Therefore, the employer who wants to give
more to highly compensated employees must use a different system. As a result, two
types of corporate pension systems coexist in the United States: qualified retirement plans
for ordinary workers, and nonqualified retirement plans for highly compensated
workers.62
Korea has a unique retirement benefit system called “retirement allowances.”The
retirement allowance system was introduced in 1961 when Korea, one of the poorest
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Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 701(a)(1), 120 Stat. 780 (2006);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 204(b)(5), 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1054(b)(5) (2006).
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See The U.S. Department of Treasury, supra note 57.
60
See InvestorWords.com.
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See Burke & McCouch, supra note 20, at 300-301.
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See id. at 301.
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countries at that time, had no system for supporting retired workers. Korea did not then
have the National Pension or employment insurance systems now used for social security
systems in Korea. Retirement allowances have been the most important system for
workers to secure their retirement income. Even after corporate pension systems were
introduced, the retirement allowance exists along with the corporate pension systems.
While Korea’s traditional retirement allowance system helped Korean workers, it
also has some weak points. First, the type of benefits from the retirement allowance is not
an annuity,63 but a lump sum64. Many retirees who receive the lump sum allowance tend
to spend the allowance on repayment of debt or purchase of a house, and not on
retirement security. Second, workers under the retirement allowance system lose their
retirement benefit if the employer goes bankrupt. As mentioned earlier, this is because
the employer need not invest financial resources for retirement allowances in outside
financial institutions.65 Third, the recent change of Korean labor markets and the
reduction of the length of service caused workers to spend retirement allowances on
living expenses. Since the financial crisis in 1997,66 Korean labor market structure also
has changed: lay-offs and job-changes are more frequent. In addition, many businesses
introduced an annual pay system under which the employer and the employee negotiate
63

Government employee pension’s type has been an annuity.
Receiving pension benefits in a lump sum is still available even under the newly
introduced corporate pension system. But an annuity type is more favorable for retirees than a
lump sum type in terms of tax treatment. See Ministry of Labor of Korea, supra note 33, at 34.
65
See p. 17 of this dissertation.
66
When the Asian financial crisis that began in Southeast Asian countries spread to
Korea, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in return for its bail-out program, asked the
Korean government and central bank to tighten its budget and monetary policy. Because the belttightening policies resulted in restructuring in many areas, many Korean businesses including
commercial banks closed down. Although Korea already graduated from the IMF management
system and its volume of foreign exchange has increased from 20 billion dollars as December of
1997 to 260 billion dollars (6th in the world) as of November of 2007, “restructuring” is still the
most important factor governing Korean business society.
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salary based on the employee’s achievements and capability.67 Under this situation, it is
difficult for workers to accumulate assets for retirement.

2. Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
While corporate pension plans are sponsored by employers, individual pension
plans are managed by each employee without contributions by employers. Individual
retirement accounts (IRAs) represent individual pension plans. In the United States, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) created IRAs. The primary
goal of establishing IRAs was to give an opportunity to accumulate retirement income to
employees whose employer does not provide employer-sponsored pensions.68 IRAs’
main function can be said to supplement existing Social Security and corporate
pensions.69
The requirements for IRA eligibility have changed a few times. Employees,
regardless of whether they participate in corporate pensions, could have IRAs from 1982
to1986, but the Tax Reform Act of 1986 restricted the IRA eligibility to employees who
were not beneficiaries of corporate pensions or whose income level was relatively low.70
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 gave more workers IRAs by raising the income level

67

The annual pay system was not familiar to Korean workers until the financial crisis,
when many Korean businesses began to reform their financial and management structure. Before
the financial crisis, the seniority wage system had been the most popular pay system in Korea,
and most Korean workers had thought they could keep their job until retirement. It was true at
that time that most Korean companies guaranteed their employees a job security until retirement.
68
See Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Funding and the Curious Evolution of Individual
Retirement Accounts, 7 Elder L.J. 283, 285 (1999).
69
See id.
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See id. at 286.
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for IRA eligibility.71 Therefore, workers with earned income can now have IRAs
regardless of whether they participate in corporate pensions.
IRAs also provide workers with tax benefits. A worker’s annual contributions to
IRAs are tax-deductible. Federal income tax is imposed on benefits withdrawn by
workers with traditional IRAs. Although IRAs have a limitation of $2,000 for annual
deposit, the accounts can accumulate a large amount of money because rollover of
retirement pension benefits is allowed into IRAs.72 In addition, the account holder can
make extra contributions. Therefore IRAs let retirees, even ones who did not have IRAs
until retirement, secure large amounts of retirement income.73
There is another type of IRA called Roth IRA. Roth IRAs were created by the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, and have many of the same features as traditional IRAs
described above.74 Tax treatment is the main difference between traditional IRAs and
Roth IRAs. Workers with Roth IRAs cannot have the benefit of deduction.75 Instead, they
do not have to pay federal income tax when withdrawing benefits from IRAs, if they have
held the Roth IRAs for at least five years and they are at least fifty-nine and a half years
old.76 Worker contributions are not subject to income tax. Investment gains included in
the benefits have some different conditions. The worker must satisfy the time and age
requirements to be exempted from federal income tax. It should be noted that the tax
imposed on gains from Roth IRAs is income tax despite the fact that they are capital
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From $25,000 to $30,000 for single taxpayers, and from $40,000 to $50,000 for
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See Kaplan, supra note 68, at 288-89.
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See id. at 289-90.
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gains.77The fact that tax treatment for Roth IRAs is different from that for traditional
IRAs is not the result of a consistent tax policy.78 Roth IRAs may help the government
reduce short-term budget deficits because they do not give Roth IRA holders the tax
deduction permitted for traditional IRA holders. Therefore, the tax structure of Roth IRAs
was designed to overcome difficulties caused by the Federal budget deficits. Roth IRAs,
however, can burden long-term federal budget management in that the Federal
government must exempt Roth IRA holders, upon retirement, from income taxes on their
entire benefit amount from Roth IRAs.79
Korean IRAs have a similar structure to the United States counterparts. They,
however, do not have a type of Roth IRA, and therefore tax treatment for Korean IRAs
does not vary with types of IRAs. Another main difference between Korean and the
United States IRAs is that the former does not permit the account holder to make
additional contributions. Thus Korean IRAs can be used only to maintain already paid
retirement pension benefits.

3. Individual Accounts
Individual accounts may play a significant role in supplementing public pensions
and corporate pensions. There are two types of individual accounts: add-on and carve-out
individual accounts. If an individual account is added to an existing social security
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system, it is an add-on individual account; when an individual account replaces a part or
all of an existing social security system, it is a carve-out individual account.80
Individual accounts may fall into two further categories: mandatory and voluntary
individual accounts. Workers under mandatory individual account systems have a legal
obligation to have an individual account. Workers under voluntary individual account
systems can freely decide on whether to have an individual account.81
Individual accounts are discussed mainly with regard to social security systems.
Many experts currently debate individual accounts as a tool for Social Security reform.
There was, however, an early debate on individual accounts in the United States
Congress. In 1935, the Clark Amendment to the original Social Security Act proposed
voluntary carve-out individual accounts for social security, but Congress rejected the
proposal on grounds that the voluntary aspect was not compatible with the Social
Security’s redistributive nature.82 A liberal point of view still validates the reason
Congress rejected the individual account proposal in 1935 since such a view emphasizes
redistributive communitarian goals.83
A libertarian point of view, however, supports introducing individual accounts as
an individual-oriented social security reform measure. Libertarians consider
individualism and freedom of choice to be essential values for maintaining human
society.84 The libertarian viewpoint is consistent with the President George W. Bush
Administration’s Social Security reform proposal. As mentioned earlier, the proposal
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might not help the federal government reduce its budget deficit because of the offset rate
and transition costs. The offset rate would be influenced by political reasons and
transition costs could not be avoided for a long time. Despite such criticism, the
Administration has pushed forward the privatization plan.
It is impossible to say conclusively that a certain political philosophy is right and
the other is wrong. Political philosophy is an issue of choice, not of ultimate truth.
Whether to use individual accounts as a tool for Social Security reform eventually falls in
the domain of political decision, even if adopting that plan needs economic and social
considerations.85 This is one of the most important reasons for the difficulty in including
individual accounts in social security systems.
Many countries adopted mandatory individual accounts that force workers to
replace part or all of social security benefits with individual account investment. Chile is
prominent in such an adoption. The South American country completely replaced its
public pension system with individual accounts in 1981.86 Following the example of
Chile, eleven other South and Central American countries introduced individual accounts.
Some countries such as Mexico adopted the same structure as Chile: mandatory full
carve-out individual accounts in which individual account systems completely replace
existing public pension systems, thereby abolishing public pension systems.87 Other
South American countries such as Uruguay introduced mandatory partial carve-out
individual accounts in which existing public pension systems remain along with the
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newly introduced individual accounts.88 Many nations in other continents have adopted
mandatory individual account systems, although detailed structures differ: Hong Kong in
Asia, Hungary/Russia in Eastern Europe, and Australia/Sweden among OECD
countries.89
Some countries are implementing voluntary carve-out individual account systems.
The United Kingdom and Japan are examples. They, however, did not adopt the pure
voluntary carve-out individual accounts in that they allow workers to partially replace
their existing corporate pension systems, not public pension systems.90 Those countries
introduced voluntary individual account systems to protect their defined benefit pension
systems under which employers had difficulty securing financial resources to pay
employees the promised retirement benefits.91 Afterward, Margaret Thatcher’s Tory
government, favoring market-based solutions, adopted the pure voluntary carve-out
individual account system that partially replaced the U.K. public pension system.92
Korean individual accounts belong to the category of add-on individual accounts,
rather than carve-out accounts. Korean individual accounts were introduced in 1995
before Korea had corporate pension systems. As a result, many Korean retirees who did
not qualify for the retirement allowance system had to depend on the country’s public
pension system, the National Pension system. Korean individual accounts provided an
important source for retirement income in the era before employer-provided pension
benefits. Another benefit of Korean individual accounts is that account holders need not
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reduce their National Pension or corporate pension benefits, since account accruals are
added to, not carved out from, their pension benefits.
Every Korean who is eighteen or older can establish his or her own individual
account.93 The individual account holders can deposit in their accounts up to one million
won94 in the Korean currency unit every month, or up to three million won95 every
quarter. A person may have two or more individual accounts. The individual account
holders are qualified for tax deduction up to 2.4 million won annually.96 They, however,
must pay income tax for their pension benefits from their individual accounts.97 The
individual account holders have to deposit money in their accounts for at least ten years
and be at least fifty-five years old to receive the pension benefits of the annuity type. In
addition, the period during which the individual account holder receives annuity has to be
five years or more in order to get the tax benefit. If the period is below five years, the
account holder must pay income tax for the entire interest earning.

4. Pension Protection Systems
The most important law for private pension protection is the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1972 (ERISA). ERISA provides not only the legal
basis for corporate pension systems and IRAs, but also pension protection tools for
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retirement income security. The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) is the
representative institution created by ERISA for pension protection. An employer who
adopts defined benefit plans is legally obligated to pay an insurance premium to the
PBGC in preparation for default of pension benefit payments for its employees. The
insurance premium to the PBGC is often attacked by critics on grounds that the premium
is an additional financial burden on employers, who are now reluctant to adopt defined
benefit plans because of the high administrative costs.98 Nevertheless, PBGC is one of the
most important pension protectors in that the institution prevents retirees from falling into
poverty even if their employer goes bankrupt. As of December 2007, PBGC protects 44
million workers and retirees who participate in 30,330 defined benefit plans.99 PBGC
increased its influence on companies through the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which
requires employers whose defined benefit plan’s financial conditions are short of
expected retirement income payments to pay higher insurance premiums to the PBGC.100
Another pension protector is the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(SIPC). SIPC is not an institution created only for pension protection, but it indirectly
protects investors who invested in securities through brokerage firms. Although SIPC
was established through the Securities Investor Protection Act, it is not a government
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agency, but one that was created by its members.101 When an investor’s assets in a
brokerage firm are in danger because of the firm’s bankruptcy or other financial
difficulties, SIPC intervenes and returns cash or securities to the investor.102 In this case,
workers escape losses of pension benefits because the pension fund in which they
participate was not affected by the troubled financial situation of the brokerage firm.
Korea operates its private pension systems according to the Korea Employee
Retirement Income Security Act created in 2005. Although the Act provides many
regulations for pension protection, Korea does not yet have pension protection
institutions such as the PBGC or the SIPC. The absence of pension protection institutions
in Korea means that Korean retirement savers are exposed to the risk of default of
retirement payment more than their American counterparts. The issue of pension
protection institutions is an important one that Korea should resolve in the near future.

C. Regulations of Pension Systems
1. Necessity of Pension Regulations
Pension regulations are necessary for any pension system. Appropriate regulations
and well-organized institutions conducting the regulations are essential to operate a
system efficiently and effectively. Each country tries to establish pension system
regulations and regulators appropriate to its own social and economic conditions. The
primary purpose of pension system regulations is to protect retirees from falling into
poverty after retirement. Regulations of pension systems are also important for financial
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market systems in which pension funds with a large volume of financial assets play a
significant role as a market participant.

2. U.S. Organizations and Regulations for Pension Systems
The U.S. department of Health and Human Services is basically in charge of the
United States public pensions system, the Social Security system. However, the Social
Security Administration substantially manages the Social Security programs. The main
business of the Social Security Administration is to receive Social Security benefit
applications from retirees and to screen the applications. The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) collects payroll taxes from workers with earned income. The U.S. Department of
Treasury operates the Social Security funds and pays retirees Social Security benefits.
The Treasury department decides on management and investment of the funds through a
fund management committee, the chair of which is the secretary of the Treasury
department.
With regard to corporate pension systems, the Employee Benefits Security
Administration (EBSA) conducts relevant policies. EBSA, an affiliate of the U.S.
Department of Labor, enforces the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1972
(ERISA) and Pension Protection Act of 2006. As mentioned previously, the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) and the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(SIPC) were established to facilitate retirement income security; therefore, they serve as
important regulators in the operation of private pension systems.
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3. Korean Organizations and Regulations for Pension Systems
The Ministry of Health and Welfare is in charge of the public pension policies of
Korea. It may submit public pension policy-related bills directly to the National
Assembly,103 the equivalent of the U.S. Congress. The Ministry drafts relevant
enforcement decrees to be finalized by the President of Korea, and makes enforcement
rules regarding the relevant acts and enforcement decrees. Although the Ministry
establishes the public pension policy, the National Pension Service (NPS) operates
Korean public pension systems. NPS, the equivalent of the Social Security
Administration in the United States, collects pension insurance premiums104 without
intervention of other government agencies. NPS also manages the National Pension Fund
by investing in a variety of financial assets, and pays pension benefits to the
participants105 of the National Pension system upon their retirement.
Corporate pension systems of Korea106 are managed by the Ministry of Labor.
Just as the Ministry of Health and Wealth does in its policy field, the Ministry of Labor
may introduce a bill concerning corporate pension policy, draft enforcement decrees, and

103
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makes enforcement rules for its pension policy. The Labor Ministry also supervises
companies that have a legal obligation to adopt corporate pensions.107
Financial institutions that want to deal in corporate pension related products must
register with the Labor Ministry.108 The Financial Supervisory Commission is not directly
connected, but indirectly relates to operating corporate pension systems. First, the
Commission determines the financial requirements of institutions that want to operate a
corporate pension business.109 Second, the Commission decides the extent of securities
qualified for investment by corporate pension funds.110 Third, the Commission supervises
asset management by corporate pension funds.111

D. Comparison of the United States and Korean Pension Systems
1. Public Pension Systems: Tax v. Insurance Premium
The United States and Korean public pension systems have similar structures. The
countries’ public pension systems are social insurance programs with the goal to secure
minimum retirement income. The United States imposes payroll taxes on participants in
Social Security. That is, taxes are the financial resources for operating the U.S. public

107

Id. § 22.
Id. § 14. However, the registration is delegated to the Commission according to the
Korea Employee Income Security Act § 30 and the Enforcement Decree of the Korea Employee
Income Security Act § 25.
109
Enforcement Decree of the Korea Employee Income Security Act § 13.
110
Id. § 17.
111
Korea Employee Income Security Act § 23; Enforcement Decree of the Korea
Employee Income Security Act § 22.
108

36

pension systems. In contrast to the U.S. systems, Korean public pension systems are
operated with insurance premiums collected from participants of the pension systems.
Generally, people consider tax to be a burden to avoid if possible, although they
recognize tax is essential for the government to run the country. Whenever a new tax is
established, many who think the tax is unfair to them defy or delay paying the tax. This
tax resistance comes not only from the thought that they do not need to pay the “unfair”
tax, but also from the idea that the new tax gathered will not be spent for their benefit.
This tax resistance is one of the most important factors to consider for a country who
wants to introduce a new tax. There is a possibility that the Korean government and
lawmakers were concerned about tax resistance when they considered introducing public
pension systems.112 They seem to have chosen, as a result, insurance premiums, not
payroll tax, as a tool for building financial sources for the public pension funds. If the
presumption is correct, the strategy of the Korean government and lawmakers was
successful. Many Koreans still think that they pay insurance premiums to the National
Pension Service,113 which they feel is an insurance company providing them with
retirement income security. In fact, Korean insurance premiums are not different from the
U.S. payroll taxes and even other Korean taxes. If a participant’s insurance premium is
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overdue, the overdue insurance premium is treated like other public charges: the payer in
arrears must pay overdue interest of three to nine percent of his overdue premiums.114 In
addition, if the payer in arrears does not pay his overdue insurance premiums and
interests within a certain period, his property is seized and appropriated according to the
example of disposition on national taxes in arrears.115
To sum up, the difference of the contribution payment types between the United
States and Korea is only apparent in the psychological effect. The contribution payment
structures of the two countries are substantially the same, despite the differences in their
external forms.

2. Corporate Pensions: Voluntary v. Mandatory
Under the United States corporate pension systems, whether employers and
employees participate in those systems depends on their own choice. The employer and
its employees participate in corporate pension systems if they want the favorable tax
treatment provided by those systems. Employees need to have corporate pension plans to
prepare for retired life, and employers need to provide employer-sponsored pension plans
to attract competitive workers.
In contrast, under Korean corporate pension systems, all the workplaces in Korea
have a legal obligation to provide employees with corporate pensions according to the
Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act.116 A temporary measure applied to
workplaces with four or less employees: the small businesses were exempt from adopting
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the new pension systems until 2007. The employer’s contribution level in small
workplaces incrementally increases from 50% to 100% of that of other employers until
2010. Small workplaces benefit from those temporary measures since they need time to
prepare for the new systems, in terms of financial resources and their ability to operate
corporate pensions.
The bottom line is that all workplaces in Korea are required by law to adopt
corporate pensions regardless of their preference or economic capabilities. This
mandatory type of corporate pensions seems related to the Korean government’s
paternalistic policy philosophy. The paternalistic policy is based on the view that a
consumer’s choice is not always consistent and cost effective.117 This policy worries that
the consumers (i.e., employers and employees) will make mistakes in their choices.118
The Korean government has conducted paternalistic polices in many areas, especially
economic policies. The government-led economic growth represents an example.119
The Korean government’s paternalistic pension policy is related to the Korean
labor market, which has a relatively short history compared to advanced western
countries. Labor-management relations in many companies are still in a state of tension,
and labor market flexibility is low in Korea. Under these conditions, employees,
especially those at small businesses, have difficulty in securing better working conditions.
In fact, a study shows that the rate covered by voluntary pensions among low-wage
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workers is lower than that among other workers.120 The Korean government still believes
that the government should protect workers from exploitation by employers. This policy
was successful under the retirement allowance system in that the system contributed to
Korean workers’ retirement income security.121
Voluntary corporate pension systems have the advantage of respecting the free
will of employers and employees,122 but mandatory corporate pension systems seem
appropriate under the unique situation of Korea. Mandating that all businesses adopt
corporate pensions requires the cost of monitoring and supervising those workplaces. The
United States, with the world’s largest economy, would incur high administrative costs to
force all the workplaces to operate corporate pensions.123 Korea is a relatively small
economy, and its government power is considerably centralized. Therefore, it could
overcome the administrative cost issue.

3. Types of Defined Contribution Plans
As already mentioned, the United States has four types of defined contribution
plans: profit sharing, money purchase pension, and section 401(k), and target benefit
plans.124 Those four types have their own characteristics, and each American workplace
can adopt one that fits its specific conditions. Korean defined contribution plans are
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basically money purchase plans with a feature of the section 401(k) plans.125 They are
money purchase plans in that the employer’s contribution is not flexible. They are also
section 401(k) plans in that employees have the choice to make a contribution. Section
401(k) plans, however, are basically profit-sharing plans under which the employer can
change the amount of contribution depending on its financial conditions. In this respect,
Korean defined contribution plans that strictly compel the employer to make a certain
level of contribution are different from the U.S. section 401(k) plans.
Profit sharing plans are not consistent with Korean mandatory pension systems. A
key aspect of profit sharing plans is the employer’s flexible contribution. The employer
can determine whether to make a contribution and how much to contribute. Under the
Korean corporate pension systems, the employer adopting defined contribution pension
plans have a legal obligation to make an annual contribution of at least 1/12 of the
employee’s annual earned income.126 The provision will be nominal if profit sharing
plans are permitted.
Target benefit plans127 may be added to Korean defined contribution plans
because they are principally money purchase plans, the basic type of Korean defined
contribution plans. Target benefit plans use a defined benefit plan method in determining
the employer’s contribution level in that the contribution level reflects the employee’s
pension benefit she would receive if the employer adopted defined benefit plans. Target
benefit plans would help Korean workplaces efficiently determine contribution levels, but
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introduction of the plans are not essential for operating Korean defined contribution plans
since they basically have no difference from the current Korean plans.

4. Benefit and Contribution Limits
Qualified pension plans enable employers and employees to get their
contributions deducted from taxable income. Private pension systems could not exist
without this tax benefit. It is also true, however, that the tax benefit for employers and
employees burdens the government with lower tax revenues. Therefore, the United States
sets maximum limits of benefits and contributions that are qualified for the favorable tax
treatment. In defined benefit plans, benefits in the form of single life annuity cannot
exceed the lesser of $160,000 (indexed for cost of living increases) or 100% of the
participant’s highest three year average of compensation.128 In defined contribution plans,
annual contributions cannot exceed the lesser of $40,000 (indexed for cost of living
increases) or 100% of the participant’s compensation.129
Unlike the United States, Korea does not impose maximum limits on benefits and
contributions. Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act provides only for
minimum limits of benefits and contribution under private pension systems. In defined
benefit plans, employers must pay the pension participants over 30 day-wages per oneyear of work.130 In defined contribution plans, employers must make a contribution of
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over 1/12 of the employee’s annual wage, and there is no limit for benefits received from
the plans.131
From the perspective of the United States private pension systems, those generous
pension policies are likely to hurt Korean government budget management. However,
Korea is in the first stage of private pension systems and in a different situation. Private
pension systems necessarily produce many pension funds that invest pension
contributions and manage pensions’ financial assets. This results in a significant increase
in the number of relevant financial products, and in qualitative and quantitative growth of
financial institutions and markets. If the number and volume of financial institutions
increase, the government gets more tax revenues from the corporations. In addition,
development of capital markets contributes to economic growth, which leads to increase
in tax revenues. Therefore, the Korean government, for now, does not need to be
concerned about budget management with regard to private pension systems. However,
the situation could change and the capital market development could become stagnant. If
so, the Korean government and lawmakers should consider the introduction of maximum
benefit and contribution limits.
Another issue with benefit limits is the extent to which asset reversions to
employers should be allowed. Employers get gains from overfunded pension plans if the
plans’ investment outcome exceeds the benefits paid to employees. Because employers
can get a tax deduction when they invest in pension plans, they also get additional gains
if the extra gain reverts to them. In addition, investment earnings accumulated in pension
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plans are tax-free.132 An employer who gets additional gains from the plan must pay an
excise tax equals to 50% of the reverted assets.133
In connection with the employer’s investment, another regulation in the United
States restricts the power of employers to make excessive contributions in advance.
Strengthened in 1987,134 the regulation reduces the tax subsidy, but has been criticized
because employers could lose gains when market conditions are favorable to
investment.135 If the employer secures sufficient funds for pension plans in good times, it
could save contributions in bad times. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 raised the
advance investment limit so that corporations may get more tax benefits when they make
more profits.136
Korea does not have such regulations because, as mentioned above, the country
has no need to worry about excessive tax subsidy. It is too early to introduce the advance
investment limit to Korean pension systems because advance investment could reduce a
corporation’s burden by accumulating more funds when business conditions are good.
Lessening the employer’s financial burden is more important, particularly as the newly
introduced private pension systems tries to take root in Korean corporate society.
However, the government needs to prevent corporations from abusing the favorable tax
treatment. Korea should introduce excise taxes on assets reverted to employers.
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5. Contribution Flexibility
Under profit sharing plans and section 401(k) plans, contributions by employers
are flexible because employers can decide whether and how much of a contribution to
make. In Korea, contributions to corporate pensions are mandatory. Contribution
flexibility seems better suited to the United States where voluntary private pension
systems dominate. The most popular corporate pension in the United States is section
401(k) plans. However, this does not fit the Korean system because mandatory
contributions are a key feature of the current Korean corporate pension systems.

6. Default Settings of Defined Contribution Plans
In defined contribution plans, employers invest contributions according to the
employees’ instructions. Employees are responsible for investment losses in their pension
accounts. Therefore, the investment strategy of employees is a key to success in defined
contribution plans. Although individual workers may have expert knowledge of
investment, most workers do not. Therefore, employers provide employees with default
settings for their defined contribution plans. Many workers tend to not make efforts to
map out their investment strategies, because it consumes much time and energy.
Furthermore, they have a tendency to not change strategies as market conditions
change.137 Thus, well-designed default settings for defined contribution plans help
ordinary workers.
Effective default settings also matter more for low-wage workers than for higherpaid ones because the low-wage workers normally have little time or expertise to
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consider investment strategies. When considering that low-wage workers need corporate
pensions more than high-wage workers, the need for default settings is even stronger.
Most default settings of defined contribution plans have low-risk/low-return structures
because employers do not want to be blamed for losses from high-risk investments.138
With regard to this tendency, there is an argument that it is necessary to lessen employers’
fiduciary responsibilities for default settings so that they can provide employees with
better default settings.139
Korean defined contribution plans compel employers to provide employees with
three or more default settings from which employees can choose at least once
semiannually.140 Among the settings, at least one has to guarantee the principal in which
employees invested.141 The principal guarantee should be achieved through a certain
method the Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act provides: for example,
investing in risk-free securities such as government bonds, the Bank of Korea monetary
stabilization bonds,142 and government-guaranteed bonds.143 Korean default settings of
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defined contribution plans also have a risk-averse characteristic that is similar to
American plans. The principal guarantee default setting is particularly risk-averse.
Default settings of Korean defined contribution plans need to be reconsidered in order to
keep the balance between risk and return.

7. PreRetirement Withdrawal
a. Defined Benefit Plans and Defined Contribution Plans
The United States defined pension plan participants must give up tax benefits if
they withdraw their pension benefits prior to fifty-nine and half-years of age. That means
that the U.S. defined benefit plans do not permit pre-retirement withdrawal. Korean
defined benefit plans also do not allow participants to withdraw their pension benefits
prior to retirement. The United States defined contribution plans also basically do not
permit the participants to withdraw their pension benefits until the participants reach the
age of fifty-nine and a half.144
Korean defined contribution plans permit participants to withdraw their pension
plans prior to retirement under three circumstances.145 First, a pension participant who
owns no house may withdraw the pension benefits accumulated until the pre-retirement
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withdrawal request if she wants to buy her own house. Second, if a participant or her
dependents need to receive medical treatment for over six months, the participant can
withdraw her pension to pay the expenses. Third, exceptional pre-retirement withdrawal
is allowed when natural disasters or unforeseen calamities take place.146 This preretirement withdrawal is a big difference between the United States and Korean defined
contribution plans.

b. Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
If the United States individual retirement account holders withdraw their account
principal and accruals prior to the age of fifty-nine and a half years, a 10% penalty is
imposed on that withdrawal.147 However, the account holder can withdraw what is
accumulated in his account in three exceptional cases: medical expenses, educational
costs, and home purchases.148
Korean IRAs also permit pre-retirement withdrawal in the same cases as those in
Korean defined contribution plans: medical expenses, home purchases, and natural or
other unforeseen disasters.
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8. Loans from Pension Funds
The United States defined benefit and contribution plans prohibit participants
from withdrawing pension benefits prior to retirement. However, loans from pension
funds are often permitted even in the United States corporate pension plans.149
Korean defined benefit plans also do not permit pension withdrawal prior to
retirement. They do, however, allow pension funds to lend money to their participants if
they are under the same hardships as mentioned in the pre-retirement withdrawal
exceptions of defined contribution plans. Korean defined contribution plans permitting
pre-retirement withdrawal also allow loans from pension funds. In the three exceptional
cases, the defined contribution plan participant can not only withdraw his benefits
accumulated until the request for withdrawal, but also receives loans from the pension
fund.
In addition, Korean IRAs permit the account holders to receive loans on the
security of their accounts.150 In contrast, the United States counterparts prohibit account
holders from receiving the secured loan.

9. Protection from Creditors
Under the United States corporate pension plans, both defined benefit and defined
contribution plans, participants are protected from creditors according to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1972 (ERISA). Creditors cannot seize the pension
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plan benefits of the participants.151 However, the ERISA does not protect the IRA holders
from creditors. Protection of the IRA holders from creditors is dependent upon state
bankruptcy laws, and most states do not protect the account holders from creditors.152
Participants of Korean defined benefit and defined contribution plans are partially
protected from creditors. A creditor can seize up to half the debtor’s pension benefits.153
Korean IRAs are also applicable to the provision;154 therefore, the IRA holders are
partially protected from creditors.

10. Pension Benefit Guaranty Systems
The United States defined benefit plans require employers to buy an insurance
policy from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to protect pension
participants from nonpayment resulting from their employer’s bankruptcy or other
financial difficulties. Although this insurance system imposes additional financial
burdens on employers, it secures employees’ anticipated pension benefits. In defined
benefit pension plans, workers can estimate their pension benefit amount because the
plans compel employers to promise workers a certain level of pension benefits upon
retirement. Workers know their estimated amount of benefits and plan for retirement
based on that amount of money. Therefore, guaranteeing the employer-promised benefits
in defined benefit plans is more important than in defined contribution plans under which
workers cannot estimate their benefits accurately. Therefore, Korea should consider
introducing the U.S. type of pension benefit guaranty system. However, Korea should be
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cautious because Korean corporate pension plans have yet to be widely used in the
business world. Employers in Korea have yet to prepare for bearing an additional
financial burden for their employee welfare.

11. Eligibility to Establish Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
The United States IRA system allows workers with corporate pensions to open
IRAs. Although the extent of workers qualified for opening IRAs is limited,155 those
accounts can help workers, particularly low-wage workers, prepare for retirement. Under
the Korean system, workers participating in corporate pensions cannot have IRAs.
Korean IRAs can be made only after the holder receives corporate pension benefits.156 In
addition, only a person who receives the benefits in a lump sum can open his IRA.157

12. Contribution to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
The United States IRAs allow the account holders to make additional
contributions even if the account was made after she received her corporate pension
benefits after retirement. That is, not only do regular IRAs but also rollover IRAs qualify
for making additional contributions. On the contrary, Korean IRA holders cannot make
contributions to their IRAs. This feature, along with the limitation of eligibility, makes
Korean IRAs thoroughly supplementary vehicles for other pension programs. The
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prohibition of additional contributions is also linked to the Korean individual accounts
that allow Koreans to accumulate more financial assets for their retired life.

13. Individual Accounts
Korea allows all citizens eighteen and older to have individual accounts qualified
for favorable tax treatment.158 While there is no requirement to open the individual
accounts, individual accounts now play a crucial role in Koreans’ preparation for retired
life. In contrast, the United States does not use this type of individual account. If the Bush
Administration’s Social Security reform plans are adopted, Korean individual accounts
might furnish the United States with useful information. From the perspective of Social
Security reform, Korean individual accounts belong to the add-on voluntary individual
accounts.159

14. Nondiscrimination Rules
United States laws strictly provide for nondiscrimination rules. Income and age
are the main fields to which nondiscrimination rules apply. In comparison, Korean
nondiscrimination provisions concerning private pensions are relatively loose. They only
broadly provide for nondiscrimination rules.160
The United States Congress worries that Social Security cannot provide ordinary
workers with retirement income sufficient to maintain comfortable retired life. Therefore,
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pension law prohibits employers from discriminating against non-highly paid employees
in operating pension plans.161
The nondiscrimination rules protect non-highly compensated employees from
discrimination. Thus, the definition of highly compensated employees is important. A
highly compensated employee means (i) a 5% owner at any time during the current plan
year or the preceding plan year or (ii) an employee who received a wage exceeding a
certain amount162 for the preceding plan year.163 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 gives the
IRS authority to promulgate extensive regulations.164 According to the IRS regulations, a
pension plan must meet three requirements to satisfy the nondiscrimination rules: (i)
contribution and benefits must be non-discriminatory in amount; (ii) all benefits, rights,
and features must be made available in a non-discriminatory manner; and (iii) the timing
of plan amendments must not discriminate significantly in favor of highly compensated
employees.165
A defined benefit plan can satisfy the first requirement of a non-discriminatory
amount in contribution and benefits if it passes either the (i) safe harbor test or (ii)
general test. To pass the safe harbor test, employers must meet three other
requirements.166 First, a benefit formula must be the same for all employees.167 Second,
the benefit formula must consist of the same form of benefit and the same uniform
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normal retirement age.168 Third, the annual benefit must be the same percentage of annual
compensation or the same amount of money for all employees who have the same
number of service years at normal retirement age.169 For employers to pass the general
test, the accrual rate of non-highly compensated employees is greater than or equal to that
of highly compensated employees.170
A defined contribution plan can meet the requirement of a non-discriminatory
amount if it passes either of the following tests: (i) employer’s contributions are allocated
to each employee by the same percentage of annual compensation, the same amount of
money, or the same amount of money for each uniform unit of service (safe harbor
test);171 or (ii) the allocation rate of non-highly compensated employees is greater than or
equal to that of highly compensated employees (general test).172
A plan, whether defined benefit or defined contribution, must satisfy two tests to
meet the second requirement of the nondiscretionary manner concerning benefits, rights,
and features. One is the current availability test: benefits, rights, and features of a plan
must be available to the employee as a result of determining on the basis of current facts
and circumstances with regard to the employee.173 The other is the effective availability
test: the benefits, rights, and features of a plan must not substantially favor highly
compensated employees.174
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Whether the third requirement, nondiscriminatory timing of plan amendment, is
satisfied is determined on the basis of facts and circumstances at the time the amendment
first becomes effective.175
The United States nondiscrimination rules are important for the ordinary worker’s
retirement income security. The primary goal of establishing corporate pensions is to
provide workers with a tool for supplementing Social Security. Those who most need
complementary vehicles for securing retirement income are ordinary workers, non-highly
compensated employees. Most highly compensated workers already have additional
sources for retirement income. There is criticism that private pension systems help highly
paid workers transfer their assets into tax shelters, qualified plans by which they can
enjoy favorable tax treatment. In addition, employers tend to favor high-wage workers,
who generally have a higher level of job skills, over low-wage workers. In fact, low-wage
workers need private pensions more than high-wage workers. In that respect, the strict
nondiscriminatory rules in the United States help protect non-highly compensated
employees from the tendency of employers to give more incentive to highly-paid workers.

15. SelfInterested Investment Advice
Unlike the United States counterparts, Korean private pension systems do not
allow a pension fund to invest in securities related to the employer sponsoring the
fund.176 Pension funds can invest in any securities issued or traded according to the
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Securities and Exchange Act.177 Additionally, securities connected with the employer are
excluded from pension fund investments.178 Although this regulation restricts the pension
fund’s choice of investment, it seems appropriate to prevent the employer from using the
pension fund for its own purposes, such as raising the employer’s stock price.

16. Regulation Systems
The United States and Korean pension regulation systems are similar in terms of
law and organizations. Korea, however, has no institutions guaranteeing defined benefit
pension benefits such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Korea also
does not protect investors from a brokerage firm’s default like the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC) does. Korea needs to take complementary measures to
protect pension participants.
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III.

Retirees and Inflation

A. Inflation Risk of Retiree’s Income
Workers save money in preparation for their retired life. Interest and investment
gains accrue from the saved money. Workers expect the accumulated principal and
investment profits to maintain their standard of living in retirement. The investment
outcome the worker acquires is nominal income. Yet even a successful strategy could fall
prey to an unexpected problem: inflation. The nominal income, then, does not consider
the loss from inflation. Those who have accumulated financial assets for living expenses
must be concerned about the real yield, which is the nominal yield minus the inflation
rate. What determines one’s standard of living is the real value of income, not the
nominal value of income. This is because purchasing power depends upon real income. A
higher inflation rate decreases real income. The risk savers bear due to inflation is called
inflation risk. Inflation risk increases with time. This is not only because the inflation rate
tends to rise over time but also because estimating inflation rate gets more difficult over
time. Therefore, long-term savers are exposed to inflation risk more than short-term
savers. Savers for retirement are long-term investors who are greatly exposed to inflation
risk.
Workers, however, have tools to compensate for inflation: salary and wages.179
Salary and wages generally increase if inflation rate rises. Therefore, workers can
normally maintain their living standard regardless of inflation. Younger workers in
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particular can overcome inflation shock better than older workers whether it is persistent
or temporary. Younger workers can compensate for the loss from inflation since they
have time to recover, and financial sources, salary or wages rise with the inflation rate.
They can also change investment strategies, investing in high-risk/high-return products to
recover losses from inflation. Even working more can be a way to maintain purchasing
power.180 Older workers, however, do not have the time or financial sources of younger
workers. Thus, older workers nearing retirement are more vulnerable to inflation risk.181
In the case of retirees, the vulnerability to inflation risk is much more serious
because retirees have few tools to overcome inflation risk such as salary or wages. Most
retirees depend solely on accumulated assets to live their retired life. If inflation erodes
the purchasing power of their assets, they have no choice but to accept a decline in their
standard of living, a painful situation for any retiree. Accordingly, retirees need more
protection from inflation risk than anyone else.

B. Social Security Systems and Inflation
Under the United States Social Security system, payments are adjusted for
inflation.182 Therefore, retirees do not need to worry about inflation risk in term of Social
Security benefits. The Korean National Pension system also guarantees the real value of
the pension benefits by linking benefits to inflation.183 Both countries use the Consumer
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Price Index (CPI)184 as a standard of measuring inflation rate.185 Public pensions can use
wage increase rate as an index, thereby adjusting pension benefits to guarantee the real
value of the pension benefits.
The initial benefit of Social Security, the retiree’s average monthly income, is
computed using the national average wage index to reflect the present value of the past
incomes.186 To compute the average monthly income, it is necessary to calculate the total
income of the retiree. The total income is the sum of the retiree’s annual income of each
year during which the retiree worked. The average monthly income is computed by
dividing the total income by the number of months that the retiree worked. Each year’s
annual income is converted into an adjusted annual income calculated by the national
average wage index.187 That is, the indexation method for computing the retiree’s initial
pension benefit is a wage increase rate, not an inflation rate. The initial pension benefit
increases with the inflation rate, and this process is called the Cost-of-Living-Adjustment
(COLA).188
Social Security benefits can vary with the methods calculating the initial pension
benefit. There are two methods for the computation. One uses a wage increase rate as an
indexation tool; the United States Social Security mentioned above is an example. The
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other uses the consumer price index to convert a past income into an adjusted income, a
basis for computing the retiree’s total income. Using wage increase rate as an indexation
tool makes a retiree’s total income larger than by using inflation rate. That is to say, this
wage indexation is more favorable to retirees. This is because the wage increase rate
tends to be higher than the inflation rate. Wage increase includes not only the inflation
rate but also an additional increase for improving the worker’s standard of living.
The Bush Administration’s Social Security reform proposal suggests that wage
increase rate, as an indexation standard, be incrementally replaced with inflation rate to
reduce the Social Security costs.189 According to the proposal, the first target of price
indexation is the group of moderate-and high-income workers.190 Then the price indexing
of past annual incomes would apply to low-income workers. This price indexing of
income can reduce Social Security benefits without lowering the rate of benefit, a
solution to the Social Security solvency issue.
As already mentioned, Korea reduced the National Pension benefits to maintain
its public pension system’s solvency.191 The solution to the public pension’s solvency
issue can vary with each country’s situation. Regardless of what a country chooses as the
indexation tool, a participant’s initial pension benefit reflects the increase in inflation rate.
This indexation of annual income and the price indexation of pension benefits protect
retirees from inflation risk.
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C. Private Pension Systems and Inflation
1. Defined Benefit Plans
Defined benefit plans have a function that protects employees from inflation risk.
The benefits from defined benefit plans are normally determined as a percentage of the
employee’s average income during a few years just before retirement.192 This “built-in
retirement pay escalator”193 can protect retirees from inflation risk. In addition, some
defined benefit plans are explicitly indexed to inflation.194
Although employees under defined benefit plans can avoid inflation risk,
employers may suffer from inflation risk because they have to pay retiring employees
their promised pension benefits regardless of whether their investment outcome is
sufficient to pay the benefits. Under defined benefit plans, employers bear the burden of
inflation risk.195

2. Defined Contribution Plans
Defined contribution plans also have the “built-in retirement pay escalator” in that
the contributions of employers or employees are made with a portion of the employee’s
salary, which tends to increases in proportion to inflation.196 Nevertheless, workers in
defined contribution plans are not free from inflation risk. Although the amount of
contribution can increase with inflation, the outcome of the contribution investment does
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not increase in proportion to the amount of contribution. In addition, investment gains are
exposed to inflation risk unless the contribution was invested in inflation-indexed
financial products.
Employers under defined contribution plans, unlike those under defined benefit
plans, do not bear investment risk because they do not guarantee a promised amount of
pension benefits. Therefore, employees under defined contribution plans, unlike their
counterparts under defined benefit plans, have a burden of investment risk. As a result,
employees also take inflation risk in defined contribution plans. They need to consider
inflation hedge tools for themselves.

3. Other Plans
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) do not guarantee investment yield
exceeding inflation rate because the account’s benefits depend completely on investment
outcome. This is also true for individual accounts, regardless of what their form is. Thus,
the holders of IRAs or individual accounts are exposed to inflation risk.

D. Financial Products to Protect Retirees from Inflation
1. Efforts to Trace Inflation
As pension funds realized that inflation risk is one of the most important
considerations for investment, they began to study financial products that can trace
inflation. The first attempt was a variable annuity made by the College Retirement
Equities Fund (CREF). A study by the Teachers Insurance Annuity Association
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(TIAA)197 showed through empirical analysis that equity-based investment could
overcome losses resulting from inflation.198 In 1951, TIAA established an equity-based
variable annuity account.199 The variable annuity account200 invested in equities alone,
and obtained good results surpassing inflation by over six percent annually.201 However,
as inflation rate rose since the 1970s, even the variable annuity could not catch up with
inflation.202 Since then many pension products have tried to track inflation by including
real estate or by mixing fixed assets and equities, but without success.203

2. Limitations of Inflation Hedge Products That Do Not Use Inflation
Indexed Bonds
None of the techniques to track inflation, however, is completely satisfactory.
Financial products aimed at tracing inflation could overcome inflation risk depending on
financial market conditions. For example, equity funds investing in stocks earned profits
exceeding estimation when stock prices were soaring, but they suffered losses when stock
market conditions were not favorable for investors. Even the CREF stock account that
gained overall investment profits exceeding those of other funds suffered yields lower
than inflation rate when inflation rate was relatively high.204 In other words, the existing
inflation hedge-oriented products relied upon empirical analysis and market situations,
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external conditions no investor can control. Therefore, retirement savers need a product
uninfluenced by external conditions such as financial market conditions. This pension
structure can be achieved when retirement savers can invest directly in a financial
product that protects investors from inflation risk. Retirement savers and retirees need
financial products that can prevent investors from suffering loss of purchasing power
from inflation. Those are inflation-indexed bonds.

E. Inflation Hedge and InflationIndexed Bonds
1. Definition of InflationIndexed Bonds
Inflation indexed bonds are bonds that index principal and interest payments to
consumer price in order to protect the purchasing power of the bonds from inflation.205

2. Necessity of Introducing InflationIndexed Bonds
As mentioned above, experiences of pension funds indicate that no financial
product can guarantee investors inflation hedge. Only inflation-indexed bonds can
prevent investors from sustaining a loss of the purchasing power of the financial products.
In addition, inflation-indexed bonds alone can guarantee additional profits exceeding
inflation level.206 The fact that inflation-indexed bonds got the support of pensionoperating organizations, when the United States Treasury Department considered
introducing these bonds, indicates that inflation-indexed bonds were already recognized

205
206

See Wrase, supra note 4, at 3.
See Hammond, supra note 5, at 7.

64

as an inflation hedge product for retirees.207 From the perspective of retirement income
security, inflation-indexed bonds are essential to retirees’ portfolios of pension products.

3. Examples of Retirement Savings Vehicles Using InflationIndexed
Bonds
Pension accounts using inflation-indexed bonds can fall into two categories. The
first is fixed annuities, in which retirement savers get promised benefits exceeding
inflation level. Pension funds managing fixed annuities that guarantee a real return, not a
nominal return hold inflation-indexed bonds to maturity.208 The fund can get from
inflation-indexed bonds a return indexed to a certain price index, such as the Consumer
Price Index (CPI). These fixed annuities using inflation-indexed bonds guarantee real
return, but investors in those accounts cannot expect additional returns such as capital
gains from trading those bonds prior to maturity.
The second type of pension accounts using inflation-indexed bonds is a variable
account, including inflation-indexed bonds. These variable accounts also use inflationindexed bonds. However, the variable accounts are valued on a mark-to-market basis
where the value of a particular account is appraised daily by the market price of the
financial products in the account. The value of the variable accounts that use inflationindexed bonds fluctuates less than accounts that do not include inflation-indexed bonds.
In addition, they can also bring returns beyond what is guaranteed by inflation-indexed
bonds. But the feature of mark-to-market valuation does not guarantee a certain level of
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interest and principal because the value of inflation-indexed bonds in the accounts varies
with a daily market price of the bonds.209
Because the two types of pension products using inflation-indexed bonds have
their weak points, new attempts are being made to balance the guarantee of a real return
with acquiring additional capital gains. For example, a pension account might invest part
of its money in inflation-indexed bonds to guarantee principal, and buy stocks with the
remainder to get additional gains.210 In this case, the account needs a type of derivative,
STRIPS (Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities), to
guarantee only the principal. Through STRIPS, investors can buy only interest coupons,
or only the principal, of a bond. That is to say, the principal and interest coupons are
traded separately under STRIPS. This STRIPS derivative enables investors to easily buy
and sell bonds in financial markets, because it can satisfy a variety of demands of
financial market participants. There is a possibility that some investors are interested only
in the principal of a bond, but not in the interest, or vice versa. These investors would not
buy bonds if bond markets did not allow STRIPS. Therefore, STRIPS facilitates liquidity.
Improving liquidity not only promotes issuing bonds, but also reduces liquidity
premiums211. Derivatives generally facilitate issuing their basic products and provide
investors with a variety of investment opportunities. Therefore, to facilitate the issuing of
inflation-indexed bonds, derivatives such as STRIPS should be developed.
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IV.

InflationIndexed Bonds

A. Overview of InflationIndexed Bonds
1. Definition and Calculation Methods
Inflation-indexed bonds index principal and interest payments to consumer price
to protect the purchasing power of the bonds from inflation.212 Inflation-indexed bonds
are the only financial products that guarantee additional gains exceeding inflation.213
Inflation-indexed bonds are different from regular bonds called nominal bonds in
terms of the structure of interest that investors receive from the investment. Regular
bonds’ interest rate, a nominal rate, is determined by adding expected inflation and an
inflation premium214 to a real rate. On the other hand, inflation-indexed bonds’ interest
rate is determined by adding actual inflation to a real rate.215 Investors in inflationindexed bonds do not need to demand the expected inflation and inflation premium from
the issuer of the bonds. This is because the investors get compensation for realized
inflation from the increase in interest that results from the inflation indexation.
The basic structure of inflation-indexed bonds involves increasing or decreasing
the amount of the principal and interest of the bond by the change in inflation. There are
three types of inflation-indexed bonds with regard to the methods of calculating the
interest and principal: Interest Indexed Bonds, Capital Indexed Bonds, and Indexed
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Annuity Bonds.216 Interest Indexed Bonds adjust the interest rate according to inflation
rate without changing the amount of the principal.217 The interest rate of the bond varies
with inflation rate. For example, assume that the real interest rate and the principal of a
bond is 5% per year and $50,000 respectively, and interest is paid annually. If the
inflation rate has increased 3% annually to the time that interest is paid, the interest rate
of the bond is 8%, or the real interest rate 5% plus 3%. And the amount of interest the
investor would receive is $4,000, calculated by multiplying the principal $50,000 by 8%.
The principal of the bond does not vary with inflation rate. The principal amount that was
fixed when the bond was issued is paid to the bondholder at maturity.
Capital Indexed Bonds adjust the principal of a bond according to inflation rate
changes without changing the real interest rate that was specified when the bond was
issued.218 This calculation method is also called the Canadian method because the
Canadian government inflation-indexed bonds, Canadian Real-Return Bonds (RRBs),
first adopted this method. Let us assume that issuance conditions of a bond are the same
as the example above. If the inflation rate has increased 3% annually to the time of
interest payment, the interest investors would receive is $2,575, which equals $50,000 ×
(1+.03) × .05. At maturity, the principal investors get $51,500,whichequals $50,000 ×
(1+.03).As far as the amount of the interest paid to investors during inflation is concerned,
that of capital indexed bonds is less than that of interest-indexed bonds. On the other
hand, if maturity arrives during inflation, the amount of principal paid is more for capital
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indexed bonds than interest-indexed bonds. The Canadian method is now an international
standard for calculating the amount of interest and principal of inflation-indexed bonds.
Indexed annuity bonds do not distinguish between the principal and interest with
regard to payment.219 The payment of these bonds is made regularly and the amount is
based on the sum of the principal and interest. The sum of total interest and principal is
divided according to the number of payments, and the divided payment is made regularly.
Therefore, investors in the bonds receive payments that do not distinguish between the
principal and interest. The divided payment is indexed to inflation rate. If interest rate
rises, the payment increases with the inflation rate.
The inflation rate used when calculating the adjusted interest and principal of
inflation-indexed bonds is generally a consumer price index. The United States Treasury
Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) uses the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers (CPI-U) as an index for adjusting the principal and interest of the bonds. The
reason that the CPI-U is used as the inflation index for TIPS is that “it is the broadest and
best known index, it is published monthly, and it is not subject to retroactive revision.”220
Korean Treasury Inflation-Linked Bonds (KTBi) also use the CPI-U as an inflation index.
The CPI-U applicable to the adjustment of the principal and interest of the government
inflation-indexed bonds has a three-month time lag.221 That is, the CPI-U used as the
adjustment index at a particular point in time is one that was published three months ago.
This three-month time lag makes inflation adjustment inaccurate. On the other hand, the
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time lag makes it possible for buyers and sellers to know the amount of the bond’s
principle and interest to be paid.222 This information enables the buyers and sellers to
easily calculate the price of the bond, improving liquidity of inflation-indexed bonds and
facilitating the trade of those bonds in secondary markets.223
The CPI measures price changes of the products and services that people purchase
in their daily lives, reflecting the changes in purchasing power.224 The CPI can be a
starting point for workers negotiating salary with employers, because it enables the
negotiating parties to calculate the workers’ cost of living.225 The central bank in a
country can also use it as a target of its monetary policy. The CPI can even affect the
government’s budget management, because inflation-indexed expenditures, such as
providing Social Security benefits, are indexed to the CPI.226 Inflation-indexed
government bonds such as TIPS are also influenced by the CPI because it is the inflation
index used to calculate the principal and interest of those bonds. Inflation-indexed bonds
other than government inflation-indexed bonds also commonly use the CPI as their
inflation indexes.227
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With government inflation-indexed bonds, the CPI can directly affect the amount
of the principal and interest given to investors, as well as the government budget.
Because the CPI has a significant influence on many areas as described above, the
accurate calculation of it is important. Particularly for investors in inflation-indexed
bonds, such as retirement savers and annuitants, even a slight change in calculating the
CPI causes a tremendous change in the amount of principal and interest that they would
receive. The issuer of inflation-indexed bonds is also influenced by the change, because
the issuer’s financial status changes depending on the amount of principal and interest
that it would give to the investors.
The CPI, however, has some weak points in calculating an accurate price change.
One is the limitation of sampling necessary for constructing the price index. The
sampling cannot reflect the current situation of markets where prices of products and
services are formed, because the sampling is conducted once every designated period of
time: for example, every five years or every ten years. But this limitation is unavoidable
since it takes a long time to revise the sampling.
Another limitation of the CPI is that everyone feels price levels differently.
People have diverse consumption patterns that differ depending on each person’s
priorities.228 The CPI assigns weight to each product or service. Consumers who
frequently purchase a product that has a low weight may feel that inflation rate has soared
if their favorite product’s price rises rapidly. However, the CPI is not as high as they
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might expect if the prices of other products with relatively high weights did not increase
to the same degree.
The most important limitation of the CPI is an upward bias that overestimates an
inflation rate. This results from the fact that the CPI cannot immediately reflect the
change in weight. For example, if the price of butter soared, many consumers of butter
would shift to margarine consumption. Assume that the weight of butter in the CPI is
higher than that of margarine. The shift of the demand results in changing the weights of
butter and margarine, and butter’s weight must be lowered according to the shift in
demand. However, this change cannot be conducted immediately after the demand shift
because the index revision is implemented every five or ten years. The existing weight of
butter, higher than the actual weight, is still used to calculate the price level of butter.
Therefore, the increase in butter price is overstated, resulting in overestimating the CPI.
A study shows that the CPI overstates inflation by up to 1.6% annually.229 This
overstatement affects the government budget management. The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimated that the budget deficit would decrease by $141 billion from 1998
to 2007 should the CPI be adjusted 1% downward.230 The upward bias of the CPI can
also influence corporate profits, because the overstated CPI makes a higher wage increase
than a non-overstated CPI does, resulting in a decrease in corporate profits.231 If it were
not for the overstatement of the CPI, the growth rate of Social Security benefits would
have been lower than the actual rate.232

229

See id. at 146.
See id.
231
See id.
232
See id. at 141.
230

72

The U.S. Congress tried to change the CPI in 1996 to reduce the upward bias.233
This was meant to reduce budget deficit, but Congress did not legislate for the change.234
Instead, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of the U.S. Department of Labor is trying to
improve its CPI statistics.235 The decision of the U.S. Congress to give up legislating for
the revision of the CPI seems appropriate. Even if the effort of Congress to revise the CPI
is legitimate, it is not desirable for lawmakers or politicians to intervene in calculating a
price index. Independence of official statistics from the outside powers is essential for
users of the statistics. If the methods for constructing the CPI are changed by politicians,
trust will be lost in the impartiality of the price index, an important indicator of many
areas concerning people’s daily lives. Therefore, revising the CPI should be entrusted to
independent expert institutions in charge of the price statistics. If the government or
lawmakers try to revise the CPI in order to balance budget, the attempt might cause
distrust in the CPI itself. This distrust could hurt the issuance and trade of inflationindexed bonds.

2. Key Features of InflationIndexed Bonds
a. Inflation Risk Hedge
The most important feature of inflation-indexed bonds is to hedge inflation risk.
Inflation-indexed bonds are the only financial products that guarantee a return exceeding
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inflation level.236 Therefore, from the perspective of individual investors, such as
retirement savers, inflation-indexed bonds can relieve them from uncertainty of future
purchasing power. For example, employees who participate in defined contribution plans,
such as the section 401(k), use the inflation risk-free feature to avoid uncertainty about
future income.
With the inflation hedge feature, inflation-indexed bonds allow investors to
effectively conduct asset-liability management.237 Those with long-term liabilities can
match the future cash flow from the inflation-indexed bonds with their future liabilities,
which increase along with inflation. For example, employers who have obligations from
defined benefit plans can acquire from inflation-indexed bonds the cash flow to provide
employees with promised pension benefits. Benefits from defined benefit plans are
generally based on the employee’s last few years’ average salary, which tends to increase
with inflation. Thus, employers need to invest in inflation-indexed bonds to match their
cash flow (assets) with pension obligations (liabilities). Only inflation-indexed bonds can
match future assets with future liabilities.238

b. Reduced Costs of Bond Issuing
Because inflation-indexed bonds have no inflation risk, the issuer of those bonds
need not incur an inflation risk premium to compensate for the uncertainty of inflation
risk. As a result, the issuer of inflation-indexed bonds can save the cost of the inflation
risk premium.
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If a country’s tax revenue does not meet the required government spending, the
country issues government bonds to raise funds for government expenditures. The
government must pay interest to the investors of its issued bonds. If the government
issues nominal bonds, it must give investors interest that includes inflation risk premiums.
Therefore, if the government issues inflation-indexed bonds, it can reduce the cost of
issuing government bonds. When inflation-indexed government bonds were first
introduced to the United States, the U.S. Treasury officials emphasized this cost saving
feature as the most important reason to issue those bonds.239
Corporations also issue corporate bonds to finance their business. If corporations
issue inflation-indexed bonds, investors will not ask for inflation risk premiums. Thus,
inflation-indexed bonds can serve as a cost saver for corporations, easing a corporation’s
financing.

c. Less Volatility
According to an empirical analysis, inflation-indexed bonds, in the long run, have
less volatility of yield and return than conventional bonds.240 The experience of the
United Kingdom also indicates that the return of inflation-indexed bonds is less volatile
than that of other conventional bonds.241 This lower volatility means reduced price
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fluctuation. Although buyers of inflation-indexed bonds are likely to be long-term
investors that tend to hold the bonds until maturity, some might want to sell the bonds
before maturity to acquire capital gains. The lower volatility of inflation-indexed bonds
can be an appropriate investment vehicle for investors who want stable products even
when trading in the secondary markets.

d. Providing Investment Vehicles Appropriate to LongTerm Investors
Institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension funds tend to
invest over a long period of time. This tendency is related to the financial structure of the
institutional investors. These long-term investors have long-term liabilities such as
insurance money and pension benefits. They have difficulty in making long-term asset
management plans because inflation reduces the real yield of their financial assets.
Therefore, institutional investors who want to manage their assets stably need to invest in
inflation-indexed bonds. Individual investors also should pay attention to inflationindexed bonds if they need long-term investment for future expenses, such as preparing
for children’s college tuitions or their own retirement income. Accordingly, inflationindexed bonds are good investment tools for long-term investors.

e. Enabling Investors to Effectively Establish Portfolios
Investors should set up portfolios that consist of a variety of investment products,
such as stocks, bonds and mutual funds. If a person invests only in a particular financial
product, her investment has a high probability that it will suffer a big loss. If the risky
investment strategy is not successful, the investor has no way to compensate for the loss.
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Therefore, the success of an investment depends on establishing appropriate asset
allocations.
Inflation-indexed bonds give investors an opportunity to diversify their
portfolios.242 Most investors buy bonds to improve their portfolio’s stability while they
purchase stocks to raise their portfolio’s profitability. Inflation-indexed bonds can replace,
or added to, conventional bonds. Those who are particularly vulnerable to inflation, such
as retirement savers, need to include inflation-indexed bonds in their portfolios. As
retirement approaches, workers should increase the proportion of inflation-indexed bonds
in their portfolios.243 They need to concentrate on avoiding unexpected losses that are not
likely to be recovered due to lack of opportunities to adjust investment strategies.
Pursuing additional gains is too risky for savers approaching retirement. Inflationindexed bonds can play a significant role in diversifying portfolios of investors,
particularly retirement savers.

3. Reasons for Issuing InflationIndexed Bonds
a. HyperInflation Countries

Hyper-inflation means an enormous decline in currency value. Economic subjects
in a country suffering from hyper-inflation do not trust in financial products denominated
in the country’s currency. As a result, the government in a hyper-inflation country has
difficulty issuing its government bonds to finance its business. Investors needed
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compensation for a big loss from hyper-inflation. When it comes to long-term investment
such as holding government bonds, this compensation is much more significant for
investors because they can easily predict a great loss over a long period of time.
Israel and many South American countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, have
experienced hyper-inflation. Those countries decided to issue government inflationindexed bonds to raise funds necessary for conducting their government policies. This
strategy was successful. Particularly in Israel, which first issued the bonds in 1955,
government inflation-indexed bonds account for an overwhelming majority among the
country’s total marketable debt.244 In hyper-inflation countries, the purpose of issuing
inflation-indexed bonds was raising funds itself.

b. Advanced Countries
Unlike hyper-inflation countries, advanced countries such as the United States
and the United Kingdom have not experienced difficulties in issuing their government
bonds. For those countries, raising funds itself is not the purpose of issuing inflationindexed bonds. Government bonds in the advanced countries were already important
investment vehicles before government inflation-indexed bonds were introduced. In those
countries, government bonds were already attractive to investors, especially to those who
wanted a stable financial product. Government bonds have no credit risk, a risk of
investors not being paid the principal and interest due to the issuer’s default. Therefore,
investors who prefer stability to profitability buy the risk-free, or more accurately, credit
risk-free bonds.
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Another risk included in bonds is inflation risk. In countries that do not suffer
from hyper-inflation, the inflation risk of government bonds is much lower than in hyperinflation countries. Therefore, investors in countries not experiencing hyper-inflation can
endure inflation risk as a normal risk of investing. Accordingly, those countries had no
difficulty in issuing their government bonds, even conventional bonds. Then, the primary
goals of introducing government inflation-indexed bonds are to save issuing cost and to
provide diverse investment opportunities. Developing capital markets can be another goal.
Inflation-indexed bonds can expand the demand for bonds and facilitate the development
of relevant derivatives.
To sum up, in advanced countries, the reasons to introduce inflation-indexed
bonds are related to qualitative development, not quantitative growth.

4. Tax Issues
Taxes are essential for any government to run the country. But taxes may hurt the
economy. One of these effects is to reduce real return of financial products. The most
important function of inflation-indexed bonds is to protect investors from inflation risk.
As far as inflation-indexed bonds are concerned, tax issues deal with the increase in the
principal or interest resulting from inflation adjustment. Taxation on this increase reduces
the inflation protection for the bond investors.245
Taxation on the increase in payment caused by inflation can reduce the demand
for inflation-indexed bonds, because investors are likely to think they benefit less from
those bonds. Particularly at the first stage of introducing inflation-indexed bonds, such
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taxation may be an obstacle to those bonds taking root in financial markets. Therefore,
tax law should be cautious as to its policy concerning inflation-indexed bonds: whether to,
or how much to, impose tax on the amount of increase from inflation adjustment.

5. Principal Guarantee Issues
Inflation-indexed bond investors expect to receive real returns exceeding inflation.
This benefit is due to the principal and interest of inflation bonds being adjusted by
inflation rate. When the principal and interest increase with inflation, the investors have
no problem with the bonds. However, investors face a different situation during deflation
when the overall price level goes down. Deflation can even reduce the amount of the
principal of inflation-indexed bonds. In terms of real returns, that reduction does not
damage the expectation of the investors. However, in terms of nominal returns, the
reduction makes investors feel that they suffered a loss. Guaranteeing the principal helps
inflation-indexed bonds look attractive to investors. On the other hand, the issuer of the
inflation-indexed bond that guarantees the principal must give investors the guaranteed
principal even during deflation, despite the fact that the issuer’s income decreases during
deflation. This principal guarantee results in a mismatch of the issuer’s incomings and
outgoings.246 Therefore, whether to guarantee the principal of inflation-indexed bonds
should be decided cautiously, considering the primary goal of introducing inflationindexed bond systems.
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B. Classification of InflationIndexed Bonds
1. Government InflationIndexed Bonds
a. History of Government InflationIndexed Bonds
In 1780 during the Revolutionary War, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
issued inflation-indexed bonds to the U.S. Army soldiers.247 These bonds are known as
the first inflation-indexed bonds issued in the world.248 At that time, the government used
the inflation bonds as a tool for a “deferred compensation,” because the soldiers were
likely to lose the bonds’ purchasing power because of wartime hyper-inflation.249
Finland is the first country to issue government inflation-indexed bonds in the 20th
century. The Scandinavian country issued those bonds in 1945 when it expected high
inflation to occur: a rapid increase in money supply had resulted from indemnity
payments that the Finland government gave to evacuees of territories ceded to the Soviet
Union due to the Second World War.250 Israel then introduced government inflationindexed bonds in the mid-1950s to protect long-term capital markets from hyperinflation.251 Chile (1956), Brazil (1964), Colombia (1967) and Argentina (1973) also
began issuing government inflation-indexed bonds to protect the purchasing power of
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their government bonds from hyper-inflation.252 Like these South American countries, in
1964 Iceland introduced the indexing of government bonds to the price level as
protection from inflation.253
The primary goal of introducing government inflation-indexed bonds in these
countries was to protect investors from inflation risk, and thereby aid the issuance of
government bonds. However, countries that did not suffer hyper-inflation also began
issuing government inflation-indexed bonds. Low-inflation countries introduced the
bonds as a “complement” to conventional government bonds.254 These relatively
advanced countries issued government inflation bonds to save issuance costs, diversify
investment vehicles and develop capital markets.
From the perspective of bond buyers, government inflation-indexed bonds are
worth investing in even in low-inflation countries. This is because even low-inflation
would result in a big loss of purchasing power over a long period of time.255 The first
low-inflation country to introduce government inflation-indexed bonds was New Zealand,
in 1975.256 Since then, many low-inflation countries have begun issuing government
inflation-indexed bonds: the United Kingdom (1981), Australia (1985), Canada (1991),
and Sweden (1994).257 The United States has been issuing government inflation-indexed
bonds, Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS), since 1997. Following the United
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States, France began issuing the bonds in 1998.258 Japan introduced the bonds in 2004.259
Korea has been issuing its government inflation-indexed bonds, called Inflation-Linked
Korean Treasury Bonds (KTBi), since 2007.260

b. Experiences of Various Countries
The reasons each country introduced government inflation-indexed bonds varied.
Hyper-inflation countries issued them to finance budget deficits and maintain long-term
capital markets. Those countries had suffered from a price increase until the mid1990s.261 Because of the high inflation rate, private sectors in those countries also took
advantage of indexation. Even bank deposits were indexed to inflation.262 These
extensive inflation indexations contributed to raising funds necessary for operating
government and private sectors.
However, the wide use of indexation had adverse effects as well. The most
serious problem is that indexation causes “inflation inertia” and makes people in a society
take inflation as a matter of course.263 In this situation, the government has difficulty
conducting inflation restraining polices, because inflation expectations of economic
subjects hinder the implementation of those polices. After all, inflation indexation,

258

See Ciaran O’Hagan, The French Experience, in HANDBOOK OF INFLATION INDEXED
BONDS 229, 229 (John Brynjolesson & Frank J. Fabozzi eds., 1999).
259
See Ministry of Finance Japan, Features of Inflation-Indexed Bonds,
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/bonds/iib/features%20of%20iib.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
260
See Press Release, Ministry of Finance and Economy Republic of Korea, supra note
246.
261
For example, in 1989, Argentina’s inflation rate was over 3,000 percent. See Price,
supra note 250, at 23.
262
See id. at 21.
263
See id.

83

particularly in hyper-inflation countries, can encourage the government and individuals to
“live with inflation.”264
In an effort to stop the “inflation inertia,” Finland banned indexation in financial
and labor markets by a government act in 1968, when the issuance of its government
inflation-indexed bonds was also discontinued.265 Argentina prohibited indexation in all
contracts in 1991 according to the Convertibility Law.266 Therefore, the country stopped
issuing government inflation-indexed bonds in 1991, and since then has issued
government bonds denominated in foreign currencies.267 Argentina’s inflation rate has
fallen from over 3,000%to around 4%between 1989 and 1994.268 However, it is difficult
to say that this dramatic achievement was achieved through the de-indexation. The
government’s economic stabilization policy, including dollarization, seems to have been
the major factor for the stabilized price level.269
Unlike Finland and Argentina, which took extreme measures of abolishing
indexation, some countries adopted incremental approaches to de-indexation. Iceland did
not abolish indexation systems completely, but has decreased the scope of indexation.
The North Atlantic country has incrementally ceased indexation from financial products
with a maturity below seven years by 2000.270 The inflation rate of the country has
decreased remarkably since 1990, although the causation between the de-indexation and
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the price stability is not clear.271 Chile and Brazil are also incrementally reducing the
scope of inflation indexation.272 Israel, in contrast, maintains its inflation indexation,273
and the proportion of the inflation-indexed bonds among the country’s total national debt
is still around eighty percent.274
While those high-inflation countries tend to reduce the issuance of inflationindexed bonds due to the “inflation inertia,” relatively low- and moderate-inflation
countries, most of which are advanced countries, do not experience the same issue. As
mentioned, those low-inflation countries introduced government inflation-indexed bonds
mainly to save the cost of issuing government bonds and to provide a variety of
investment tools for market participants. Developing capital markets is another major
reason to introduce the indexed bonds.
The United Kingdom introduced its government inflation-indexed bonds, Indexed
Gilts (IGs), in 1981, for almost the same reasons as above. The U.K. introduced IGs for
three official reasons. The first reason was to raise economic subjects’ confidence in the
government’s anti-inflation policy.275 Governments can intentionally induce inflation to
reduce the real value of their liabilities. If the government indexes its debt to inflation, it
has no reason to cause inflation, because increase in inflation rate means increase in the
amount of payment the government must provide for the debt holder. Therefore, the
introduction of government inflation-indexed bonds can give the country’s economic
subjects a strong signal of the government’s intent to fight inflation. This signal effect
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rarely works in hyper-inflation countries in which everyone is aware that the inflation is
chronic and that the government has difficulty lowering the inflation rate. However, the
effect does work in relatively low- or moderate-inflation countries because the people
believe that their government has the ability to control inflation.
The second reason that the U.K. introduced IGs was to reduce the cost of issuing
government bonds,276 typical for all the moderate-inflation countries adopting
government inflation-indexed bonds.
The third reason was to facilitate the control of money supply.277 If a government
spends money, the country’s money aggregate increases. If the increase in money supply
is excessive, it raises inflation pressure. In response to the pressure, the country’s central
bank should take measures to reduce the increased money supply. This process places a
heavy burden on the central bank, resulting in lowered efficiency of monetary policy.
Even when market participants expect inflation, the government that issues inflationindexed bonds does not need to raise the bonds’ nominal interest rate, because the interest
rate of inflation-indexed bonds does not include inflation risk premiums. The central
bank, whose primary goal is to stabilize prices, can reduce the burden of responding to
inflation pressure from the government’s additional expenditures. This relief gives the
central bank more room to fight inflation. In the U.K., the inflation rate is relatively
low.278 Studies show that the U.K. saved on costs of bearing government debts by issuing
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IGs.279 Thus, the U.K.’s experience with government inflation-indexed bonds seems
successful.
Australia had an unusual reason to introduce government inflation-indexed bonds,
apart from the typical ones such as saving issuance costs. The government indexed bonds,
called Treasury Indexed Bonds (TIBs), were introduced in 1985.Australia considered it
important to provide useful retirement income saving vehicles. The Oceanic country
wanted to provide pension and insurance funds with inflation protection tools by issuing
government inflation-indexed bonds.280 The fact that Australia clearly expressed
retirement income security as one of the main goals of introducing TIBs is full of
suggestions. The country has been issuing Indexed Annuity Bonds (IABs) along with the
traditional Capital Indexed Bonds (CIBs).281 IABs are appropriate for retirement saving.
The Australian model indicates that government inflation-indexed bonds can play a
significant role in retirement income security.
Canada began issuing its government inflation-indexed bonds, called Real-Return
Bonds (RRBs), in 1991. As with the examples of other advanced countries, one of the
reasons to issue RRBs is to save the cost of issuing government bonds.282 However, the
most important reason is connected with the North American country’s price stability
policy. The Canadian government and the Bank of Canada, the country’s central bank,
made an agreement on inflation-control targets in 1991.283 This type of monetary policy
is called inflation targeting, under which the central bank has the responsibility to control
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inflation within a target band during a certain period of time: for instance, 1%-3% of the
CPI inflation for three years. The target is determined by the accord between the
government and the central bank. Under the inflation targeting system, the central bank’s
performance is evaluated primarily by whether inflation was maintained within the
specified target.284 In some countries such as New Zealand, the governor of the central
bank must step down if the central bank fails to keep inflation within the target. The
inflation targeting policy sends each economic subject a strong signal of the government
and central bank’s firm intention to stabilize prices. Therefore, the policy is a significant
measure for price stability. To support the inflation targeting system, Canada decided to
issue government inflation-indexed bonds (RRBs). The first effect of RRBs is to raise
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stage of conducting their monetary policy, use policy measures they can control, such as the
Federal Funds Rate (FFR) which the Federal Reserve System controls through open market
operations. The first policy measure affects the intermediate goal that in turn influences the
ultimate goal. On the other hand, the central banks adopting the inflation targeting policy do not
establish an intermediate goal such as the amount of money supply or a certain level of interest
rate. They instead directly aim for its ultimate goal of price stability expressed by a target band. It
controls the first policy measures such as FFR, considering all the information variables such as
interest rates in bond markets, currency aggregate and financial market conditions. Although the
primary goal for the central bank operating the inflation targeting is stabilizing prices, inflation
targeting does not mean that the central bank gives up other policy goals such as supporting stable
economic growth. For example, the inflation target is determined as a band such as 2%-4%. The
purpose of establishing the minimum level of the inflation rate is to prevent the central bank from
conducting its policy only to suppress prices which might cause depression. Still, the majority of
the countries in the world operate the traditional monetary policy. The United States, Germany
and Japan are examples of the traditional monetary policy. Some twenty countries, such as the
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Korea, adopted the inflation targeting system.
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people’s confidence in the government’s willingness to stabilize prices, because inflation
implies additional government expenditures for paying the increased principal and
interest of RRBs.285
Additionally, RRBs can provide the Bank of Canada with inflation expectations,
useful information for conducting the inflation targeting policy.286 Many of the countries
adopting the inflation targeting system are issuing government inflation-indexed bonds.
The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada operate the inflation targeting
system along with the government inflation-indexed bond system. Those bonds seem to
play a significant role in countries that regard price stability as one of the most important
policy goals of the country.
The low- and moderate-inflation countries have operated their government
inflation-indexed bond system to fit in with the purpose of introducing those bonds.
Those countries, unlike the hyper-inflation countries, do not try to abolish or reduce
government inflation-indexed bonds. Rather, the low- or moderate-inflation countries are
trying to increase the volume of government inflation-indexed bonds so that they may
save the cost of issuing government bonds, support retirement savers and facilitate the
price stability policy.

c. Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS)
The U.S. government decided to issue its government inflation-indexed bonds
later than other major advanced countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada. The
experiences of other countries showed the U.S. government that government inflation-
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indexed bonds could save the costs of issuing government bonds.287 The successful
experiences had the U.S. government hold a strong conviction that it could also succeed
in issuing government inflation indexed bonds. Practically, the U.S. Treasury received
much advice from the U.K. and Canadian government officials with regard to issuing
government inflation-indexed bonds.288 The Treasury also asked financial market
participants for their opinions on issuing the bonds.289 After studying this information, the
U.S. government finally decided to issue government inflation-indexed bonds.
In 1997, the United States introduced its federal government issued inflationindexed bonds, Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS). The official name of TIPS
was the Treasury Inflation-Indexed Securities (TIIS), but TIPS is generally used as the
name of the U.S. government inflation-indexed bonds. Even the official name has
changed to the Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) as auction rules were
converted to plain language.290 The primary reason of issuing TIPS was to reduce the cost
of issuing government bonds.291 The expectation that TIPS will help raise the national
savings rate was another reason to issue the bonds, because TIPS can offer
unsophisticated investors an appropriate investment tool with protection from inflation.292
The United States government also thought that TIPS could restrain the
government’s temptation to conduct policies causing inflation, and provide the Federal
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Reserve Board with useful information on inflation expectations.293 The U.S. Treasury
expected TIPS to play a significant role in raising investor’s confidence in inflationindexed bonds.294 The Treasury regarded inflation-indexed bonds as important because
those bonds can be critical to investors. Inflation-indexed bonds can provide a good
investment instrument to individual investors preparing for retirement. Particularly
defined contribution plans, unlike defined benefit plans managed by employers, can be
the target of inflation-indexed bonds. This is because individual workers who participate
in defined contribution plans have the responsibility of risks from investment. Because
most workers, especially low-income workers, have little knowledge of investments, they
normally invest in financial products with low risk/low return. The ordinary workers who
have this low risk investment strategy can take advantage of inflation-indexed bonds that
guarantee a specified level of real return. The U.S. government believes inflation-indexed
bonds get more attention from ordinary workers who participate in defined contribution
plans.295 The government also expects inflation-indexed bonds to enable institutional
investors to diversify investment portfolios.296
The basic structure of TIPS is that of capital indexed bonds,297 the principle of
which adjusts with inflation. Most commentators recommended this structure under
which both the principle and interest vary with inflation.298 The structure is similar to that
of government inflation-indexed bonds of the U.K. and Canada, and that of capital
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indexed bonds of Australian government indexed bonds.299 The U.S. Treasury officially
expresses that the structure of TIPS is similar to that of Real Return Bonds (RRBs) of
Canada.300
Chapter 31 of Title 31 of the United States Code authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury to borrow money and issue securities on behalf of the government. It also
authorizes the Secretary to prescribe the terms and conditions for issuing the United
States obligations including bonds301 and notes.302 According to the authorization, the
Secretary regulates terms and conditions of securities issued by the government.303
TIPS can be divided into two types: notes and bonds. Notes have maturities of at
least one year, but not more than ten years.304 Bonds have maturities of more than ten
years.305 There is no difference between notes and bonds except for the maturity.
Therefore, this dissertation does not make a distinction between the two, and uses bonds
as a general term for the two securities.
According to the Treasury Regulations, TIPS have four features in addition to
maturity. First, TIPS’s interest is calculated by applying a specified interest rate to the
inflation-adjusted principal on each interest payment date.306 The “inflation-adjusted
principal” is the value of the security derived by multiplying the par amount by the index
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ratio, calculated by dividing the CPI of a particular date by the CPI of the original issue
date.307 This provision indicates that TIPS have the characteristic of capital indexed
bonds. Second, TIPS pay holders the interest semiannually.308 Third, the holder of TIPS
receives, at maturity, the inflation-adjusted principal or the par amount, whichever is
greater.309 This provision means TIPS guarantee that investors will get the nominal face
value of the principal regardless of inflation rate. Due to this principal guarantee
provision, investors in TIPS can be paid the amount of the principal specified on the issue
date even during deflation. TIPS are also sold at discount, par, or premium.310 These
auction types are the same as those of other government issued securities.
Besides the basic features described above, TIPS are applicable to the Separate
Trading of Registered Interest and Principal Securities (STRIPS) program, under which
investors can trade TIPS’s principal and interest separately.311 “Stripping” can be
implemented at any time from issuance until maturity.312 With regard to STRIPS, the
Code of Federal Regulations prescribes the provision of paying principal at maturity. If
the inflation-adjusted principal is less than the par amount due to deflation, the method of
paying the principal differs depending on whether the security has been stripped or not. If
the bond is not stripped, the par amount of the principal is given to the holder of the bond;
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if the bond is stripped, the par amount is paid to the holder of the principal component
only.313
The essential factor for calculating the index ratio is the Consumer Price Index
(CPI). The Code provides that the price index is the U.S. City Average All Items
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U).314 The calculation of the index
ratio has a three-month lag.315 That means that the CPI used as the numerator in
calculating the index ratio on a particular date is the one published three months ago.
The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe
regulations relating to the federal income tax treatment of debt instruments.316 According
to the authorization, the Secretary provides for regulations of the federal income tax on
inflation-indexed bonds including TIPS.317
As mentioned earlier, the tax treatment of inflation-indexed bonds affects the
inflation protection feature of the bonds and the marketability of the bonds.318 Therefore,
the tax policy regarding inflation-indexed bonds needs to be flexible depending on the
market conditions. The fact that the Treasury regulations concerning inflation-indexed
bonds are temporary319 seems to reflect the need for flexibility.
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According to federal tax regulations, federal income tax is imposed on the
increase in the inflation-adjusted principal amount as well as interest paid to the holder.320
The increased inflation-adjusted principal amount is treated as the Original Issue
Discount (OID).321 OID is a difference between par value and current value of the
principal of a bond, and federal income tax is imposed on OID. The income tax on the
increase is imposed each taxable year.322 Therefore, the holder, prior to maturity, must
pay an income tax on the part he did not receive because the only time the holder receives
the inflation adjustment is maturity. With regard to the principal guarantee of TIPS,323 the
regulation imposes a federal income tax on the minimum guarantee payment, an
additional payment made at maturity to compensate for the inflation-adjusted principal
amount reduced by deflation.324 The minimum guarantee payment, unlike the increase in
the inflation-adjusted principal amount, is not taxed until the holder receives the
payment.325 When the holder receives the minimum guarantee payment, the payment is
regarded as interest on the date it is paid, and on which the federal income tax is
imposed.326 According to the Federal Register, the Treasury and the IRS believe that “it is
appropriate to ignore the minimum guarantee payment until it is paid,” because the
additional payment is not likely to be made.327 The U.S. government appears to have
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concluded that administrative costs are greater than the revenue from taxing the minimum
guarantee payment prior to maturity.
Since TIPS was first issued in 1997, the U.S. government indexed bonds have
successfully attracted investors. Market participants now recognize that TIPS are a
different type of government bond that have a unique characteristic of inflation risk
hedge. Investors classify TIPS as a class of government bonds separate from
conventional government bonds. This reflects the purpose of issuing TIPS: the Treasury
does not offer TIPS as an alternative to conventional government bonds, but as an
alternative to other inflation protection vehicles.328
Since the issuance of TIPS, the volume of issuance of corporate and municipal
inflation-indexed bonds has increased.329 This indicates that TIPS contributed to
expanding the issuance of inflation-indexed bonds by corporations and municipal entities.
TIPS seem to have raised investors’ understanding of inflation-indexed bonds.
Liquidity is the biggest concern with inflation-indexed bonds, because markets for
those bonds are premature and investors’ confidence in the relatively new instruments is
not high. In addition, most investors of inflation-indexed bonds tend to hold bonds until
maturity because they are generally long-term investors, such as pension funds and
insurance companies. The U.S. Treasury was also concerned about the inflation bond’s
poor liquidity that other countries experienced when it considered issuing government
inflation-indexed bonds.330 However, the liquidity issue in the United State is not as big
as in other countries issuing inflation indexed bonds. One reason for this is that the U.S.
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inflation-indexed bond markets have more participants than any other market in the
world.331 The U.S. bond markets also have well-organized infrastructures for bond
investment, such as developed STRIPS and other derivatives markets.332 Another reason
for the relatively good liquidity of TIPS is the fact that futures contracts on TIPS are
allowed in futures markets.333
The operation of TIPS has so far been successful, and they are expected to have a
more significant role in supporting retirement income security.

d. Series I Savings Bonds
Series I savings bonds are one of the inflation-indexed bonds the U.S. government
issues. Series I savings bonds provide investors with a long-term saving tool. Thus
retirement savers can use these bonds as a vehicle for retirement income security.
Chapter 31 of the Title 31 of the United States Codes provides for savings bonds,
and it authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe relevant regulations.334
Currently, the Treasury issues two types of savings bonds: Series I savings bonds and
Series EE savings bonds.335 The basic difference between the two is the use of price
indexation: while Series I savings bonds are indexed to inflation, Series EE savings bonds
are not.336
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One of the most important features of Series I savings bonds is its nonmarketability. Savings bonds are not transferable and are payable only to the owners
named on the bonds.337 That is, Series I savings bonds cannot be traded in secondary
markets. Therefore, the Series I savings bond holders must keep those bonds until
maturity when the holders are paid the principal and interest accrued. In addition, Savings
bonds cannot be used as security for the performance of an obligation.338 This feature
indicates that Series I Savings bonds can help retirement savers stably prepare for
retirement.
Although Series I savings bonds have the merit of providing long-term investors
such as retirement savers with a stable investment tool, they also have the weakness of
lack of liquidity. First, the non-transferable feature mentioned above is the biggest reason
for the lack of liquidity. Second, the limitation for redemption is another aspect that
reduces liquidity of the bonds. When an owner of a Series I savings bond wants to
redeem the bond less than five years after the issue date, the owner cannot receive three
months of interest: the bond’s redemption date is treated as arriving three months
earlier.339
Series I savings bonds pay interest in a different way than TIPS. Series I savings
bonds calculate their interest rate by combining a fixed rate of return with a semiannual
inflation rate.340 Semiannual inflation rate here equals the six-month percentage change in
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the CPI-U.341 Series I savings bonds do not adjust the principal to inflation. They adjust
only the interest to the CPI-U. Series I savings bonds, therefore, are a type of Interest
Indexed Bonds, while TIPS are the type of Capital Indexed Bonds. In capital indexed
bonds, the interest rate does not change, while the principal changes with inflation rate.342
The Secretary of the Treasury Department announces a fixed rate, a semiannual
inflation rate, and a composites rate each May 1 and November 1.343 The fixed rate
applies to all Series I savings bonds issued during the six months since the rate was
announced, and remains the same until maturity.344 The semiannual interest rate applies
to all outstanding Series I savings bonds for the following six months.345 As mentioned
earlier, the interest accrual of Series I savings bonds is based on the composite rate.346
The composite rate is an annual rate; the composite annual rate combines an annual fixed
rate of return and a semiannual inflation rate.347 The owner of a Series I savings bond
earns interest calculated by the annual composite rate every month, and the amount of the
interest is added to the bond’s value on the first day of the following month.348 The
accrued interest compounds semiannually until maturity.349
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The temporary regulations relating to the federal income tax treatment of
inflation-indexed debt instruments do not apply to the U.S. savings bonds.350 Therefore,
many of the federal income tax regulations applying to TIPS, such as taxing the increase
in the inflation-adjusted principal amount, are not applicable to Series I savings bonds.
The federal income tax treatment of Series I savings bonds is basically the same as other
bonds. Interest of the bonds is subject to all taxes imposed under the Internal Revenue
Code, and they are also subject to Federal and State estate, inheritance, gift, or other
excise taxes.351 The Series I savings bonds are exempt from all other state or local
taxes.352 The owner of Series I savings bonds may defer reporting interest to the year of
final maturity, redemption, or other disposition, whichever is earliest.353
Only a person who has a taxpayer identification number (TIN) can own a Series I
savings bond.354 The TIN is an individual’s social security account number (SSN) or an
employer identification number (EIN).355 This TIN requirement indicates the bonds’
basic feature of supporting the U.S. residents’ savings.356
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e. InflationLinked Korean Treasury Bonds (KTBi)
Korea began issuing its government inflation-indexed bonds called InflationLinked Korean Treasury Bonds (KTBi) in 2007. The purposes of issuing KTBi can be
classified into three categories: (1) aspects of budget management, (2) aspects of
financial markets, and (3) aspects of macroeconomics. In terms of budget management,
the first reason to issue KTBi is to save the cost of issuing government bonds by reducing
inflation risk premiums.357 The second reason is to raise the demand for government
bonds by introducing a new government bond product.358 The third reason with regard to
budget management is to strengthen the asset/liabilities management.359 Tax revenue
increases with inflation, during which the government must pay more interest on
government inflation-indexed bonds. Therefore, government inflation-indexed bonds can
match the cash flow of assets with that of liabilities.360
From the perspective of financial markets, KTBi can raise the stability and
profitability of investment portfolios, and provide a benchmark interest rate for corporate
inflation-indexed bonds.361 In addition, KTBi is expected to facilitate the globalization of
Korean financial markets by encouraging market participants to develop financial
derivatives, such as SWAPS, futures and options.362 This market development can help
Korea prepare for the full opening of its financial markets.363 The Korean government

357

See Press Release, Ministry of Finance and Economy Republic of Korea, supra note

246.
358

See id.
See id.
360
See id.
361
See id.
362
See id.
363
See id.
359

101

already made the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States government,364
and is negotiating on the FTA with the EU. If the FTAs with those advanced countries
take effect, more sophisticated financial techniques, such as a variety of derivatives, will
be introduced to Korean financial markets. Korean financial institutions and markets can
minimize shocks arising from the opening of markets by developing advanced financial
techniques before the opening takes effect.
From the perspective of macroeconomics, the Korean government expects the
issuance of KTBi to show the government’s intention to stabilize prices to markets.365
This signal can help get rid of unnecessary inflation expectation in financial markets.366
The KTBi is also expected to help raise the efficiency of the monetary policy of the Bank
of Korea: inflation expectation measured by subtracting real interest rate of KTBi from
nominal interest rate can provide the central bank with useful information concerning a
preemptive monetary policy.367 In addition, the Korean government expects KTBi to
serve as a counter-cyclical fiscal stabilizer: if the economy is overheated, the
government’s cost of paying interest increases, and the government needs additional fund
raising which results in absorbing money in the economy, and vice versa.368 Furthermore,
KTBi can stabilize the country’s economy because they may suppress what is called
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inflationary spending, or excessive spending arising during inflation, by providing
investment tools guaranteeing real return.369
The State Bond Act provides that the Minister of the Ministry of Finance and
Economy issues government bonds.370 In addition, the Act authorizes the Minister of the
Ministry to prescribe the terms and conditions of issuing government bonds.371 According
to the authorization, the Minister established the Regulation on State Bonds and Primary
Dealers of State Bonds. The regulation provides for the terms and conditions of KTBi.
The reference price index of KTBi is the CPI.372 In terms of the method of
calculating principal and interest, KTBi are capital indexed bonds. As mentioned earlier,
the United States adopted the capital indexed bond type through the advice of Canada.
According to the Korean government, the reason it has adopted the so-called “Canadian
Model” is to prevent the global investor’s confusion by following the global standard.373
The volume of the Korean financial market is considerably smaller compared with that of
other advanced countries such as the United States. The reputation of the Korean market
is also not as high as the world’s leading financial markets, such as the United States and
the United Kingdom’s. Therefore, the Korean financial market has difficulty securing
foreign investors who invest all or most of their funds in the Korean market. Most of the
foreign investors in the Korean market regard it as a complementary market for
diversifying portfolios. Accordingly, the Korean financial market should adopt
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international standards so that investors may invest in the market without the additional
burden of adapting to a new investment environment. It is particularly important for the
Korean market to attract investors from the U.S. market, the world’s largest. The Korean
government’s decision to follow the capital indexed bond type, like the U.S. government,
appears to be appropriate to the Korean financial market.
Because KTBi has adopted the Canadian model, the calculation method of the
principal and interest of KTBi is the same as that of TIPS. Like TIPS, the index ratio of
KTBi is measured by dividing the CPI of a particular date by the CPI of the original issue
date.374 The three-month time lag also exists in KTBi. The index ratio is announced on
the websites of the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the Bank of Korea and Korea
Exchange so that investors can estimate the price or yield of KTBi.375 If the CPI is
reformed, the government can choose to continue using the existing unreformed CPI and
index ratio instead of adopting the new CPI.376
Korea introduced STRIPS in 2006 to develop government bond markets. The
holder of a government bond with a maturity of five or more years can separate the bond
into principal and interest, or recombine the two separated parts.377 However, STRIPS is
not applied to KTBi.378 The main reason is that both STRIPS and KTBi have not yet
taken root in the Korean government bond market. However, if STRIPS becomes familiar
to investors and the outstanding volume of KTBi gets bigger, STRIPS will apply to KTBi
as well.
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KTBi do not guarantee the principal amount during deflation.379 Guaranteeing the
principal has the advantage of increasing demand for the bond by eliminating the concern
of losing part of the principal. However, the principal guarantee has weaknesses as well.
One weak point is that the guarantee weakens the stability of asset/liability management
of the government, because the government must pay the par value of the principal even
during deflation when its tax revenue tends to decrease.380 Another defect of guaranteeing
the principal is that the inflation bond’s function as a counter-cyclical fiscal stabilizer
weakens, because the government has to raise funds for the additional payment during
deflation.381 It seems that the Korean government chose not to guarantee the principal of
KTBi to prevent problems with budget management.
Korean income tax law does not impose income taxes on the increase in the
principal amount of KTBi caused by inflation.382 The Korean income tax law called the
Income Tax Act, like the United States counterpart, basically imposes income tax on the
original issue discount (OID) as an interest income.383 However, the Act authorizes the
President to prescribe the details of the interest income provision.384 According to the
authorization, the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act provides that the increase
in the inflation-adjusted principal amount is not included in the OID prescribed in the
Income Tax Act.385
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The main purpose for this favorable tax treatment for KTBi is to encourage use of
KTBi by financial markets.386 Korean tax policy-makers387 give another reason for
exempting income taxes from the increase: if an income tax is imposed on the increase in
the inflation-adjusted principal, the income tax must be collected even though the
increase has not been paid to the holder.388 The tax policy authority seems to regard that
result as unreasonable. However, the main reason for the tax exemption is to support
efforts for developing government bond markets.389
The volume of KTBi issued has not been considerable so far, because KTBi has a
very short history. However, the newly introduced government bonds are getting more
attention from investors, particularly long-term investors such as pension funds and
insurance companies.

f. Comparison of TIPS and Series I Savings Bonds
TIPS and Series I savings bonds have a common characteristic in that they are
issued by the U.S. government and indexed to the CPI-U. However, there are many
differences between the two government inflation-indexed bonds.
First of all, TIPS and Series I savings bonds use different methods to calculate the
principal and interest. TIPS are a type of capital indexed bonds, while Series I savings
bonds have features of interest indexed bonds. TIPS adjust the principal to inflation, and
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a fixed interest rate applies to the inflation-adjusted principal. In contrast, Series I savings
bonds do not change the amount of the principal. Instead, they adjust an interest rate to
inflation. The inflation-adjusted interest rate applies to the unchanged principal.
Secondly, marketability is a big difference between the two. TIPS are freely
transferrable in secondary markets, and even STRIPS is applicable to TIPS.390 The
Treasury regulation concerning government securities provides TIPS as one of the U.S.
Treasury Marketable Securities.391 On the other hand, Series I savings bonds are not
transferable and are payable only to the owners whose name is written on the bond.392
An inflation indexing cycle is another difference between the two inflationindexed bonds. TIPS adjust the principal and interest to the CPI-U published monthly.393
Series I savings bonds, however, make an inflation adjustment semiannually, because the
Treasury Secretary announces semiannually a composite rate that combines an annual
fixed rate of return and a semiannual inflation rate.394
Requirements for ownership also differ between TIPS and Series I savings bonds.
In order to buy and own Series I savings bonds, the purchaser must have a taxpayer
identification number (TIN) such as a social security number (SSN).395 Basically, the
owner must be a taxpayer of the United States. This relates to the purpose of the savings
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bond system in supporting long-term savings of U.S. residents. In contrast, TIPS have no
such requirement. Thus even foreign investors may freely buy and hold TIPS.
The ability of the holder to cash a bond is another difference between TIPS and
Series I savings bonds. The holder of TIPS, even before maturity, may cash in those
bonds by selling them in secondary markets. However, the holder of Series I savings
bonds cannot sell them in secondary markets because the bonds are not transferable.396
Furthermore, the redemption prior to maturity is considerably restrictive. The owner of
Series I savings bonds issued on February 1, 2003 or thereafter cannot redeem those
bonds within twelve months from the issue date.397 If the owner redeems the bonds less
than five years after the issue date, he must pay a three-month interest penalty.398 These
provisions restricting early disposal fit the purpose of the savings bond system of
supporting long-term savings. Potential investors in Series I savings bonds need to be
cautious about the restrictions before investing in those bonds.

g. Comparison of TIPS and KTBi
TIPS and KTBi basically have the same structure. First, the two government
inflation-indexed bonds are types of capital indexed bonds. Under that scheme, the
principal is adjusted to inflation rate, and interest is calculated by multiplying the
inflation-adjusted principal by a specified interest rate determined when the bond was
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issued. The reference price index is also the same: the CPI-U. Even the three-month lag
of the CPI-U is the same.
Despite the similarity of the structure, there are some differences between TIPS
and KTBi. First, there is the difference of financial market environments. Separate
Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities (STRIPS) is a useful system in
that it satisfies a variety of investor demands. STRIPS raises the liquidity of a bond by
allowing investors to trade the principal and interest separately. On one hand, STRIPS
facilitates the development of the bond’s market. On the other hand, it needs a developed
market. A quantitatively and qualitatively mature market can provide room for investors
to take advantage of diverse investment schemes. The United States government bond
market was already prepared to for TIPS investors to use the advanced skill of STRIPS
when TIPS was first introduced in 1997. The U.S. government bond market is the
world’s largest, and even central banks of various countries, let alone general investors,
buy and hold an enormous amount of U.S. Treasury bonds.399 The participants in the
market are also the world’s most sophisticated investors, equipped with a variety of
advanced investment techniques. Accordingly, STRIPS had been used since 1982 by
many investors in the U.S. government bond market, long before TIPS were first
introduced. Therefore, there was no problem applying STRIPS to TIPS.
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However, the Korean government bond market is not in the same situation. The
volume of Korean government bonds issued is still insufficient to satisfy investor
demands. This is mainly because the Korean government traditionally has tended to avert
budget deficit, resulting in a relatively small volume of outstanding government bonds.
Because of this quantitative lack of government bonds, there was not much room for
investors to take advantage of advanced investment skills. Furthermore, STRIPS was first
introduced to the Korean government bond market in 2006. STRIPS itself has not taken
root in Korean bond markets. The Korean government bond market needs to adapt itself
to STRIPS. The outstanding volume of KTBi is still considerably small, and it is difficult
to say that KTBi has taken root in the Korean government bond market. Therefore, the
Korean government decided to hold the introduction of STRIPS.400 Prohibiting KTBi
from being applicable to STRIPS does not necessarily mean that KTBi investors
permanently cannot use the STRIPS system. If the STRIPS and KTBi markets become
more mature, STRIPS is expected to be applicable to KTBi.
One of the differences between TIPS and KTBi is tax treatment. The United
States imposes federal income taxes on the increase in the inflation-adjusted principal
amount, treating it as interest.401 This tax imposition is consistent with the U.S. tax policy.
It, however, can reduce the demand for TIPS because the tax imposition decreases the
real return investors would get. Because the tax imposition can be an obstacle to
attracting investors, the Korean government decided not to impose income tax on the
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increase in the inflation-adjusted principal amount.402 The Korean government expresses
clearly that the tax exemption is meant to support the development of its government
inflation-indexed bond market.403 Surely enough, the tax exemption on the increase in the
inflation-adjusted principal can serve as an incentive for government bond investors.
Particularly, the volume of the Korean government bond market is still relatively small.
Moreover, the KTBi market is in a growth period. In addition, the basic purpose of
buying inflation-indexed bonds is to secure real return over a certain level. Therefore,
from the perspective of investors, taxation on the increase reduces the advantage of
inflation-indexed bonds. Accordingly, the tax exemption of the increase is expected to
attract investors.
Another difference between TIPS and KTBi is the guarantee of principal.
According to the basic concept of inflation-indexed bonds, the bonds’ principal has to
decrease during deflation. From the perspective of bond investors, however, decrease in
the principal may be unacceptable because the investors have a tendency to prefer riskfree assets. Such bond investors can recognize the reduction of part of the principal as a
loss. The United States adopted a policy that guarantees the principal of TIPS to give
incentive to TIPS investors. TIPS guarantee the payment of the par value of the
principal.404 In contrast, Korea does not guarantee the principal of KTBi.405 This is
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mainly because the government is concerned about the possible difference between tax
revenue and expenditure.406
Guaranteeing the principal gives the government the burden of additional
payment during deflation when tax revenue tends to decrease. Although the principal
guarantee is a big difference between TIPS and KTBi, the actual difference decreases to
some extent in terms of the amount investors receives for the guarantee. The United
States imposes a federal income tax on the additional payment for guaranteeing the
principal of TIPS.407 This taxation means that the actual amount paid to the holder is less
than the amount added to the reduced inflation-adjusted principal caused by deflation.

2. Corporate InflationIndexed Bonds
a. Overview

Corporate inflation-indexed bonds are bonds that corporations issue in the form of
inflation-indexed bonds. Therefore, the basic structures of corporate inflation-indexed
bonds are the same as those of government inflation-indexed bonds such as TIPS.
Generally, these fall into two categories: The bond’s interest rate changes with inflation
rate, or a fixed interest rate applies to an inflation-adjusted principal.408 The former is an
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interest-indexed bond and the latter is a capital indexed bond.409 Most corporate inflationindexed bonds adopt the CPI-U as a reference price index with the three-month time
lag.410
Corporations, if they issue inflation-indexed bonds, can match their liabilities with
assets.411 Generally, a corporation’s earnings increase when inflation rate rises, and vice
versa. Interest of inflation-indexed bonds increases when inflation rate rises, and vice
versa. Therefore, corporations that issued inflation-indexed bonds can conduct effective
asset/liability management.
Corporations can save the cost of raising funds by issuing inflation-indexed bonds,
because issuers of such bonds do not need to pay inflation risk premiums. In addition,
corporations can reduce the cost of issuing bonds by using an inflation swap.412 Although
in financial markets swaps were first invented to hedge risks, they are often used as a tool
to save costs. An inflation swap is one of the interest swaps. In interest swaps, two parties
issuing bonds exchange each party’s method of paying interest. For example, assume that
one party (A) issued a fixed interest rate bond and the other party (B) issued an adjustable
interest rate bond with a principal amount the same as A’s. After issuing those bonds, the
two parties agreed on an interest swap. Then A pays the holders of B-issued bonds the
interest based on the adjustable interest rate, and B pays the holder of A-issued bonds the
interest based on the fixed interest rate.
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Inflation swaps have the same structure. Corporations can save the cost of issuing
bonds by using this structure. For example, a company (C) can issue inflation-indexed
bonds at the interest rate of 2% plus CPI,413 and can issue fixed rate bonds at the interest
rate of 5%. Another company (D) can issue inflation-indexed bonds at the interest rate of
3% plus CPI, and can issue fixed rate bonds at the interest rate of 4%. C prefers to issue
fixed rate bonds because most of its financial assets are fixed interest products. D wants
to issue inflation-indexed bonds because D’s earnings are sensitive to inflation. In fixed
rate bond markets, C must give investors the interest rate of 5%, but D can issue those
bonds only at the interest rate of 4%. In inflation-indexed bond markets, D must issue
bonds at the interest rate of 3% plus CPI, but C may give investors only the interest rate
of 2% plus CPI.
Fortunately, C and D can take advantage of inflation swaps. C and D make an
agreement to make an inflation swap. According to the agreement, C issues inflationindexed bonds and D issues fixed rate bonds before the two parties exchange their
interest payment methods. Now C pays the holders of D-issued bonds the interest based
on the interest rate of 4%, which is lower than the5% C would otherwise pay. D pays the
holders of C-issued bonds the interest based on the rate of2% plus CPI, which is lower
than the 3% plus CPI D would otherwise pay. C and D can save costs as well as hedge
risk by using inflation swaps.414
As considered above, corporate inflation-indexed bonds provide corporations with
a useful financing tool. The bonds contribute to developing financial markets particularly
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by facilitating the development of financial derivatives such as inflation swaps.
Furthermore, corporate inflation-indexed bonds can contribute to retirement income
security because they provide retirement savers with an investment vehicle free from
inflation risk. Particularly, corporate inflation-indexed bond markets need to be well
developed so that financial products using inflation-indexed bonds may gain more
return.415
In the United States, the federal income tax treatment of corporate inflationindexed bonds is basically the same as that of TIPS. With regard to income tax, the major
difference between TIPS and corporate inflation bonds is the issuer, since the federal
government, the issuer of TIPS, does not pay income tax. The treasury tax regulation
permits deductions for the increase in the inflation-adjustment principal amount that the
issuer paid.416 Therefore, the issuer of a corporate inflation-indexed bond can get the
deduction benefit.

b. Present Conditions of Corporate InflationIndexed Bonds
The volume of corporate inflation-indexed bonds is considerably smaller
compared with government inflation-indexed bonds. This inactivity of corporate bond
issuance may have several causes. First of all, investors are still not familiar with
corporate inflation-indexed bonds. Second, the liquidity of those bonds is still at a low
level, like government inflation-indexed bonds. The liquidity of a financial product is one
of the most important factors for the success of the product in markets. Investors want a
bond that can be converted into cash whenever they want. Liquidity cannot be achieved
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without securing a sufficient level of market volume. Lack of familiarity of corporate
inflation-indexed bonds is also a major factor in the lack of liquidity. Development of
government inflation bond markets can help increase familiarity with inflation bonds.
The increased familiarity gives investors confidence in buying corporate inflationindexed bonds. In fact, the introduction of TIPS facilitates issuance of corporate inflationindexed bonds.417 As the issuance volume of TIPS grows, liquidity of corporate bond
markets will increase, resulting in more issues of those bonds.418
In Korean bond markets, corporate inflation-indexed bonds have not been issued.
This is because the Asian country has a significantly shorter history of inflation-indexed
bonds: government inflation-indexed bonds were only introduced in 2007. However, a
Korean financial institution named Korea Development Bank has issued corporate
inflation-indexed bonds in the United States.419
In order to facilitate issuance of corporate inflation-indexed bonds, incentives for
investors such as favorable tax treatment are needed. A tax exemption for the increase in
the inflation-adjusted principal amount is an example. As mentioned earlier, in the United
States, issuers of corporate inflation-indexed bonds get tax deduction for the increase in
principal.420 This deduction resulted in quicker development of the United States
corporate inflation-indexed bond market.421 In contrast, the Korean tax code has not yet
provided deduction for the inflation adjustment. Therefore, tax reform is needed to allow
the issuer of corporate inflation-indexed bonds to get the deduction benefit.

417

See Rosen, Schumacher & Casaudoumecq, supra note 408, at 249.
See id.
419
See id. at 250.
420
Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1275-7T(f)(1)(ii) (1997).
421
See Anderson, supra note 220, at 220.
418

116

3. Municipal InflationIndexed Bonds
a. Overview
Like the federal government, municipal governments issue bonds to raise funds.
These municipal bonds include the bonds issued by states and their political
subdivisions.422
Municipal governments can also get benefits from issuing inflation-indexed bonds.
As the issuer, a municipal government can save the cost of issuing bonds by issuing
municipal inflation indexed bonds. It can also match its liabilities with tax revenue,
which tends to change with the inflation rate. In addition, municipal inflation-indexed
bonds can raise awareness about inflation-indexed bonds because they attract long-term
investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies. Therefore, municipal
inflation-indexed bonds can contribute to the fundraising by municipal governments,
which often suffer financial difficulties. The bonds also provide investors with other
benefits such as diversifying portfolios.

b. Present Conditions of Municipal InflationIndexed Bonds
Municipal inflation bond markets are much smaller than government bond
markets. Municipal inflation-indexed bonds have not been issued in Korea. The financial
independence of municipal governments in Korea is relatively low.423 The money given
by the central government comes with its own spending purposes; the local government
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has no discretion on where to spend the money. When a municipal government is short of
tax revenue and wants to finance a certain business, the government issues municipal
bonds. The local government can issue inflation-indexed bonds instead of conventional
bonds to attract an investor’s attention.

C. Regulations of InflationIndexed Bonds
1. Government/Municipal Bond and Corporate Bond Regulations
Government inflation-indexed bonds are regulated by the Government Securities
Act (GSA) of 1986 and the Government Securities Act Amendments (GSAA) of 1993.
The purposes of the GSA of 1986 are as follows:
(1) to provide for the integrity, stability, and efficiency of government securities
transactions and of matters and practices related thereto;
(2) to impose adequate regulation of government securities brokers and government
securities dealers generally; and
(3) to require appropriate financial responsibility, recordkeeping, reporting, and related
regulatory requirements; in order to protect investors and to insure the maintenance
of fair, honest, and liquid markets in such securities.424

The GSA of 1986 established for the first time a federal system for the regulation
of government bond markets.425 It amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
inserting a new section entitled “Government Securities Brokers and Dealers” after
section 15B of the 1934 Act.426 The organizations participating in the federal regulation
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system include the Department of the Treasury, Securities and Exchange Commission,
and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.427
The GSAA of 1993 extended the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to
issue orders and to propose and adopt rules for government securities brokers and
dealers.428 The GSA of 1986 had provided that the authority of the Secretary should
terminate on October 1, 1991.429 The GSAA of 1993 gives the authority to adopt rules
concerning large position reporting and recordkeeping requirement.430
The federal government bonds and municipal bonds belong to the exempt
securities of the Securities Act of 1933.431 That is, those bonds are exempt from
registration, and the bonds’ owners need no exemption to resell their securities.432 There
is little concern that the federal government would default on its debt obligations, and
people generally think “governments do not lie.”433 Thus mandate disclosures are not
necessary to protect investors.
There are additional reasons municipal bonds need no registration. The first is a
political one: the exemption for municipal bonds prevents the federal government from
establishing a regulatory system governing municipal bonds.434 The second is the
“constitutional restraints” provided in the Tenth Amendment, under which the state
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powers not delegated to the federal government belong to the state governments.435
Therefore, municipal governments do not need to register their issued bonds with the
federal government agency. Accordingly, municipal inflation-indexed bonds are free
from the registration.
Because they are not included in the exempted securities, corporate bonds
including corporate inflation-indexed bonds are regulated by the Securities Act of 1933,
and must be registered with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).436 Therefore,
corporations are generally subject to the registration duty, unless the corporation is a bank.
The Securities Act of 1933 includes in the exempted securities, the securities issued or
guaranteed by any bank.437 The reason for this provision is that banks have their own
regulatory systems that protect investors.438 Therefore, banks can issue inflation-indexed
bonds without the burden of registration.
In Korea, the State Bond Act regulates government bonds. Like in the United
States, the central government bonds and municipal bonds are exempt from the
registration provision of the Korea Securities and Exchange Act.439 Corporate bonds are
basically subject to the registration provision in Korea.440 But corporate bonds guaranteed
by banks are exempt from registration, like in the United States.441 However, corporate
bonds issued by banks are not included in the exempted securities in Korea. Therefore,
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banks have to register their bonds, including inflation-indexed bonds, with the Financial
Supervisory Committee.

2. The U.S. Organizations and Regulations for InflationIndexed Bonds
a. Department of the Treasury
As described earlier, Chapter 31 of Title 31 of the United States Code authorizes
the Secretary to prescribe the terms and conditions for issuing the United States
obligations, including bonds442 and notes.443 According to the Government Securities Act
of 1986, the Secretary of the Treasury issues rules for government securities brokers and
dealers.444 According to the authorization, the Treasury prescribed rules. The prescribed
rules include: buy-in rules, early warning levels for capital decreases, minimum capital
requirements and notification of large capital withdrawals, risk assessment rules, large
position rules, and financial institution recordkeeping rule.445

b. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
The Securities and Exchange Commission is authorized by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to issues rules for government bond transactions.446 In addition,
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the SEC is a part of the Working Group for Treasury Market Surveillance (Working
Group), which consists of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), SEC,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Treasury, and Board.447 The Working Group
coordinates the monitoring of trading in government bond markets.448 The SEC regulates
corporate and municipal bonds.

c. Federal Reserve System
As fiscal agents of the United States, the Federal Reserve Banks participate in
issuing government bonds. Therefore, they are part of the regulatory system for
government inflation-indexed bonds.449
According to the Government Securities Act Amendment of 1993, financial
institution regulators, such as the OCC and the Federal Reserve Board, issue rules and
regulations for transactions in government bonds to prevent fraudulent and manipulative
practices, and to promote just and equitable principles of trade.450
Among the Working Group divisions, the FRBNY takes primary responsibility
for daily surveillance of the government bond markets.451 While the SEC monitors
suspicious price and volume movements and overall market conditions, the FRBNY
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helps the monitoring by collecting and assessing information such as dealer position
data.452

3. Korea’s Organizations and Regulations for InflationIndexed Bonds
a. Ministry of Finance and Economy
The State Bond Act authorizes the Ministry of Finance and Economy to issue
rules for government bonds. The Ministry established some rules on government bond
issue and primary dealers: Regulation on State Bonds and Primary Dealers of State
Bonds. According to the regulations, the Ministry provides for government inflationindexed bonds. It also has incentives to facilitate issuance of government inflationindexed bonds. Primary dealers of government bonds can get benefits from underwriting
government inflation-indexed bonds. The Ministry designates as primary dealer of
government bonds the financial institutions who meet the requirements453 of the
qualification.454
Primary dealers have a duty to support issuance and trade of government bonds.
First, primary dealers have to underwrite five percent or more of the total amount of
government bonds recently issued by the government.455 Second, primary dealers have to
trade five percent or more of the total amount of government bond traded in the
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secondary market.456 In addition, primary dealers must accept the request of investors
who want to trade government bonds.457 The Ministry of Finance and Economy
supervises and evaluates primary dealers.458 The Ministry evaluates primary dealers by
adding or subtracting points, and gives the top five dealers advantages such as
participating in business to be given by the government.459 On the other hand, the
Ministry may suspend or cancel the designation of a primary dealer if the dealer did not
satisfy financial status standards or did not get the required points.460 The most important
factor in adding points is the amount of government bonds that the dealer underwrote,
that is, thirty five percent.461
If a primary dealer deals with government inflation-indexed bonds, it can get
benefits from the inflation-indexed bond transactions. The amount of government
inflation-indexed bonds that the dealer underwrote is calculated as twice the amount
when the Ministry evaluated the dealer.462 This provision provides primary dealers with
an incentive to actively participate in issuance of government inflation-indexed bonds.

b. Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC)
The Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) supervises securities firms and
transactions. The FSC takes charge of overall securities transactions. Therefore, the FSC
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basically regulates corporate bond issuance and trade. Corporations that want to issue
bonds have to register the bonds with the FSC, and they are subject to the disclosure
regulations.463 However, if financial institutions guarantee the payment of the corporate
bonds, the corporation that will issue the bonds does not need to register the bonds with
the FSC.464 Likewise, municipal bonds along with government bonds are not subject to
the registration provisions.465

c. Bank of Korea (BOK)
The Bank of Korea issues government bonds according to the delegation of the
government. For example, the central bank, as fiscal agent of the government, conducts
auctions concerning issuance of government bonds. The BOK also issues the government
inflation-indexed bonds named KTBi. The State Bond Act delegates to the BOK the
practical business of issuing government bonds.466 According to this delegation, the BOK
issues regulations for purchasing government bonds.

D. Comparison of the U.S. and Korean InflationIndexed bonds
1. Principal Guaranty during Deflation
The United States government inflation-indexed bonds, TIPS, guarantee the
payment of the principal amount specified when they were issued.467 Therefore, TIPS
investors do not need to worry about the reduction of the principal when the economy is
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experiencing deflation. In contrast, Korean government inflation-indexed bonds, KTBi,
do not guarantee the specified amount of the principal.468 Therefore, investors in KTBi
must accept the decrease in the bonds’ principal amount during deflation.
Investors in government bonds rarely imagine that the principal will diminish.
Therefore, the fact that the government does not compensate for the decrease in the
inflation-adjusted principal may be shocking measure for government bond investors who
prefer safe assets, resulting in decrease in demand for those bonds. Accordingly, the
principal guarantee can play a significant role in encouraging investment in the inflation
bonds. The United States selected the principal guaranty policy to facilitate investment in
TIPS. On the contrary, the Korean government decided not to guarantee the principal,
mainly because it was concerned about the lack of balance between tax revenue and
spending during deflation when tax revenue tends to decrease.
The United States government imposes income tax on the compensation for the
decreased principal amount caused by deflation,469 resulting in reduced compensation.
But the compensation is still attractive to TIPS investors. It is difficult to say which
policy is better, since policy-making requires many considerations such as the order of
priority in policy and market environments. If emphasis is on facilitating issuance of
inflation-indexed bonds, the government should provide investors with an incentive of
guaranteed principal of the inflation bond.
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2. Taxation for Increase in Principal
Taxing the increase in the inflation-adjusted principal amount is also important in
facilitating issuance of inflation-indexed bonds. The United States imposes the federal
income tax on the increased inflation-adjusted principal.470 The increase in principal is
regarded as interest of the bonds. Therefore, investors in inflation-indexed bonds, in the
United States bond markets, have to pay income tax when those bonds’ principal
increased because of inflation. The taxation is applicable to any kind of bonds,
government or corporate. That is, regardless of what kind of inflation-indexed bonds
investors hold, they have to pay income tax for the increase in principal.
Korea does not impose the national income tax on the increased principal of
government inflation-indexed bonds. Korea’s tax code permits only government
inflation-indexed bonds to get the income tax exemption for the increased inflationadjusted principal.471 Therefore, additional legal measures are needed so that other
inflation-indexed bonds such as corporate inflation-indexed bonds may get the tax
exemption benefit.
Taxation on the increase in the inflation-adjusted principal can be a strong
incentive to investors in inflation-indexed bonds. The reason that Korea adopted a policy
that excludes the increased principal from interest liable for taxation was to facilitate
issuance of inflation-indexed bonds by giving incentives to hold those bonds. The tax
exemption, like the principal guarantee, is a strong attraction for inflation-indexed bond
investors.
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3. Series I Savings Bonds
Series I savings bonds are a useful saving vehicle particularly for retirement
savers. Series I savings bonds were created by Congress to support savings, and are
issued by the U.S. government. The owner of these bonds cannot sell them in the
secondary market.472 Furthermore, the owner cannot redeem the bonds within five years
without a penalty worth three months of interest.473 These restrictions prevent the owner
from falling to the temptation of discontinuing saving prior to maturity.
Korea has no bonds with the same features as the United States Series I savings
bonds. Korea has insufficient financial products supporting long-term investment
compared with the country’s economic volume.
Long-term investment instruments tend to be exposed to credit risk more than
short-term investment tools. The bigger credit risk is a significant reason for investors to
hesitate in investing in long-term investment vehicles. Government bonds are credit riskfree investment instruments because the holders of the bonds do not have to worry about
default so long as the country exists. This credit risk-free feature is one of the reasons
government bonds are appropriate for long-term investment.
Long-term financial products have a much higher inflation risk than short-term
products do. Therefore, the inflation-indexed bond structure can provide a useful tool to
design long-term investment instruments. Accordingly, government inflation-indexed
bonds similar to Series I savings bonds can also be significant investment tools for longterm investors in Korea.
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Korea should introduce a new government inflation-indexed bond that has the
features of Series I savings bonds so that it may provide retirement savers or retirees with
a useful tool for investment. Government inflation-indexed bonds of the Series I savings
bond type are expected to improve retirement income security of Koreans.

4. Corporate and Municipal InflationIndexed Bonds
Issuance of both the corporate and municipal inflation-indexed bonds is relatively
inactive compared with government inflation-indexed bonds. In Korea, corporate and
municipal inflation-indexed bonds have never been issued, although government
inflation-indexed bonds have been issued since 2007.
Corporate and municipal inflation-indexed bonds provide diverse investment tools
to long-term investors such as retirement savers. They also improve the rate of return of
pension funds. Korea, having never issued corporate and municipal inflation-indexed
bonds, need to support a certain level of favorable tax treatment of inflation-indexed
bonds. As mentioned earlier, Korean tax law permits only government inflation-indexed
bonds the tax exemption on the increase in the inflation-adjusted principal amount.
Guaranteeing the principal during deflation can also attract bond investors.
Whether to adopt this treatment would depend on the choices of individual corporations
or municipalities. However, corporations or municipalities need support from the tax
policy to vitalize issuance of their inflation-indexed bonds. For example, tax exemption
for guaranteeing the principal may facilitate the issuance of those bonds. Non-taxation on
the increase in principal is also attractive for inflation-indexed bond investors. These
kinds of incentives for investors can help develop corporate and municipal inflationindexed bond markets in Korea, where those markets do not even exist.
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Issuers also need tax incentives in order for corporate inflation-indexed bond
markets to provide retirement savers with diverse investment opportunities. The United
States tax regulation recognizes the deduction for inflation. Issuers of inflation-indexed
bonds qualify for deduction for the increase in the inflation-adjusted principal amount.474
Therefore, corporations issuing inflation-indexed bonds in the United States bond
markets can enjoy the tax benefit, encouraging corporations to issue inflation-indexed
bonds. Korea also needs to clarify its tax code to allow corporations the deduction benefit.

5. Market Conditions to Issue InflationIndexed Bonds
a. Importance of Bond Markets
Bond markets, along with stock markets, are an important source that provides
funds to corporations and other institutions. Governments also raise funds by issuing
bonds when they are short of tax revenue for government expenditure. That is, bond
markets function as a fund-raising place for corporations and the government.
From the viewpoint of investors, bond markets provide safe financial assets for
individual and institutional investors. Stock prices fluctuate with economic conditions. A
heavy fall in stock prices often makes investors suffer tremendous losses that cannot be
recovered. Even if an investor holds stocks in order to receive dividends, the stocks can
be as good as wastepaper if the corporation does not make profits. Price fluctuation of
bonds is relatively low compared with that of stocks. If bondholders hold bonds until
maturity without selling in the secondary markets, they can receive the promised interest
and principal from the issuer. Even if the corporation issuing the bonds becomes bankrupt,
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the bondholders as creditors can receive payment preferentially from the corporation.
Stockholders, as owners of the corporation, can get distribution after all creditors have
received payment. Although stock investment has the possibility of higher return than
bond investment, the risk of loss is as high in proportion to the high return.
Bond markets are also important to a country’s central bank because they are
transmission channels of monetary policy. In addition, the central bank conducts open
market operations by buying and selling bonds, particularly government bonds.

b. Volume of Government Bond Markets
The United States government bond market is the world’s largest and most liquid
bond market.475 Therefore, the U.S. government has a more advantageous fund-raising
environment than the Korean government does. Quantitatively and qualitatively mature
government bond markets in the United States provided the government with a good
environment to introduce new bonds. In contrast, the Korean government bond market
has a relatively small volume that may make it difficult for KTBi to take root in the
Korean bond markets for the time being.
The tremendous volume and liquidity of the U.S. Treasury bonds provide the
Federal Reserve System with a favorable policy environment. The central bank of a
country conducts open market operations mainly with government bonds which are the
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safest securities in a country. The Federal Reserve System has no difficulty in securing
the Treasury bonds to use for open market operations.476
In contrast, the Bank of Korea, Korea’s central bank, has difficulty in securing
government bonds sufficient for open market operations.477 Korean government and
lawmakers traditionally have tended to avoid budget deficit. Because of this, the
government has hesitated in conducting aggressive fiscal policies that tend to include
issuing government bonds. Therefore, the Bank of Korea always has difficulty securing
government bonds to buy and sell for open market operations.
This difficulty created securities unique to Korea: the Bank of Korea Monetary
Stabilization Bonds.478 The Korean legislature authorized the Bank of Korea to issue the
bonds to use for open market operations.479 Because the Bank of Korea has to pay interest
to the holder of the bonds, the Bank is caught in a vicious circle where it must issue new
monetary stabilization bonds to reduce the increased money supply caused by the interest
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payment. This is another reason that Korean government bond markets need more
quantitative and qualitative development.

c. Development of Derivatives Markets
In order to facilitate issuance and trade of inflation-indexed bonds, bond markets
need to provide investors with a variety of derivatives related to the bonds. The United
States bond markets offer diverse derivatives such as STRIPS, options and SWAP. The
United States introduced STRIPS in 1986, and STRIPS satisfies diverse demands of
investors. It seems that STRIPS helps TIPS take root in the U.S. government bond
markets because investors can use STRIPS as a tool to meet their demand. For example,
investors who want to get an “inflation-protected income stream” can purchase only the
interest of inflation-indexed bonds; meanwhile, investors who want to get a zero-coupon
bond protected from inflation risk can buy only the principal of inflation-indexed
bonds.480
Korean bond markets are not as sophisticated as the United States counterparts.
For instance, STRIPS had not been introduced to Korean government bond markets until
2006. Therefore, STRIPS is still unfamiliar to bond investors in Korea. Furthermore,
STRIPS is not applicable to KTBi, the Korean government inflation-indexed bonds.481
The Korean government is waiting to see whether the STRIPS market in Korea is
successful. STRIPS is expected to be applicable to KTBi if STRIPS successfully takes
root in Korean bond markets.
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In Korea, SWAP markets are also small. In order to support a corporation’s
financing, SWAP needs to be activated in Korean bond markets.

d. Investor Protection System
Safe investment environments attract investors, who are sources of money for
diverse areas. Those who want to manage assets do not want to invest if they are likely to
lose all or part of the invested money. This concern that investors might not get their
expected return created a variety of premiums: credit risk, liquidity, and inflation risk
premiums. Issuers of bonds should pay investors those premiums to compensate for risks
investors face, so that the issuers can raise funds by issuing those bonds.
Sometimes those bonds are not sufficient to attract investors. The Asian financial
crisis in 1997 is a good example. At that time, Korea also experienced a financial crisis
caused by a lack of short-term foreign exchange liquidity. Financial institutions began
rejecting companies’ requests for extending lending maturity. They even demanded that
companies suffering financial difficulties repay advanced money prior to maturity.
Therefore, many companies in Korea went bankrupt or were in danger of bankruptcy,
despite the potential for profits in the near future or even profits already made.
Accordingly, bond investors began avoiding investing in corporate bonds, resulting in
worsened financial difficulties of companies in Korea.
Bond investors at that time needed more than risk premiums to invest in corporate
bonds. They needed more reliable investor protection systems. One of them is the
indenture trustee system. Indenture trustees protect bondholders in that they monitor
issuer companies’ compliance with the indenture, a contract between the issuer and
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bondholders.482 Indenture trustees also administer the authenticating of bonds and paying
the principal and interest.483 The United States indenture trustee system is more reliable
than the Korean counterpart, because under the system, an underwriter of a corporate
bond cannot be an indenture trustee of the bond.484 This limitation prevents conflict of
interest between underwriters and indenture trustees. Underwriters are basically on the
issuer’s side because their role as underwriter is given by issuer companies. If
underwriters hold the additional role of indenture trustees, whose primary role is to
protect bondholders, underwriters have difficulty paying attention to the best interests of
bondholders. Underwriters cannot help reading the face of the issuer company who has
the power to give an underwriting job in order to keep a good relationship with the issuer.
Therefore, the United States law prohibits an institution from holding the dual
status of underwriter and indenture trustee. However, Korean law does not have such a
limitation.485 In Korea, underwriters function as indenture trustees as well. Issuers prefer
this structure because they can save the cost of issuing corporate bonds. In Korean bond
markets, institutions that function both as underwriter and indenture trustee rarely ask for
fees for the indenture trustee job. Because of this situation, investors in Korean bond
markets sometimes excessively distrust the stability of corporate bonds.
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Such distrust reached a climax during the financial crisis in the late 1990s. Most
of the bond investors did not want to buy corporate bonds, even ones with relatively high
credit ratings. Bond investors began to pay more attention to government bond markets.
In proportion to the growth of government bond markets, corporate bond markets shrank
for the time being.486 Therefore, Korean companies had difficulty fund-raising, and many
of them had no choice but to give up their businesses. If bondholder protection systems
such as indenture trustees had been stronger, the decrease in the issuance of corporate
bonds would not have been so great. Thus, Korean law needs to provide that institutions
independent of underwriters assume the role of indenture trustees.
The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) is another protector for
bond investors. When a brokerage firm is bankrupt or is experiencing financial
difficulties, SIPC intervenes to return customers’ cash, stocks, and bonds.487 Therefore,
bondholders do not have to worry about losing their bonds or cash in the event of the
brokerage firm’s default. Korea does not have this kind of securities protection agency. In
order to strengthen bond investors’ protection, Korea should introduce an institution like
SIPC along with reforming indenture trustee systems.
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V.

Pension Systems, InflationIndexed Bonds and Financial
Markets

A. Pension Systems, InflationIndexed Bonds and Financial
Markets as Protectors for Retirees
Pension systems are essential as the basic safety net for retirees who rarely have
additional income sources. Pension systems are also significant for the government and
the whole society. Without pension systems, retirees who are not prepared for retired life
cannot live a normal economic life. This would result in social unrest, such as increase in
criminal acts. Furthermore, lack of purchasing power of retirees would decrease the
demand of the country’s whole economy, an obstacle to economic growth. If a country
does not provide pension programs, the government would bear tremendous social and
economic costs. Therefore, most of the countries in the world have pension systems to
support retirement income security.
Pension systems need the support of appropriate financial products to function as
income security providers for retirees. Pension funds invest in a variety of products
including financial assets and even real estate. Financial products are the main assets of
pension funds. The first reason for this is that financial products have higher liquidity
than real estate. Second, they provide diverse products such as stocks, bonds and
derivatives. Third, financial products have large and well-organized markets. Fourth,
financial markets are much more globalized than real estate markets; therefore, financial
product investors do not require much time and costs for information on foreign markets
and for familiarizing themselves with the new markets. Accordingly, pension funds
invest their money mainly in financial products.
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One of the most prominent features of pension funds is long-term investment.
Thus pension funds need to be careful in choosing long-term investment instruments
appropriate for the fund. As mentioned several times, long-term investors are exposed to
the inflation risk that causes investors to lose purchasing power of their invested products.
This is why long-term investors such as pension funds need to pay attention to inflation
risk hedge products. Inflation-indexed bonds can satisfy the demand of pension funds for
inflation hedge instruments. Investors in inflation-indexed bonds do not need to worry
about losing purchasing power of the bonds. Inflation-indexed bonds enable pension
funds to stabilize their asset management. Although bond investment can result in lower
profits than stock investment, and inflation-indexed bonds are also a kind of bond,
pension funds can secure more profits if they take advantage of corporate and foreign
inflation-indexed bonds in addition to government inflation-indexed bonds.488
Corporate inflation-indexed bonds are not as safe as government inflation-indexed
bonds, but they provide investors with more profits. Corporate bonds offer higher interest
rates than government bonds due to the credit risk that government bonds do not have.
Foreign inflation-indexed bonds give investors an arbitrage opportunity to “take
advantage of the price and yield differences among countries.”489 That is, investment in
foreign inflation-indexed bonds diversifies portfolios.490 Investing in foreign inflationindexed bonds, however, comes with some concerns. It brings currency risk, and may not
serve to hedge the inflation risk because the inflation rate in foreign countries may not be
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consistent with that in the investor’s home country.491 Investors should consider these
negative influences when they make an investment decision. Nevertheless, foreign
inflation-indexed bonds are useful investment tools for pension funds.
Financial products are meaningless without financial markets in which they are
issued and traded. Investors search, in financial markets, for instruments appropriate for
their investment purpose. Pension funds are no exception. Pension funds cannot achieve
retirement income security unless financial markets provide diverse products fit for the
funds’ goal. Stock markets provide pension funds an opportunity to make a high profit,
while bond markets enable pension funds to acquire safe investment instruments.
Therefore, financial markets may serve as an important protector for retirees.

B. Relationship between Pension Systems and Financial Markets
1. Influence of Pension Systems on Financial Markets
a. Change in Financial Market Structures
Pension systems can change the structure of a country’s financial markets.
Pension funds under the country’s pension systems affect capital markets because they
invest mainly in stocks and bonds, both of which are issued and traded in capital markets
such as stock and bond markets. Korea introduced corporate pension systems in 2006,
and is expected to experience development of its capital markets. Under the retirement
allowances systems,492 Korean corporations did not need to invest retirement allowances
in profit-making assets such as financial products. All they had to do was enter the
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retirement allowances in their account books. If all the allowances are invested in capital
markets, it will contribute much to the development of capital markets in quantitative and
qualitative aspects. In Korea, banks are at the center of financial markets; therefore,
indirect financing is the main source of businesses’ fund-raising. If capital markets such
as stock markets and bond markets grow, businesses can more easily access direct
financing.

b. Increase in Influence of Pension Funds on Corporate Governance
Because pension funds have a large volume, they can easily gain the status of
majority shareholder if they have interest in corporate governance. They can affect the
management of the company in its composition and policies. This is more likely in public
pension funds than in private pension funds. Public pension funds can try to achieve
political or social goals that they consider as ideal.
Calpers, the retirement fund for California public employees and the largest
pension fund, has adopted an investment strategy developed from a sense of social
responsibility: the pension fund does not invest in tobacco stocks or in companies related
to an infringement of worker’s rights.493 Calpers has also paid attention to the corporate
governance issue.494 Private pension funds have little incentive to reflect social
responsibilities in their investment strategies, since their goal is to gain as much profit as
possible, not to take social responsibility. Public funds may feel social responsibilities as
Calpers does. Sometimes they may want to intervene in a company’s corporate
governance.
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In Korea, private pension funds have not yet taken root, but the national pension
fund has managed a tremendous amount of money. Although the national pension fund is
operated by an independent organization called the National Pension Service, it still has
characteristics of a governmental agency. Therefore, the National Pension Fund is
sometimes influenced by government policy, even while it mostly operates on investment
principles aimed at safe and profitable asset management. If the economy is in a deep
recession or stock markets fall into panic, the government is sometimes tempted to
intervene in stock markets by mobilizing the national pension fund. Such a measure may
result in a temporary recovery of stock markets, but it also may cause the fund to suffer a
big loss, leading to damage to the pension participants. Therefore, it is important to
prevent the government from taking advantage of public pension funds for a policy
purpose.
Corporate governance issues have the same situation. If the government should
want to affect a company’s corporate governance, it could prevent an autonomous
development of private sectors. For example, if a public fund influenced by the power of
the government has the status of majority shareholder of a bank, the government is
tempted to use the bank as a channel for providing money to a certain business that is
consistent with the government’s policy. Such government intervention in the financial
industry would diminish the industry’s competitiveness.
Korea has had a similar experience. Prior to the financial crisis in the late 1990s,
most commercial banks in Korea were not free from government influence. In fact, the
Korean government had intervened in the appointment of each bank’s CEO, because
Korean commercial banks did not then have shareholders who could influence the
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appointing of directors and CEOs. Although a single shareholder can now have stocks of
a bank up to ten percent (fifteen percent in the case of regional banks) of the total stocks
issued by the bank,495 at that time the limit was only four percent. The primary purpose of
such an ownership limitation is to prevent banks from becoming a private safe for a
certain shareholder.
This limitation can prevent lending from being concentrated in a particular place.
Yet it sometimes tempts the government to fill the ownership blanks. The government
could intervene in the decision-making processes of banks whose CEOs are not free from
government influence. A loan decision is an example. It is hard to deny that such
government influence on commercial banks contributed to the success of the Korean
economy, particularly when Korea was still an underdeveloped country. The
unprecedented growth of the Korean economy was basically initiated by government
leadership. The government-initiated economy began in the1960s. The government made
overall plans for the development of the economy, and actively supported businesses by
giving many incentives, such as favorable tax treatment.
Financial support was also significant for businesses recognized by the
government as essential for the development of Korean economy. The government
intervened in loan decisions of banks to provide loans to businesses that had similar goals
as the government. This kind of assignment of monetary resources, which were then
insufficient to satisfy the demand of all the entrepreneurs, contributed to the rapid growth
of the Korean economy, especially according to the unbalanced growth theory. On the
other hand, the government protected Korean banks in many ways such as protecting
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Korean banks from competition with foreign banks. However, while Korean banks were
receiving both the intervention and protection of the government, their competitiveness
was growing weaker. Since the financial crisis, the structure of the Korean financial
industry has experienced many changes, adopting what is called global standards.
Although the Korean financial industry is now growing more competitive, it still has a
long way to go to gain international competitiveness.
Although the decline in Korean banks’ competitiveness was not caused by the
intervention of the national pension fund, the example shows that the government
intervention in private sectors could result in disasters. In addition, the National Pension
Fund and the government appear to have some intention to invest in Korean banks.496 If
the Fund has the status of majority shareholder, the government can directly influence
commercial banks. If the intention is real, the Korean government should reconsider the
plan in order to raise the competitiveness of Korean commercial banks.

2. Influence of Financial markets on Pension Systems
a. Facilitation of Developing Financial Products Used by Pension Funds
Financial markets are where pension funds invest. Financial markets provide
financial products that pension funds can use to manage their investment sources.
Inflation-indexed bonds are representative products that financial markets provide for
pension funds. Without financial markets, pension funds cannot operate.
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b. Strengthening Retirees’ Income Security
The goal of pension funds is to secure retirement income, and they cannot carry
out investment activities unless financial markets support them by offering products
appropriate for the goal. Financial markets, therefore, contribute to retirement income
security. The development of financial markets is necessary for retirement savers as well
as other investors.

C. Relationship between InflationIndexed Bonds and Financial
Markets
1. Influence of InflationIndexed Bonds on Financial markets
a. Increase in Demand for Bonds
Introducing inflation-indexed bonds can contribute to increasing the demand for
bonds, regardless of whether they are inflation-indexed or not. For example, imagine an
investor who is not interested in bond investment. As he gets older, he becomes
concerned about retirement. He learns about inflation-indexed bonds which are useful for
retirement preparation. Along with inflation-indexed bonds, he learns about the
advantages of bond investment. Now he invests in conventional bonds as well as
inflation-indexed bonds. Therefore, inflation-indexed bonds can help expand the overall
demand for bonds.

b. Expansion of Derivatives Markets
Inflation-indexed bonds can be the source of diverse derivatives. Inflation swap is
one of the important derivatives that the bonds provide to financial market participants.
Futures and options are other derivatives that inflation-indexed bonds provide investors.
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Derivatives markets may reinvigorate the basic product markets. Therefore, expansion of
inflation-indexed bond derivatives markets can contribute to the development of
inflation-indexed bond markets.

c. Providing Investment Vehicles Appropriate to LongTerm
Investment Market Participants
Long-term investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, need
financial assets that match their long-term liabilities. Such investors, therefore, invest in
long-term products such as long-term bonds. If they invest in inflation-indexed bonds,
they can avoid the inflation risk. Individual long-term investors, as well as institutional
investors, can take advantage of inflation-indexed bonds as inflation risk-free long-term
investment instruments. Retirement savers and retirees can enjoy this advantage because
they who have no additional income source and are exposed to the inflation risk.

2. Influence of Financial Markets on InflationIndexed Bonds
a. Facilitation of Issuing InflationIndexed Bonds: Primary Markets
Well-developed financial markets facilitate issuance and trade of financial
products. It is important to develop investment environments that provide confidence in
investments and investor protection systems that attract investors to the market. Inflationindexed bond markets are relatively new. Accordingly, the necessity to create proper
investment environments is more pronounced than in other markets with a long history.
The history of inflation-indexed bonds is much shorter in Korea. Therefore, the
country should pay more attention to these markets. Government inflation-indexed bond
markets should be activated because those bonds can lead the development of other
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inflation-indexed bonds, such as corporate inflation-indexed bonds not yet issued in
Korea. The incentive for primary dealers who issue KTBi is an appropriate measure to
develop government inflation-indexed bond markets. If the markets gain investor
confidence, issuance and trade of inflation-indexed bonds will grow.

b. Reducing Liquidity Premiums: Secondary Markets
Liquidity is one of the most important factors that investors consider in
investment decisions. If investors find better investment opportunities or need cash, they
want to sell their financial assets in secondary markets, in which financial products
already issued are traded between investors. Because liquidity is a significant
consideration, issuers should provide liquidity premiums to investors if their issued
instrument lacks liquidity. This liquidity premium raises the cost of issuing financial
instruments such as bonds. If a secondary market is well-developed in qualitative and
quantitative aspects, liquidity of financial products traded in the market becomes high.
In terms of inflation-indexed bonds, it is not easy to raise the liquidity because
most inflation-indexed bond investors use the buy-and-hold strategy.497 For example,
inflation-indexed bonds in the U.K. are turned over much less often than other
conventional bonds: one-third.498 This is natural because inflation-indexed bond investors
are mostly long-term investors such as pension funds and insurance companies. They are
mainly interested in asset/liability management, not temporary capital gains. Accordingly,
inflation-indexed bonds have some limitations in raising liquidity. Nevertheless, the
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bonds would have difficulty developing without a certain level of liquidity. Derivatives
such as STRIPS and inflation swap serve to raise the liquidity of inflation-indexed bonds.
Raising the liquidity of inflation-indexed bonds attracts investors to the market. It
also provides the bond issuers incentive to issue those bonds because they can save the
issuing cost by reducing liquidity premiums. Improvement of inflation-indexed bonds’
liquidity as resulting from the development of secondary markets may increase the
issuance of inflation-indexed bonds.

D. Relationship between Pension Funds and InflationIndexed
Bonds
1. Influence of Pension Funds on InflationIndexed Bonds
a. Increase in Demand for InflationIndexed Bonds
Pension funds as long-term investors need stable asset management. The
retirement savers, or the pension funds’ customers, want protection from inflation risk. If
a fund manages an employer’s assets for defined benefit plans, the necessity for inflation
risk hedge becomes higher. Defined benefits tend to increase with inflation because the
benefit calculation is based on the last few years’ average salary of the employee, which
tends to increase with the inflation rate. That means that the employer’s liabilities are
indexed to inflation. Therefore, the employer needs proper asset/liability management in
which the maturity of assets matches that of liabilities.
Pension funds as long-term investors need to invest in inflation-indexed bonds
that protect investors from inflation risk. This necessity facilitates issuance of inflationindexed bonds.
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2. Influence of InflationIndexed Bonds on Pension Funds
a. Facilitating Asset/Liability Management of Pension Funds
As mentioned, pension funds need proper asset/liability management tools
consistent with the concerns of long-term investors. Inflation-indexed bonds can
strengthen pension funds’ asset/liability management because they provide a useful
inflation hedge tool. If the bonds are activated in financial markets, pension funds can
manage their assets more efficiently. Corporate and municipal inflation-indexed bonds, as
well as government inflation-indexed bonds, would facilitate proper asset management.
Diverse kinds of inflation-indexed bonds can facilitate pension funds’ asset management,
leading to the benefit of retirement savers.

b. Supporting Inflation Indexation of Annuities
If a pension fund provides annuities indexed to inflation, the participants can
enjoy financial assets free from inflation risk. If a pension fund provides annuities to its
participants, the annuities are the fund’s liabilities. Because the liabilities are indexed to
inflation, the fund needs a cash flow that matches the payment of the inflation-indexed
liabilities. If the fund invests in inflation-indexed bonds, asset/liability management is
easier. Of course, all the assets and liabilities cannot have the same maturity.
Nevertheless, it is certain that investment in inflation-indexed bonds reduces the risk of
asset/liability mismatch.
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Unlike defined benefit plans, few other pension systems provide inflation-indexed
benefits.499 However, an exceptional case is in South America. Chile is a country in
which individual accounts are replacing the traditional social security system.500
Insurance companies managing individual accounts have no difficulty providing retirees
with inflation-indexed annuities, because Chile has well-developed inflation-indexed
bond markets.501 If inflation-indexed bond markets are well-developed, pension funds can
use the bonds efficiently because inflation-indexed bonds are useful in introducing
inflation-indexed annuities. This is another reason to activate inflation-indexed bond
markets.
A pension fund can also use inflation-indexed bonds as a tool for an inflationindexed annuity. This scheme takes advantage of STRIPS of inflation-indexed bonds.502
Pension funds buy only the interest component of the bonds, and use the interest from the
component for payment of inflation-indexed annuities.

c. Protecting Retirees from Inflation
Although inflation-indexed bonds are not just for retirement income protection,
they are useful for securing retirement income because they serve as an inflation risk
hedge. Therefore, inflation-indexed bonds can protect retirees from inflation. Pension
funds also need to avoid inflation risk because they are long-term investors aiming to
secure retirement income. Inflation-indexed bonds can satisfy that demand. Accordingly,
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vitalized inflation-indexed bonds can lead to pension funds equipped with assets that
support retirement income security.
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VI.

Recommendations for Reforming Korean Retirement
Income Security Systems

A. Basic Principles: Facilitating the Interaction of Pension
Systems, InflationIndexed Bonds and Financial Markets
To secure retirement income security, retirement savers and retirees need, among
other thing, the support of well-developed pension systems. Pension systems, public or
private, help retirees maintain the minimum standard of living. Inflation-indexed bonds
protect investors from losing purchasing power. They provide pension funds with a
useful investment vehicle guaranteeing a specified rate of return. Therefore, inflationindexed bonds are essential for pension funds. Financial markets provide pensions funds
with a variety of investment tools, such as stocks and bonds, including inflation-indexed
bonds. Because financial markets are where pension funds manage their assets, the
development of those markets leads to efficient and effective investment by pension
funds. Financial market development also facilitates issuance of inflation-indexed bonds,
essential for pension funds. Those three factors influence one another and together affect
retirement income security. Therefore, retirement income security can only be improved
if pension systems, inflation-indexed bonds and financial markets effectively interact
with one another.
Compared with the United States, Korea does not have well-developed pension
systems, especially private pension systems. The country lacks qualitatively and
quantitatively mature financial markets as compared with the United States. Korean
inflation-indexed bonds also have a short history. Thus Korea has many issues blocking
the improvement of retirement income security. It means the country should reform the
existing systems with a view to strengthen retirement income security. In order to do this,
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Korea must remember that retirement income security can be achieved through the
interaction of pension systems, inflation-indexed bonds and financial markets.

B. Revitalizing InflationIndexed Bond Markets
1. Inflation Indexation of Annuities and InflationIndexed Bond
Markets

As mentioned, Chile’s individual accounts provide participants with welldeveloped annuities because the country has qualitatively and quantitatively welldeveloped inflation-indexed bond markets.503 Although Chile’s example deals with
individual accounts,504 it can also be applied to other pension programs, such as defined
benefit plans and defined contribution plans. Benefits under the Korean corporate pension
systems are basically paid in the form of annuities.505 Therefore, Korean pension funds
need to prepare for paying annuities.
Annuities are paid on the basis of long-term investment results. In addition,
annuity benefits, unlike lump sum benefits, are paid over a long period of time. Inflationindexed bonds are appropriate for long-term investment because they maintain their
purchasing power until maturity. If pension funds use STRIPS of inflation-indexed bonds,
they can easily provide inflation-protected annuities by using the cash flow from the
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interest component of inflation-indexed bonds. Therefore, developing inflation-indexed
bond markets is essential for Korean pension funds to effectively provide participants
with annuities.

2. Reducing Liquidity Premiums
a. Expanding Derivatives Markets of InflationIndexed Bonds: Inflation
SWAP and Inflation Futures
When it comes to investment decisions, investors consider liquidity as much as
profitability. To improve liquidity of a particular financial product, the product should
have incentives for investors. This is because the volume of issuance and trade of the
product needs to increase for the liquidity of the product to improve. Derivatives of a
financial product play a significant role in invigorating the trade of the product, because
derivatives can satisfy diverse investor demands. Inflation SWAP can contribute to a
corporations’ smooth financing by exchanging the interest payment obligation.506
Therefore, inflation SWAP is expected to improve efficient financing of corporations in
Korea, where corporations do not use the scheme because of the lack of inflation-indexed
bonds. Particularly, inflation SWAP should be activated to support issuance of corporate
inflation-indexed bonds in Korea. Then, the liquidity of inflation-indexed bonds will
improve. Inflation futures can also facilitate the liquidity of inflation-indexed bonds.
Inflation futures need to be listed on the Korea Exchange in order to be traded by
investors in Korea. Therefore, regulations of the Korea Exchange need to be reformed.
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b. Reinforcing Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of
Securities (STRIPS)
STRIPS is a system in which investors can trade the principal and interest of a
bond separately.507 This scheme can improve the liquidity of inflation-indexed bonds by
meeting the demand of investors who want to trade only one of the principal or interest of
the bond. In particular, STRIPS of inflation-indexed bonds can be used for the payment
of annuities. Pension funds can buy the interest component of inflation-indexed bonds
and use its cash flow to pay annuities.
Korean STRIPS market has not yet taken root in the country’s financial markets.
STRIPS was first used by investors in 2006. Although STRIPS for government bonds is
now permitted, Korean government inflation-indexed bonds, KTBi, are prohibited to take
advantage of STRIPS.508 This prohibition stemmed from a lack of confidence in the
Korean STRIPS market. The Korean government wants to wait until the STRIPS market
has matured and the KTBi market volume has grown. However, STRIPS can facilitate
issuance of KTBi by allowing investors to trade the principal and interest separately. If
investors can take advantage of STRIPS in KTBi markets, the demand for and issuance
of KTBi can increase. Invigorating KTBi markets will lead to an increase in issuance of
corporate inflation-indexed bonds by raising investor confidence in inflation-indexed
bonds, resulting in smooth financing of corporations. Therefore, the prohibition of KTBi
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from being traded in the form of STRIPS should be deleted from the section 26 of the
Regulation on State Bonds and Primary Dealers of State Bonds.

3. Reforming Primary Dealer Systems
Primary dealers play a central role in the issuance of government bonds in Korea,
even though individuals or institutions other than primary dealers can participate in
Korean government bond auctions.509 The individuals and institutions participating in
government bond auctions must do it through primary dealers.510 Therefore, primary
dealers are a key to the success of issuance of government bonds.
The situation is the same with government inflation-indexed bonds. The Korean
government gives benefits to primary dealers who participate in issuance of KTBi.511 In
particular, the government recognizes the volume underwritten by a primary dealer as
twice the actual volume when evaluating the primary dealer for benefits or penalties.512
The Korean government should consider giving more incentives to primary dealers that
participate in KTBi auctions. The section 18 of the Regulation on State Bonds and
Primary Dealers of State Bonds needs to give more weight to primary dealers that
underwrite KTBi: for example, considering the volume underwritten as four times larger
the real volume. These greater incentives for underwriting KTBi should be temporary
until KTBi has taken root in Korean financial markets. If the strengthened incentive
continues to be applied, other conventional government bonds would likely shrink
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compared with KTBi. Therefore, the incentive for KTBi under the section 18 should be
flexible depending on the conditions of KTBi issuance and trade.

C. Introducing Corporate and Municipal InflationIndexed Bonds
1. Tax Issues
Corporations and municipalities need to issue inflation-indexed bonds to raise
funds for business costs. Corporate and municipal inflation-indexed bonds can provide
investors with useful tools for acquiring both stability and profitability. Although the
bonds have benefits like those described above, corporate and municipal inflationindexed bonds have not been issued in Korea. Therefore, Korea needs to introduce
corporate and municipal inflation-indexed bonds.
Tax treatment is important in facilitating issuance of a particular bond. Corporate
and municipal inflation-indexed bonds are not exceptions. Korean income tax law does
not impose national income tax on the increase in the principal of KTBi.513 However, the
regulation does not provide for other inflation-indexed bonds such as corporate inflationindexed bonds. Therefore, additional measures need to provide corporate inflationindexed bond investors with favorable tax treatment on the increase in the inflationadjusted principal. The Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act should provide for
favorable tax treatment in order to facilitate issuance of corporate inflation-indexed bonds.
This is also true for municipal inflation-indexed bonds. Investors in those bonds
also deserve favorable tax treatment because there is no reason to discriminate against
municipal inflation-indexed bond investors. In addition, Korea’s local governments, most
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of which are suffering lack of budget, need to issue bonds; municipal inflation-indexed
bonds will not only contribute to fund-raising for the municipalities, but also provide
pension funds with useful investment instruments.
Principal guarantee during deflation can be an incentive to invest in corporate and
municipal inflation-indexed bonds. At this time, tax treatment is an issue. The United
States imposes federal income tax on the compensation for the difference between the par
value and the current value reduced due to deflation.514 Korean government inflation
indexed bonds, KTBi, do not guarantee paying the par value of the principal during
deflation;515 there is no provision for tax treatment of the compensation. Korean
corporations and municipalities need to consider allowing the principal guarantee. It
would attract inflation bond investors who are still unfamiliar with corporate and
municipal inflation-indexed bonds. If corporations and local governments adopt the
principal guarantee scheme, Korean tax law needs to consider supporting them with the
tax exemption.
The two favorable tax treatments described above are for investors. Issuers also
need incentives for issuance of corporate inflation-indexed bonds. The United States tax
regulation permits inflation-indexed bond issuers to get a deduction for payment of the
increase in the inflation-adjusted principal.516 Korea needs to introduce the same system
in order to support the issuance of corporate inflation-indexed bonds. The deduction
scheme can be reflected in the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act.
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2. Disclosure and Regulation Issues
Government bonds have no issues of disclosure, because government bonds have
little credit risk as long as the country exists and people believe that the government does
not lie.517 Unlike central and local governments, corporations have a legal obligation of
disclosure; private profit organizations are capable of lying to people to get illegitimate
profits, and corporate bonds always have the risk of default.
Korean corporations also have the duty of registration.518 Corporate bonds are
regulated by the Financial Supervisory Committee. Corporate bonds cannot avoid
disclosure because the purpose of the disclosure regulations is to protect investors.
However, corporate inflation-indexed bonds have never been issued in Korea, and
investors still have questions about the bonds. Corporate inflation-indexed bonds should
be introduced to Korean financial markets because they can protect retirees and be useful
fund-raising tools for corporations. Therefore, the government and supervision authorities
need to consider mitigating the disclosure regulations for corporate inflation-indexed
bonds. However, such mitigation has to be considered cautiously since it is connected to
investor protection, lack of which may be an obstacle to issuing those bonds. In addition,
even if enacted, the exception should be temporary until corporate inflation-indexed
bonds have taken root in the financial markets of Korea.
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D. Facilitating Development of Inflation Hedge Financial Products
Variable annuities can trace inflation by getting a high level of profit resulting
from investment in equities and real-estate. When stock or real estate markets are in a
booming stage, variable annuities investing in stocks or real estate may get high profits.
They, however, often fail to catch up with the inflation rate, especially during high
inflation.519 Therefore, variable annuities investing in stocks and real estate cannot meet
the goal to secure retirement income.
Variable annuities have the advantage of gaining additional return that exceeds
investor expectations, but they may also suffer losses that can even reduce the principal.
It is possible to establish variable annuities that invest in bonds. However, even such
annuities are not free from the risk of loss, because the value of the annuity account is
evaluated daily by the market price of the financial assets invested for the account.
Therefore, variable annuities are not desirable for investors such as retirement savers who
want a stable income from annuities.
If a variable annuity uses inflation-indexed bonds, the annuity account can
provide investors with a relatively stable income in terms of real return. The
representative example of this is the TIAA-CREF’s Inflation-Linked Bond Account.520
The account is appropriate for investors who want inflation-protected assets because they
are exposed to inflation risk.521 Therefore, retirement savers can take advantage of this
kind of annuity account.
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Variable annuities of the inflation-linked bond account type still have the
weakness of not guaranteeing real return exceeding the inflation rate. This is because the
account is also a type of variable annuity with a value evaluated by daily market prices.522
The account needs more profitable inflation-indexed bonds to get relatively higher
returns. Corporate inflation-indexed bonds can provide variable annuities of the inflationlinked bond account type with an opportunity to gain more returns.523
Korean financial institutions that manage assets for corporate pension plans have
difficulty operating this kind of account, because Korean inflation bond markets are not
yet mature. What is worse is that corporate inflation-indexed bonds have not even been
issued in Korean bond markets. Therefore, Korea should encourage issuance of inflationindexed bonds to support the operation of inflation-linked accounts. The favorable tax
treatments mentioned above need to be adopted by the Korean government in order to
facilitate inflation-indexed bonds.
Variable annuities, whether they are equity-based or inflation-indexed bond-based,
are limited in that they cannot guarantee a return exceeding inflation. This limitation is
eliminated if the account holds inflation-indexed bonds until maturity without selling in
secondary markets. The account then guarantees a return exceeding inflation, and is
called a real-return fixed annuity.524
The real-return fixed annuity guarantees a return exceeding inflation; therefore,
retirement savers and retirees can take advantage of the inflation hedge feature to secure
stable retirement income. Korean financial institutions that operate pension-related
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products should pay attention to the real-return fixed annuity, which is consistent with the
goal of establishing annuities for retirees. In order to introduce these annuities, inflationindexed bond markets in Korea need to be activated. Institutions managing pensions
would not design the real-return annuities unless Korea has lively inflation-indexed bond
markets.
While a real-return fixed annuity is useful for securing retirement income, it also
has the weakness of investors being unable to expect additional return other than the real
return specified in advance. For investors who want additional return exceeding a
guaranteed level of real return, an equity-linked real return annuity is an appropriate
financial product.525
Equity-linked real return annuities invest in equity as well as inflation-indexed
bonds. The purpose of investing in those bonds is to guarantee the principal of the
annuity account, while that of investing in equity is to get additional profits.526 The
account uses the STRIPS scheme to guarantee the principal of the account. It buys
principal components of inflation-indexed bonds to accumulate assets, and purchases
interest components of inflation-indexed bonds to pay the annuity.527 This annuity also
has to be supported by the development of inflation-indexed bond markets.
These inflation hedge financial products described need well-developed inflationindexed bond markets. The Korean inflation-indexed bond market is not yet mature.
Therefore, Korean financial institutions cannot freely design such inflation hedge
products using inflation-indexed bonds, even if they want to introduce those products.
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Thus the Korean government should support the issuance and trade of inflation-indexed
bonds in many areas, especially through tax policy. The government, including financial
supervision authorities, also has to be careful not to heavily regulate the development of
new inflation hedge financial products. Excessive regulation often shrinks
entrepreneurship in the private sector, creating an obstacle to the industry’s development.

E. Providing Default Settings in Defined Contribution Plans and
IRAs
Generally, ordinary workers lack expert knowledge of financial products. They
also lack the time and energy to consider their investment strategies. This is especially
pronounced for low-income workers. Those workers need investment strategy advice, but
employers are reluctant to give investment advice and be actively involved in employees’
investments. The passive attitude of employers stems from the fear that employers will be
blamed for failure of investment strategies. Defined contribution plans, such as 401(k)
plans, place the investment risk on the workers. Accordingly, many workers rely upon
default settings of defined contribution plans.
Pension funds invest in stocks and bonds. Stock investment helps pension funds
gain high return while it risks big losses. Bond investment provides pension funds with
stable investment opportunities. If a retirement saver nears retirement, he should invest in
bonds more than stocks, because older workers do not have sufficient time to compensate
for losses.528 Therefore, default settings of defined contribution plans should be
established according to the age of workers.
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Default settings of defined contribution plans should include inflation-indexed
bonds to protect retirees from inflation risk. The inclusion of those bonds cannot
completely protect the participants from inflation if other financial assets such as stocks
are included in the default setting. Nevertheless, inflation-indexed bonds can reduce the
inflation risk even when other financial products are included in the investment portfolio.
The interest rate of government inflation-indexed bonds is lower than that of
corporate and municipal inflation-indexed bonds. This is because the credit risk of the
central government is much lower than that of corporations or local governments.
Because of the higher interest rate, corporate and municipal inflation-indexed bonds can
give pension funds more returns.
It is also necessary to consider the higher credit risk of corporate and municipal
inflation-indexed bonds. Corporate inflation-indexed bonds particularly require attention
because corporations are exposed to credit risk much more than local governments.
Therefore, when establishing default settings of defined contribution plans, it is desirable
to restrict the credit ratings of corporate inflation-indexed bonds.
Foreign inflation-indexed bonds also can be included in default settings of defined
contribution plans. These bonds give investors an opportunity to benefit from the
difference of yield and prices between two countries, even while they are exposed to
currency risks.529 When it comes to profitability, foreign inflation-indexed bonds help
retirement savers increase a return. Therefore, a default setting designer should consider
inclusion of these bonds. As with corporate inflation-indexed bonds, foreign inflation-
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indexed bonds included in the default setting should have credit ratings exceeding a
certain level.
Inflation-indexed bonds can play a significant role in the success of a default
setting of defined contribution plans. Therefore the inclusion of inflation-indexed bonds
in investment portfolio should be mandatory in the default setting.
Setting the proportion of inflation-indexed bonds is important. Government
inflation-indexed bonds should have the highest percentage because they are the safest
assets that guarantee a real return exceeding inflation. Safety is the most significant factor
for securing retirement income. Corporate and municipal inflation-indexed bonds should
make up the next highest percentage. Foreign inflation-indexed bonds should have the
least percentage because they are exposed to currency risk, and two countries’ inflation
rates may vary.
The Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act requires employers to
provide employees with at least three types of default settings of defined contribution
plans, once or more semiannually.530 Therefore, establishing default settings is the
obligation of employers whose employees adopted defined contribution plans as their
pension plans. One of those settings has to guarantee the principal of the pension
account.531 This provision of Korean law is advantageous for employees who lack expert
knowledge to secure retirement income.
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Korean law also provides for default settings of IRAs. The regulations for IRAs
are the same as for defined contribution plans: three or more default settings532 with at
least one setting guaranteeing the principal of the account.533 Employers in Korea should
consider including inflation-indexed bonds in the investment portfolio of default settings.
The Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act authorized the President to
determine the methods guaranteeing the principal of the defined contribution plans.534
According to the authorization, the Enforcement Decree of the Korea Employee
Retirement Income Security Act provides three methods: (1) guaranteeing by financial
institutions of the principal and interest, (2) investing in government bonds, municipal
bonds and the Bank of Korea’s monetary stabilization bonds, and (3) the method
determined by the Financial Supervisory Committee.535 This default setting guaranteeing
the principal and interest is significant for retirement savers who want stable retirement
income. The second method, investing in risk-free bonds, is desirable in that those bonds
do not have credit risk and provide stable cash flow to investors.
When employers and financial institutions managing the pension assets design a
default setting using risk-free bonds, they need to consider including inflation-indexed
bonds in the default setting. Inclusion of inflation-indexed bonds is needed to maintain
the purchasing power of the account. Therefore, the section 16 of the Enforcement
Decree of the Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act should include inflationindexed bonds in the method of using risk-free bonds. Because the bonds included in the

532

Id. § 25.
Id. § 17.
534
Id.
535
Enforcement Decree of the Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 16
(2006); See pp. 45-46 of this dissertation.
533

165

default setting are risk-free bonds, included inflation-indexed bonds should be
government and municipal inflation-indexed bonds.
However, Korean financial markets still lack the inflation-indexed bonds to
support such default settings of defined contribution plans. Municipal inflation-indexed
bonds have not even been issued in Korean financial markets. Therefore, the mandatory
inclusion of inflation-indexed bonds should be postponed until the bonds have taken root
quantitatively and qualitatively in Korean bond markets. When the Enforcement Decree
calls for the mandatory inclusion of inflation-indexed bonds, it should reflect the default
setting issues mentioned above: for example, the percentage of government and
municipal inflation-indexed bonds.

F. Restricting Preretirement Withdrawal of Pension Benefits and
Loan from Pension Funds
Korean defined benefit plans, like the United States counterparts, do not permit
withdrawal of pension benefits prior to retirement. Whereas the United States defined
contribution plans basically do not allow pre-retirement withdrawal, Korean counterparts
permit participants to withdraw the pension benefits before retirement.536
The Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act provides that pension
benefits cannot be transferable or be a security for debt unless participants are under
exceptional situations that the Enforcement Decree537 and the Enforcement Rule538
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determine.539 Even if a security is allowed, the security has a ceiling determined by the
Labor Minister.540
The Enforcement Decree of the Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act
allows participants to withdraw pension benefits541 prior to retirement or to provide
pension benefits as a security if they fall under one of the following three cases: (1)
purchase of a house by a participant who owns no home; (2) six or more months of
medical treatment of a participant or his/her dependents; (3) others such as natural
disasters determined by the Labor Minister.542
The Enforcement Rule of the Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act
provides that “others such as natural disasters” refers to cases in which participants or
their dependents suffered damages exceeding the level determined by the Labor
Minister.543 The Rule also provides that the limit of the pension benefits provided as a
security is fifty percent of the accumulated assets in the participant’s account, as stated in
the first and second cases of the section 7 of the Korea Employee Retirement Income
Security Act.544 The Labor Minister announces the limit for the third case separately from
the Rule.545 IRAs have the same regulations for pre-retirement and security.546
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If participants satisfy the above conditions, they can withdraw their pension
benefits prior to retirement, or get loans from pension funds with their benefits
collateralized. The purpose of these measures, of course, is to provide participants with a
bailout tool when they suffer hardships. In that sense, loans from pension funds are
acceptable. However, pre-retirement withdrawal comes with problems since pension
benefit accounts are not for temporary living expenses but for securing retirement income.
If workers know that they can withdraw contributions accumulated in their pension
accounts, they may consider the accounts as savings accounts that can be withdrawn at
any time. This effect is not good for pension systems.
Workers sometimes do need money to solve immediate problems. The United
States, even while prohibiting it, often experiences pre-retirement withdrawal of pension
benefits. Many workers who are in danger of foreclosure of their homes, due to the
subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 and 2008, are withdrawing money accumulated in their
401(k) accounts.547 Those who withdraw their pension benefits prior to retirement must
pay penalties and give up the favorable tax treatment. Nevertheless, they chose the preretirement withdrawal instead of taking loans from pension funds.548 This shows that
pension participants are often tempted to make pre-retirement withdrawal. If preretirement withdrawal is permitted, workers would have more difficulties avoiding such
temptation.
There is no question that pre-retirement withdrawal jeopardizes a worker’s
retirement income security. The following statement expresses this clearly: a worker who

547

See Christine Dugas, 401(k) Tapped to Save Homes, USA Today, Mar. 11, 2008, at

548

Id.

1A.

168

withdrew her 401(k) to prevent foreclosure of her home said, “It’s not the kind of thing
you want to use your 401(k) for. And if I keep doing this, I’m not going to have any
retirement savings.”549
The Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act should abolish the
exceptional cases in which workers can withdraw their defined contribution benefits prior
to retirement. If abolishing all of the three exceptions is difficult, the home purchase
exception particularly should be abolished. Koreans spend much money in purchasing
homes: the demand always exceeds the supply in Korean housing markets due to limited
land space and the relatively huge population.550 Therefore, a Korean worker’s first
priority is to purchase a home. Accordingly, many workers are expected to withdraw
their pension benefits prior to retirement to purchase homes, Korean corporate pension
systems take root. Korea should abolish the exceptions, especially the home purchase
exception, before workers take pre-retirement withdrawal of pension benefits as a matter
of course.
Unlike pre-retirement withdrawal, loans from pension funds should continue to
exist because the loans do not extinguish the pension benefits for the worker. However,
limits for the loans should be adjusted in order to prevent workers from abusing the
system.
Since pension systems are for securing retirement income, the pension benefits
need to be spent over a worker’s entire retired life. Workers should prepare for urgent
money needs separately from pension accounts. Workers should save money to purchase
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homes or for medical treatment. Medical treatment savings in particular should be made
through health care programs. Home purchase also should be planned through other
measures, such as effective savings products for home purchase or mortgage programs.

G. Protecting Retirees from Creditors
Participants in Korean defined benefit and defined contribution plans can be
protected from creditors. According to the Civil Execution Act, a creditor can seize up to
half of her debtor’s pension benefits.551 IRAs are also subject to the provision.552 In order
to protect retirees from living a poor retired life, it is necessary to improve retiree
protection from creditors. It is desirable to increase the limit of protecting pension
beneficiaries from creditors. However, this requires a balanced consideration between
retiree protection and the possibility of abusing the protection system. If pension
participants or IRA holders are excessively protected from creditors, those who incur
immoderate debts are likely to transfer their assets to pension plans or IRAs. This
problem is enhanced in Korea, where pensions and IRAs have no limit for benefits and
contributions. Therefore, the limit for seizing pension benefits should be increased
incrementally.

H. Introducing A Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
The United States has a strong retiree protector called the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), established by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1972. The PBGC protects participants in defined benefit plans from losing their
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pension benefits when the payment of benefits by their employers goes into default. In
contrast, Korea has no pension protection organization like the United States PBGC.
Korean law does not require an organization of the PBGC type because it does not want
to give employers the additional burden of paying insurance premiums to the
organization. Employers must pay insurance premiums to the PBGC because the
organization is operated with the premiums, not with tax. The burden of paying insurance
premiums is one cause of defined benefit plans shrinking as compared with defined
contribution plans in the United States.
It is understandable that Korea does not provide for a pension protection
organization because Korea’s defined benefit plans have not yet taken root in Korean
corporate pension systems. Nevertheless, a pension protection organization is needed to
protect defined benefit plan participants from unexpected loss of pension benefits.
Therefore, as pension benefit plans take root in Korea, the government and lawmakers
have to consider establishing an organization like the United States PBGC. Korea
Employee Retirement Income Security Act has to provide for such a corporation if the
insurance premiums and regulations by the pension benefit guaranty corporation no
longer become obstacles to operating the defined benefit plans.

I. Strengthening Supervision of Pension Funds
Appropriate supervision of pension funds is important because the sound financial
status of the funds is essential for retirement income security. Asset management is the
key function of pension funds. First, pension supervision authorities should monitor
whether pension funds comply with the contract concerning default settings provided for
workers. Second, measures should be taken to prevent pension funds from intervening in
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corporate governance. These measures are needed especially for the National Pension
Fund, since the government, which operates the Fund, is likely to intervene in the
management of private corporations, creating an obstacle to the development of Korea’s
economy that is fueled by entrepreneurship.553

J. Introducing Series I Savings Bonds as Complementary Retiree
Protector from Inflation
The United States government issues Series I savings bonds to support savings
free from inflation risk. The bonds are not transferable, and therefore have no secondary
market in which bonds already issued by the federal government are traded between
investors.554 Series I Savings bonds can be significant for retirement income security
because they provide retirement savers with an investment vehicle guaranteeing a real
return exceeding inflation. Retirement savers and retirees may use Series I savings bonds
as a complementary tool to pension plans. Series I savings bonds cannot be traded in the
secondary market555 and cannot be redeemed within five years without the three-month
interest penalty.556 Moreover, Series I savings bonds cannot be used as security for the
performance of an obligation.557 These features are appropriate for financial products
used for retirement income security.
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Korea has no bond with the features of Series I savings bonds. Korea is also short
of financial products that can be used by retirement savers and retirees. Korea should
introduce inflation-indexed bonds of the Series I savings bond type. In order to do so, the
Regulation on State Bonds and Primary Dealers of State Bonds needs to be reformed
because it sets the terms and conditions of Korean government bonds. These government
inflation-indexed bonds would be the first Korean government bonds to focus on
facilitating people’s savings and retirement income security, instead of fund-raising for
the government. Of course, government inflation-indexed bonds with features of the
Series I savings bonds would also be used by the government to raise funds necessary to
finance the government’s business. Nevertheless, these bonds would be a fresh change to
Korean investors because of the bond’s new feature of facilitating individual savings.

K. Clarifying Fee Structure of Pension Funds
If investors invest through financial institutions, they pay fees for the investment
activities of the institutions. Likewise, participants in defined contribution plans or
holders of IRAs must pay fees to the institutions providing retirement saving programs.
The fees are significant for the program providers because they are the source of profits
from operating the investment programs. At the same time, the fees are also significant
for retirement savers because their ultimate rate of return is affected by the amount of the
fees. Even if a retirement saver’s pension provider offers a higher return than other
providers, the saver may get a lower return than participants in other providers’ pension
products if her provider takes a large amount in fees.
Investors tend to overlook fees when they make investment decisions. Yet fees
are significant factors that determine how much the saver gets after completing the
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investment.558 Even a small difference in fees may result in a big difference in benefits
paid to retirees.559 Pension providers often offer free administrative fees that are paid by
employers; they charge high investment fees to compensate for the free administrative
fees.560 A bill to require pension providers to “break out” all the costs was introduced in
the House of Representatives.561 This bill addresses transparency of fee disclosure.
“Transparency” gives investors clear information on their investment and helps them
make “informed choices.”562 Clear information on each specified cost563 is important for
providing investors a basis for informed choices. The total amount of fees is also
significant because retirement savers can easily compare a real rate of return among
many pension products.564
The broken-out fees and the total amount of fees need to be clearly provided by
law in order to support retirement savers in making informed decisions. The Korea
Employee Retirement Income Security Act provides for fees charged by defined
contribution plan providers. Providers must submit to the Labor Minister the rules about
the plan, as required in section 13 of the Act.565 One of the requirements is determined by
the Enforcement Decree. The Enforcement Decree of the Act provides that defined
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contribution plan providers include administrative and investment fees in the rules about
the plan.566 This regulation is all that Korean law provides on fees charged by pension
providers. Therefore, the Act, the Enforcement Decree and Enforcement Rules of the Act
need further provisions for making fees clearer. They need to require pension providers to
offer savers the anticipated broken-out fees and the total amount of fees when the savers
decide to participate in a plan. This clarification would facilitate informed decisions by
retirement savers and contribute to retirement income security.

L. Imposing Excise Taxes on Excess Funds Reverting to Employers
Employers may be tempted to overfund pension benefits because the accumulated
benefits are tax-free. After distributing benefits to employees, employers can get the
remaining benefits. These excess funds reverting to employers cause the reduction of tax
revenue. Thus, in the United States, the employer who obtains additional gains from
overfunded plans must pay excise tax that equals 50 percent of the reverted assets.567 In
contrast, Korea has no similar regulation. Korea has not felt the necessity for it because
Korean corporate pension systems have not yet taken root. However, as time passes,
Korea also will need to restrict the favorable tax treatment employers enjoy when excess
funds revert to employers themselves. Accordingly, Korea should prevent corporations
from abusing the favorable tax treatment, the purpose of which is to facilitate retirement
income security. Korea’s tax law needs to introduce excise taxes on assets reverted to
employers.
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M. Allowing contributions to IRAs
Unlike the United States Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), Korean IRAs do
not permit the account holder to make a contribution to the account. Under Korean
private pension systems, IRAs function as a safe for the benefits already acquired by
retirees. Workers can open IRAs when they receive a lump sum pension benefit.568 IRAs
in the United States can accumulate a tremendous amount of money through additional
contributions made by the account holder. In contrast, Korean IRAs have limited
accumulation because additional contributions are not permitted. This limitation seems
related to Korean individual accounts that can be held by any Korean eighteen years or
older. The holders of Korean individual accounts can enjoy a favorable tax treatment.569
Therefore, the limitation is understandable. However, as the life expectancy of Koreans
grows longer, additional safety nets for retired life will be needed. Accordingly,
contributions to IRAs should be allowed in order to expand opportunities to accumulate
retirement income.
Pre-retirement withdrawal provisions, as mentioned earlier, also need to be
reformed with the view to abolish the exceptions allowing pre-retirement withdrawal. It
is necessary to prevent IRAs from becoming a tool to save for daily life, not retired life.
In order to reflect those measures in law, the Korea Employee Retirement Income
Security Act has to be reformed.
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N. Expanding Support for Asset Management Companies
One of the biggest obstacles to the development of Korea’s financial industry is
excessive regulation. Capital market related businesses, such as securities, futures, asset
management and trust, have been regulated separately, and mixed products have been
difficult to develop. It has been difficult for one institution to deal in diverse financial
products. Developing new financial products is not easy because products that can be
traded are generally listed in a positive system. In order to facilitate a variety of pension
related products, those regulations should be reformed. Pension plan providers need to
develop diverse pension products under a relatively free business environment.
Expanding support for asset management by pension plan providers is essential to give
retirement savers and retirees an opportunity to invest efficiently and effectively.
Therefore, Korea should make a freer environment in which pension providers can
efficiently and effectively manage assets.
Fortunately, Korea enacted in 2007 the Capital Markets and Investment
Banking Act which takes effect in February 2009. The Act introduced the investment
banking business and allows investment banks to offer a variety of capital market
products such as securities, futures and derivatives. Thus, Korea has laid the foundation
of establishing large investment banks in the likes of Goldman Sachs or Merrill Lynch. If
investment banking is well-developed, retirement income security should improve
because it could develop diverse pension products by raising the efficiency and
effectiveness of investment. Along with the enforcement of the Capital Markets and
Investment Banking Act, the government should keep deregulating the asset management

177

industry in order to support the Korean capital market’s development, leading to
improved retirement income security.

O. Strengthening Investor Protection Systems
People are unwilling to invest their money unless they have systems for protection
from unexpected events such as an issuer company’s default or brokerage firm’s
bankruptcy. Retirement savers or retirees are also the same investors who need protection
from unpredicted losses.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) of the United States directly
protects retirement savers or retirees. The necessity for Korea to introduce that kind of
organization has been mentioned in this section. An institution of the PBGC type is not
sufficient to protect Korean retirement savers and retirees from unexpected losses. PBGC
protects participants in defined benefit plans; therefore, participants in defined
contribution plans and IRA holders are short of protection measures. This is why
retirement savers and retirees need additional protection systems.
One of the institutions that can protect retirement savers and retirees is the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). SIPC does not directly protect
retirement savers and retirees, but it indirectly serves as a pension protector by protecting
investors in securities through brokerage firms.570 When an investor’s assets in a
brokerage firm are in danger because of the firm’s bankruptcy or other financial
difficulties, SIPC intervenes and returns cash or securities to the investor.571 In this case,
workers can avoid losses of pension benefits from defined contribution plans or IRAs
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because they can get their cash or securities back through the SIPC. Korea also needs this
kind of institution in order to strengthen the protection of retirement savers and retirees,
as well as of general investors.
Another system that can protect retirement savers and retirees is a strengthened
indenture trustee system. Like SIPC, indenture trustees do not directly protect retirement
savers and retirees. Indenture trustees play an important role in protecting bondholders in
that they monitor issuer companies’ compliance with the indenture, a contract between
the issuer and bondholders.572 In addition, indenture trustees also function as
administrators authenticating bonds and paying the principal and interest.573 Therefore,
indenture trustee systems are essential to protect bond investors, including retirement
savers and retirees.
Under the United States indenture trustee system, an underwriter of a corporate
bond cannot be an indenture trustee of the bond.574 This limitation prevents conflict of
interest between underwriters and indenture trustees. If underwriters also hold the
indenture trustee job, it is easy to neglect protection of bondholders, since as underwriters
they serve an issuer’s interests to get another underwriting job from the issuer in the
future.
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Unfortunately, Korean law has no such a limitation to holding the two jobs
simultaneously.575 Accordingly, underwriters in Korea play the indenture trustee role at
the same time. Because underwriters rarely ask for indenture trustee fees, issuers can save
fees of issuing bonds. As a result, bond issuers in Korea prefer the current indenture
trustee system. However, they have to realize strengthened indenture trustee systems can
save costs in issuing bonds, because strengthened investor protection systems can reduce
the credit risk premiums. Therefore, reforming indenture trustee system is helpful to
issuers as well as to investors. Korea should make a provision in the Commercial Act that
prohibits underwriters from being indenture trustees at the same time.

P. Reforming Employer’s Fiduciary Responsibilities
Employers have fiduciary responsibilities to take care of employees’ pension
plans. This fiduciary responsibility of employers can be the first step for employees’
retirement income security. Although this responsibility does not directly determine the
quality of employees’ retired lives, its indirect influence on retirement income security
cannot be overlooked.
The Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act provides for fiduciary
responsibility with regard to pension plans. However, this provision does not place the
responsibility with employers.576 All the section provides is that pension providers must
take the fiduciary responsibility.577 The Act needs to provide for fiduciary responsibilities
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of employers in order to secure more responsible involvement in employees’ pension
plans.
Additionally, the Act should include more detailed provisions concerning
fiduciary responsibilities. Employers tend to offer employees risk-averse products as
default settings of defined contribution plans, because they do not want responsibility for
losses from relatively high-risk investment.578 Of course, safe investment should be the
first priority among investment strategies for retirement income security, since retirees
have few tools for recovering investment losses. Nevertheless, profitability of pension
products should not be ignored, because profitability is a significant determinant in
investment activities: the more pension benefits, the more comfortable retired life.
Employers need incentives to actively participate in designing pension plans,
especially default settings of defined contribution plans. If the default settings result in
unsatisfactory outcomes for workers, they may raise the issue of their employer’s
fiduciary responsibility. If the fiduciary responsibility is strictly applied to employers,
employers will be reluctant to participate in designing the default settings. If a law
provides that the fiduciary responsibility be reduced when employers participate in
designing default settings, employers will more actively establish appropriate default
settings, including ones that are relatively high-risk/high-return structures.579
The Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act applies fiduciary
responsibilities only to pension providers, but should also add employers’ fiduciary
responsibility. At the same time, it should provide more detailed fiduciary responsibilities
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that reduce that of employers who participate in designing default settings of defined
contribution plans.

Q. Establishing Limits of Benefits and Contributions
Unlike the United States pension plans, Korean defined benefit and contribution
plans have no limit to benefits and contributions. In Korean defined benefit plans,
employers must pay the pension participants over 30 day-wages per one-year work.580 In
Korean defined contribution plans, employers must make a contribution of over 1/12 of
the employee’s annual wage, and there is no limit for benefits received from the plans.581
In the United States, the Internal Revenue Code sets a maximum limit of benefits
of defined benefit plans: benefits in the form of single life annuity cannot exceed the
lesser of $160,000 (indexed for cost of living increases) or 100% of the participant’s
highest three year average of compensation.582 The Code also limits contributions to
defined contribution plans: annual contributions cannot exceed the lesser of $40,000
(indexed for cost of living increases) or 100% of the participant’s compensation.583
Annual contributions include contributions by both the employer and the employee.584
In Korea, defined benefit plans have no maximum limit to benefits, because there
is no provision restricting maximum pension benefits in Korean law. In addition, an
employer’s contributions to defined benefit plans are deducted from the taxable income
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of employees, and there is no limit for the amount of the deductible contribution.585
Therefore, Korean employees, at least theoretically, can enjoy large pension benefits
from defined benefit plans. However, there is a limit in the tax treatment of employers.
Employer’s contributions to defined benefit plans fall under deductible expenses that
reduce the employer’s profit, thereby saving the employer tax.586 The deduction is
allowed only to a limit calculated by subtracting (2) from (1): (1) is the total pension
benefits to be paid if all the employees should retire at the end of the business year, and
(2) is the total contribution paid by the employer until the end of the previous business
year.587 Although this does not directly restrict pension benefits of defined benefit plans,
it can restrict the benefits indirectly. Despite the indirect limitation, Korean employees
can get benefits exceeding normal benefits, the base of which is generally the average
annual income during three years prior to retirement. This is because Korean law does
not provide express limits of benefits from defined benefit plans. This generous benefit
provision may lead to a burden on the government budget. Accordingly, Korea also
should consider establishing a limit to benefits of defined benefit plans.
Employee contributions under Korean defined contribution plans are deductible,
but the deductible contributions cannot exceed three million won.588 If the employee has
individual accounts,589 the limit of contribution for defined contribution plans is reduced
because the three million won limit applies to the sum of contributions to both pension
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products.590 However, Korean defined contribution plans, like defined benefit plans, do
not restrict the limit of contributions of employers.591 This provision of the Korea Income
Tax Act differs from that of the United States Internal Revenue Code, which includes the
employer’s contribution in the total annual contribution subject to the limitation.592 In
addition, Korean corporate tax law recognizes all the contributions by employers in
defined contribution plans as deductible expenses.593
Therefore, the limit of contributions for Korean defined contribution plans is
much more generous than that of the United States counterparts. This generous limit of
contributions, along with the generous limit of benefits of defined benefit plans, may
result in reduction of tax revenue. Accordingly, Korea needs to consider lowering the
limits of benefits and contributions as its corporate pension systems take root in its
society. Korea only introduced corporate pension systems in 2005; therefore, it is
important for Korean corporate pension systems to become significant resources for
workers’ retirement income security. In addition, the development of corporate pension
systems would lead to the development of capital markets and financial institutions. This
development can result in increase in tax revenue. Accordingly, the burden on the
government budget is not the main issue. However, Korea should remember this tax issue
as the volume of corporate pensions grows.
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In the United States, qualified pension plans are one of the largest tax
expenditures in the federal budget.594 This suggests that Korea needs to balance the
development of corporate pension systems with the stability of the government budget.
Korea should consider setting limits to contributions by employers and employees. In the
first stage, the limits should be relatively generous. Afterward, the limits could be
reduced incrementally, taking into account the balance between the settlement of
corporate pension systems and the stability of the government budget.
As corporate pension systems mature in Korea, the Income Tax Act and the
Corporate Tax Act should reflect the balanced tax policy in their provisions.

R. Strengthening Education of Pension Systems and Inflation
Indexed Bonds
Success of a new system or product requires education for participants or
investors. If the public does not understand the system or product, they are unlikely to
participate.
Pension systems are hard to understand because there are many kinds of plans
provided by employers and pension products managed by financial institutions. The
structures of pension systems and relevant products are very complicated. Accordingly,
education is essential for the successful operation of pension systems and relevant
financial products.
The Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act gives employers the
responsibility to educate employees about corporate pension systems at least once a year.
They may delegate the education to pension providers, the financial institutions such as
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banks and insurance companies.595 The Enforcement Decree of the Act details the
required education.596 The details are divided into two parts, for defined benefit plans and
defined contributions plans, and they cover most important factors required for decisionmaking.597 For example, they include contributions by employers and employees,
benefits paid on retirement, methods for asset management, risks and profits of each asset
management method, and matters in the importance of retirement income security.598
With regard to IRAs, the Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act asks
pension providers to educate the account holders at least once a year.599 As with defined
benefit and defined contribution plans, the Enforcement Decree of the Act details the
education required to IRA holders.600 The details are the same as those for defined
contribution plans provided in section 18 of the Enforcement Decree, with one
exception.601 According to the exception, employer contribution under defined
contribution plans is not applicable to the education requirement concerning IRAs.602
This is because Korean IRAs do not permit employer contribution.603 However, this
exception does not apply to education for holders of IRAs provided in section 26 of the
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Act.604 Therefore, the details of the education for IRA holders are the same as those for
defined contribution plan participants if the employer and employee adopt IRAs provided
in section 26 of the Act.
According to section 26 of the Act, an employer that hires nine or less employees
can adopt IRAs as its pension system instead of corporate pension systems, such as
defined benefit plans or defined contribution plans, if the representative of the employees
agrees.605 In this case, the Act deems that the workplace adopted corporate pension
systems.606 This is aimed at reducing the small business owner’s burden of operating
corporate pension systems. This special IRA applies to all the employees once the
employer and representative of the employees agree on the adoption.607 Employees under
the special IRA system cannot choose defined benefit plans or defined contribution plans.
Therefore, the employer does not bear burdens resulting from adopting defined benefit
plans, such as guaranteeing a certain level of pension benefits.
The differences between the special IRAs and the general IRAs are as follows.
First, employers adopting special IRAs have to contribute annually at least 1/12 of the
employee’s annual wage to the employee’s account.608 This employer contribution, an
obligation of employers in corporate pension plans, is not allowed in general IRAs.609
Second, employees may make an additional contribution besides the employer
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contribution.610 This is not allowed in general IRAs, although it is permitted in defined
contribution plans.611 Third, special IRA holders cannot withdraw benefits prior to
retirement.612 The pre-retirement withdrawal is allowed in defined contribution plans and
general IRAs.613
The special IRAs are for employers and employees of small businesses that
cannot afford corporate pension systems. The employees of such workplaces tend to lack
knowledge of investment. Therefore, education concerning retirement income security in
small businesses is more important than in larger businesses. Nevertheless, workers in
small businesses have more difficulty receiving such education, since the small
businesses generally do not lack the time and systems to provide something not essential
for their business operation. Therefore, the government should supervise the small
businesses more thoroughly than larger businesses with regard to the education of
pension systems.
The Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act provides for government
supervision of corporate pension systems.614 The Labor Minister can order employers to
comply with the Act or contracts concerning corporate pension systems.615 In addition,
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the Minister can order employers to discontinue operating their corporate pension plans if
they do not correct violations.616
Unfortunately, the Act does not provide government supervision of IRAs,
including the special IRAs for small businesses. This is because education regarding
corporate pension systems is an employer’s responsibility according to the Act,617 while
education concerning IRAs is a pension provider’s responsibility according to the Act.618
It is understandable that education regarding general IRAs is the responsibility of pension
providers, since general IRA holders already received lump sum pension benefits from
their employers. The general IRA holders in Korean IRA systems are no longer related
with employers. However, special IRA holders are still employees working for employers
responsible for their employees’ welfare.
The special IRA holders working at small businesses need more protection than
other workers, because their working environment is not favorable for retirement
preparation. Accordingly, the law should encourage small business owners to pay
attention to their employees’ retirement income security. The section 19 of the Korea
Employee Income Security Act should also place the responsibility for education on
employers adopting the special IRAs. In addition, the section 22 of the Act needs to
include such employers in those that the government supervises with regard to retirement
income security.
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Even with the issues described, the pension education system is generally
appropriate to Korea. In contrast, inflation-indexed bonds lack education systems that
raise understanding of the bonds, which are still unfamiliar to Korean investors.
The United States government took many opportunities to educate investors about
TIPS by explaining them to investors around the country when they were first
introduced.619 The Korean government also needs to help investors understand the
features and investment consideration of inflation-indexed bonds.
When it comes to government inflation-indexed bonds, the Korean government
should encourage primary dealers to educate investors about KTBi because primary
dealers are in direct contact with investors. In order to do so, Korean government may
use the evaluation of primary dealers as provided in the Regulation on State Bonds and
Primary Dealers of State Bonds to also reflect the effects of such investor education.620
The central government cannot compel education about corporate or municipal
inflation-indexed bonds. Such education belongs to the issuer’s discretion. However, if
education about corporate and municipal inflation-indexed bonds is included in the
mandatory education about pension systems, it will give investors a better understanding
of those bonds. This is also true for the central government inflation-indexed bonds.
Accordingly, education about inflation-indexed bonds needs to be included in pension
system education as provided in the section 18 of the Enforcement Decree of the Korea
Employee Retirement Income Security Act. This would help workers understand both
pension systems and inflation-indexed bonds simultaneously.
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VII.

Conclusion

As life expectancy gets longer, retirement income security is an important issue
for almost all people. The government also cannot ignore this issue, which is critical to
the foundation of its people’s lives. Beyond that, each country’s government now
recognizes retirement income security as one of the most important issues they have to
address. The United States and Korea are certainly not exceptions. The first step toward
retirement income security is public pension systems, such as Social Security in the
United States and the National Pension in Korea. Public pension systems are the
minimum safety net for retirement, and are essential for retirement income security.
Nevertheless, public pension systems are showing their limits in securing retirement
income, because it is harder to maintain their solvency as the ratio of workers to retirees
goes down. The “pay-as-you-go” public pension systems are expected to become heavier
burdens on governments as time goes by; therefore, private pension systems will play a
significant role in securing retirement income.621
Korea resolutely reduced the National Pension benefits by reforming the National
Pension Act in 2007.622 This reform is expected to help the solvency of the National
Pension Fund. At the same time, however, it decreases retirement income from public
pension systems. Therefore, private pension systems in Korea became more important for
retirees. Fortunately, Korea introduced corporate pension systems in late 2005 by
establishing the Korea Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Korean corporate
pension systems, like the United States counterparts, consist of defined benefit plans and
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defined contribution plans. Korean IRAs function as complementary tools for corporate
pension systems. This is also the same as the United States counterparts, although there
are distinctions between the two country’s systems, such as the availability of additional
contributions.623 Another private pension product contributing to retirement income
security in Korea is individual accounts, available to anyone eighteen years or older.624
Korea’s experience of operating individual accounts could help the United States if it
introduces individual accounts as a complement or replacement of the Social Security
system.
Despite the continual improvement of Korea’s pension systems, Korea still has
systems that need reforms to strengthen retirement income security.
To begin, Korea should make every effort for private pension systems to take root
in its society. As the National Pension system goes through reform, the importance of
private pension systems is rising. Still, most workplaces in Korea have not yet adopted
the corporate pension systems introduced in 2005. This is mainly because most major
corporations in Korea use the retirement allowance system unique to the country and
which operates relatively well.625 Nevertheless, the retirement allowance system does not
guarantee the payment of pension benefits upon retirement. Employers under the
retirement allowance system do not need to invest their contributions in financial
products. They satisfy their obligation for benefits if they accumulate a pension benefit
reserve just by book-keeping. This non-funding scheme has a high danger of default of
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the pension benefit payment. Therefore, workplaces in Korea need to introduce the new
corporate pension systems as soon as possible.
The first alternative to the retirement allowance system is defined benefit plans.
Defined benefit plans are more familiar to Korean employers and employees than defined
contribution plans, because defined benefit plans have a structure similar to the
retirement allowance system.626 If defined benefit plans are adopted in lieu of the
retirement allowance system, employees’ retirement income security will improve.
Independent financial institutions would manage the sources of employees’ pension
benefits, keeping their accounts separate from the employers’.
Nevertheless, Korean defined benefit plans have some weak points. They have no
pension payment guarantee organization such as the Unites States Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). This absence of a pension guarantee organizations may
jeopardize Korean workers’ retirement income security. Therefore, Korea needs to
introduce an organization that guarantees pension benefits under defined benefit plans.
Another reform necessary for Korean defined benefit plans is the restriction of
overfunded pension plans by imposing excise taxes on the excess funds reverting to
employers. This restriction is meant to maintain the government’s budget. Korea has no
need for concern about the budget loss for now, because the development of pension
systems could lead to expanding tax revenue. However, Korea will need to restrict the tax
benefit for the overfunded pension benefits as the volume of defined benefit systems
grows.
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Korean defined contribution plans also requires many reforms. Establishing
default settings fit for workers with insufficient knowledge of financial investment is one
of the most important measures. Employers should support the designing of default
settings for defined contribution plans. Employer’s fiduciary responsibilities need to be
reduced so that employers may actively participate in designing the default settings. Even
if workers have good investment environments, such as appropriate default settings,
workers should remember the pension plan’s goal of retirement income security. If
workers forget that goal and withdraw accumulated pension benefits prior to retirement,
pension plans cannot fulfill their function no matter how good the plans may be.
Therefore, Korea needs to abolish the exceptions to the prohibition of pre-retirement
withdrawal of defined contribution benefits. It would prevent workers from considering
pension plans as simple savings accounts.
Another important factor in defined contribution plans is easily overlooked fees
charged by pension providers. Pension providers operating defined contribution plans
must clarify the components of fees and the total fees, and provide accurate fee
information so that workers can make informed decisions in selecting pension products.
Establishing limits to benefits and contributions is another issue for Korea to
consider. It would prevent excessive tax favors from negatively affecting the government
budget management.
Protecting retirees from creditors is also important for securing retirement income.
The protection, however, needs to be restricted so that pension participants cannot abuse
the system.
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Korean Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) need the same support for default
settings and restriction of pre-retirement withdrawal as in defined contribution plans.
Korean IRAs, unlike the United States counterparts, now do not permit the account
holders to make a contribution. The main reason for this is that Korea permits anyone
eighteen years or older to hold individual accounts, which is a kind of individual pension
system qualified for favorable tax treatment. The Korean government should consider
allowing additional contributions from IRA holders so that retirees have an opportunity to
make a considerable amount of income even after retirement.
The support of financial products is critical for pension systems to succeed.
Pension systems are meaningless unless they have financial products in which to invest.
Financial products appropriate for pension funds contribute to the development of
pension systems.
Inflation-indexed bonds are one of the most important investment tools for
retirement savers and retirees. They protect retirees from inflation, which is a major
threat to retirees who have few opportunities to recover losses. Inflation cuts the real
return of a bond. Inflation-indexed bond investors are free from this reduction by
indexing inflation to the principal and/or interest. Government inflation-indexed bonds
are representative among all types of inflation-indexed bonds. They lead the introduction
of inflation-indexed bonds to a country’s financial markets. Therefore, the development
of government inflation-indexed bonds is critical for the development of inflationindexed bond markets in a country.
Korea began issuing its government inflation indexed bonds, KTBi, in 2007.
Therefore, its KTBi market is still small and has many issues to be resolved. Among
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them, Korea should allow its government inflation-indexed bond investors to use the
STRIPS scheme, which would increase the demand for KTBi by satisfying diverse needs
of investors. STRIPS markets can play an important role in annuitizing pension benefits
by separating the principal and interest of inflation-indexed bonds. Derivatives using
inflation-indexed bonds are also expected to expand the demand for KTBi. These
derivatives would also help the development of corporate and municipal inflationindexed bonds, still not issued in Korea. Inflation SWAP in particular would help a
corporation’s smooth financing.627
Favorable tax treatment is also significant in developing inflation-indexed bonds
in Korea. For example, KTBi, unlike the United States TIPS, does not impose income tax
on the increase of the inflation-adjusted principal. This kind of incentive is needed for
Korean corporate and municipal inflation-indexed bonds. The Income Tax Act of Korea
should apply these favorable tax treatments to corporate and municipal inflation-indexed
bonds as well. However, favorable tax treatment also could place a burden on
government budget management. Therefore, the government and legislature should
remember to balance incentives with budget management.
Pension providers should keep trying to develop inflation hedge products, and the
government should support their efforts. The government should support asset
management by pension providers through deregulation and favorable tax treatment.
Aside from the official pension systems, a type of the United States Series I
savings bonds should be introduced to Korean retirement savers and retirees. It would not
be allowed to be traded in secondary markets or be redeemed prior to maturity without
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large penalties, a three-month interest in the case of the United States Series I savings
bonds. The non-transferable feature and the restriction of early redemption would save
workers and retirees the temptation of cashing those bonds until maturity. That type of
government inflation-indexed bonds would serve as a stable investment tool.
Investors in bonds need investor protection systems when they make investment
decisions. This is because they want to be protected from unexpected losses. Issuers can
also benefit from bondholder protection systems because they reduce the credit risk
premiums that compensate for the bond’s credit risk. Indenture trustees are representative
protectors for bondholders because they monitor the issuer’s compliance with indentures
between issuers and investors. In order to strengthen the role of Korean indenture trustees,
the Korea Commercial Act should prohibit underwriters for a bond from also serving as
indenture trustees for the same bond. The restriction prevents conflict of interests.
Organizations such as the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) can also
protect investors in bonds, including inflation-indexed bonds.
Education for pension system participants and inflation-indexed bond investors is
significant for the success of Korean retirement income security systems. Education
raises understanding of the systems, and helps participants and investors make informed
decisions. Korean law should support the education. In particular, the Korea Employee
Retirement Income Security Act should include employers adopting special IRAs in the
employers defined as having responsibility to educate employees about pension
systems.628 If education about inflation-indexed bonds is included in the mandatory

628

See p. 185-88 for details of special IRAs and education thereof.

197

education about pension systems, workers may get a better understanding of both the
bonds and systems.
Pension systems and inflation-indexed bonds as protection for retirement income
security cannot develop independently. They have to interact with each other to get the
synergy effect. Financial markets also play a significant role in protecting retirement
savers and retirees, because they provide pension funds with the place in which to invest
and offer investors opportunities to trade inflation-indexed bonds. Interaction of these
three elements is a critical factor for retirement income security. All three need to
develop by interacting with one another. Such interaction has to be supported by
government policies through relevant laws. The Korean government and legislature
always need to consider the interaction when they adopt policies concerning retirement
income security.
Beside the above reform measures, Korean policy-makers should try to harmonize
retirement income security policies with other policies necessary for managing the
country.
Policies regarding retirement income security belong to social welfare concerns.
The primary purpose of retirement income security is to act as a safety net for social
security. The government conducts tax policy on the basis of tax laws enacted by the
legislature in order to improve social welfare by supporting retirement income security.
Retirement income security policies are closely connected with economic policy.
In terms of macroeconomics, the government controls fiscal policy, which affects the
country’s economy through tax revenue and expenditure, while the central bank conducts
monetary policy, which operates the economy by controlling money supply. Tax policy is
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significant in establishing the foundation of retirement income security: favorable tax
treatment affects employers and employees in their decisions related to retirement income
security systems. On the other hand, tax policy affects the government’s fiscal policy,
because excessive tax benefits area burden on the government’s budget management.
When the government wants to spend tax revenue to stimulate the economy, but has
insufficient tax revenue, it has no choice but to issue government bonds, which cause an
increase in the government’s debt. Therefore, the government should not allow excessive
tax benefits in all policy areas, including retirement income security. If additional
issuance of government bonds is inevitable, inflation-indexed bonds may be used to
support retirement income security. The Korean government should heed the above
considerations in order to harmonize retirement income security with fiscal policy.
The central bank directly affects retirement income through interest rate policy.
Retirees depending on interest income suffer reduced income when the central bank
lowers the interest rate. When the central bank adopts a high interest rate policy, those
retirees can get additional interest income. Interest rate also influences yield and prices of
many financial products, such as bonds and stocks, many of which are included in
pension funds. In this way, monetary policy influences retirement income. Unfortunately,
the central bank does not conduct its policy with a focus on retirement income security,
since its primary policy focus is the country’s macro economy, such as prices and
economic growth.629 Therefore, retirement savers and retirees should consider the central
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bank’s monetary policy. It is important for retirement savers and retirees to establish
portfolios that are not strongly affected by monetary policy. Ordinary workers, however,
lack financial knowledge. In this regard, appropriate default settings are important for
retirement income security.
Policies concerning retirement income security also have aspects of
microeconomics. Financial markets are where market participants such as pension funds
and other investors including retirees trade financial products. Price and yield of financial
products are formed in financial markets. Investors cannot invest effectively unless price
and yield are determined according to economic principles. The government and financial
supervision authorities monitor whether market players comply with rules, preventing
financial markets from being extorted by illegal activities. They take disciplinary actions
against the violation of laws and regulations. The central bank monitors financial market
conditions, and intervenes in markets if necessary. For example, the central bank

Accordingly, the Bank of Korea chose the policy to tighten money supply. Although this was also
the request of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which gave Korea the emergency financial
aid, the Korean government and the Bank of Korea accepted the IMF’s request because the sense
of crisis was enormous concerning the future of Korean economy. Because of the tough policy,
five commercial banks and many small financial institutions closed, and countless corporations
went bankrupt. Numerous workers were laid off and Koreans suffered from the restructuring
processes. However, those restructuring efforts were successful: financial institutions and
corporations escaped the temptation of lax management, and their financial status became sound.
Those improvements set a sound foundation for continuous development of the Korean economy.
While many Koreans suffered from the austere policy, retirees living with interest income
enjoyed the high interest rate era. Retirees, not facing the danger of lay-off, wanted the Bank of
Korea to adhere to the high interest rate policy. However, the policy did not last. The Korean
economy stabilized quicker than expected and prices also stabilized. Therefore, since the early
2000s, the Bank of Korea has shifted to a low interest rate policy to support stable economic
growth. As money supply increased, so did business activities. While the Korean economy has
been full of vitality, retirees have suffered losses of interest income. Many Koreans who have
interest income, particularly retirees, have criticized the Bank of Korea on its low interest rate
policy. But interest rate policy cannot be a tool to protect retirees with interest income. Effective
pension systems and financial products supporting the systems can ease retirement income
worries.
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provides financial markets with additional liquidity if it thinks the lack of liquidity would
disrupt market functions. That is, the government, financial supervision authorities and
the central bank correct market failures. These microeconomic policies enable retirement
savers and retirees to invest with confidence in financial markets.
Retirement income security cannot be achieved without the support of diverse
policies. Issues concerning retirement income security should be viewed from the
perspectives of social and economic policies. In terms of economic policy, both macro
and microeconomic policies are closely related with retirement income security. Along
with social and economic analyses, legal support is also essential. Retirement income
security in this regard is a composite art. The legislature, the government, financial
supervision authorities, the central bank, other relevant organizations and even retirees
themselves should all perform their parts in cooperation.
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